Josh Swiger, a defense lawyer I know and like, has a new piece in Food Safety Magazine today, November 3, 2026, under the title “The Best Defense Against Foodborne Illness Litigation Begins Before an Outbreak.” Josh has spent 25 years defending food companies in national outbreaks. I have spent more than 30 years suing them. On this we agree: by the time a company is served, most of its defense has already been written, in its food safety plan, in the records that show whether anyone followed it, and in the decisions made before the first person got sick. I have one thing to add, and it is the same thing I have been saying since 2002. The only complete defense to a food poisoning lawsuit is food that does not poison anyone. Put me out of business, please.

Josh has worked the defense side for 25 years, and his advice is sound.

Josh is a partner at Weinberg Wheeler Hudgins Gunn & Dial in Atlanta and a past chair of DRI’s Food Law Special Litigation Group. We have spent our careers on opposite sides of the same kind of case, which is probably why his piece reads to me like a very good description of how I win them.

He explains why these cases are hard to defend. Most states hold sellers of adulterated food strictly liable, so a company can be careful and still lose. Once FDA, USDA or CDC ties a product to an outbreak, a jury is hard to move off that conclusion, and the defense usually needs an alternative explanation for the illness that it cannot produce. Jurors take food poisoning personally, because anyone can get it no matter how careful they are. Verdicts are rising, and settlements with them. His example is the one I spent this summer on, the Cyclosporaoutbreak in iceberg lettuce from Taylor Farms de Mexico, which ended with 12,883 sick in 21 states, 570 hospitalized and two dead when CDC closed it on September 11.

His prescription is the right one. Have a robust written plan. Make sure it describes what the company actually does. Hire or consult a qualified food safety professional. Follow the plan and keep the records that prove it. Carry enough insurance. Preserve evidence. Get counsel who know this area before you need them. Do not assume your product is low-risk, because the list of foods that have never caused an outbreak gets shorter every year. His shortest line is his best: “Say what you do, do what you say.”

The plan is rarely the problem. The gap between the plan and the records is where my cases live.

I have read a lot of food safety plans, most of them in depositions. The plan is almost never the problem. Companies write good plans. The problem is in the records: the sanitation log that was filled in from memory, the environmental swab that came back positive and generated no corrective action, the supplier audit that was scheduled and never done, the water test nobody can find. Josh warns that every deviation from the written plan hands opposing counsel a ready-made argument. He is describing my opening statement.

Strict liability means the only complete defense is a product that never made anyone sick.

The part of Josh’s piece worth stopping on is strict liability. In most states, if the food was adulterated and it caused the injury, the seller pays whether or not it was careless. Care is not a defense. Insurance is not a defense; it is a way to pay. The only complete defense is a product that did not make anyone sick, which means the real question is not how to win the lawsuit but how to never generate one.

That is where I would add a line to Josh’s advice. Say what you do and do what you say, and then test to prove it. Test incoming ingredients. Test the plant. Test finished product where the science supports it. Hold product until the results are back, act on every positive, verify suppliers instead of trusting their paperwork, and keep the records. A file that shows contamination found and product destroyed is the best thing a company can hand its lawyer. A file that shows nobody looked is the best thing a company can hand me.

The beef industry took my advice in 2002, and the hamburger cases stopped.

I know this works because one industry did it. In January 1993, hundreds of people were sickened in the Jack in the Box outbreak and four children died. From that outbreak until the ConAgra recall of 18.6 million pounds of ground beef in the summer of 2002, at least 95 percent of my firm’s revenue came from E. coli O157:H7 cases tied to hamburger. On August 4, 2002, I wrote an op-ed for the Denver Post, “Four Steps to Safer Food,”asking for product sampling, mandatory recall authority, lot records and one food safety agency, and asking USDA and the beef industry to put me out of business.

They largely did. FSIS had declared E. coli O157:H7 an adulterant in raw ground beef after Jack in the Box. After ConAgra, the agency made every ground beef plant reassess its controls, and the industry put real money into carcass interventions and test-and-hold. The hamburger cases went from 95 percent of my practice to nearly zero. I have called that the best thing to happen in food safety in my lifetime. It did not happen because the beef industry found a better defense. It happened because there was nothing left to defend.

I said the same thing to the Salinas lettuce and spinach growers in person in February 2007, five months after the Dole spinach outbreak killed five people whose families I represented. Last month, after the largest Cyclospora outbreak in American history, I asked the lettuce industry again. The offer is still open.

Josh’s checklist is my first request for production.

Here is what I want Josh’s clients to take from his piece. Everything on his list, the written plan, the records that show employees followed it, the qualified food safety professional, the supplier verification, the preserved evidence, is also the first thing I ask for in discovery. When those documents exist and say what they should, a case is harder for me to bring and quicker to settle on fair terms. When they do not exist, the case writes itself. A company that does what Josh describes, and tests to prove it, will rarely need Josh at all. I suspect he would be fine with that.

One more thing that is not in his article or in any food safety plan. Go meet someone who got sick from a product like yours. I have been asking executives and regulators to do that for thirty years. It changes how you read your own records.

Josh, nice piece. Send it to every client you have. Then tell them that the cheapest and surest way to never see either of us is to make food that does not make people sick. Put us both out of business, please.

Here we go again

I have been doing this since the Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak in 1993. In the thirty-plus years since, I have heard one defense argument more than any other: “Nobody ever found the bacteria in our food.”It sounds like a good argument. It isn’t. It misunderstands how CDC, FDA and state health departments actually solve outbreaks, and it ignores the most powerful tool public health has ever had for linking sick people together: whole genome sequencing, or WGS.

Here is the short version. WGS tells us which sick people are part of the same outbreak. Epidemiology tells us what they ate. Traceback tells us where that food came from. When those line up, the government names the food, positive food sample or not. And when the traceback from ill people converges on a single farm, plant or supplier, the case gets even stronger.

WGS is DNA evidence for bacteria

Think of WGS as forensic DNA testing for germs. A public health lab takes the Salmonella, E. coli or Listeria cultured from a sick person’s stool or blood and reads essentially its entire genetic code. Isolates that are nearly identical share a recent common source. Period.

CDC’s PulseNet network uses WGS to build those DNA fingerprints and then looks for clusters of matching patterns that signal an outbreak. PulseNet retired the older PFGE method and made WGS its primary surveillance tool, in part because PFGE could lump unrelated strains together. FDA runs a companion network, GenomeTrakr, that sequences bacteria from food, farms and plants and posts them to a public database. A multiagency federal report describes the two systems as complementary tools for linking related pathogens during outbreaks.

Here is what matters in a courtroom: the government’s outbreak case definition is a WGS definition. In the 2022 Wendy’s E. coli outbreak, a case was a person whose isolate was closely related to the outbreak strain by cgMLST, with illness onset in a set window. If your bug matches, CDC has already decided you are part of the outbreak.

And WGS is honest. In the 2015 Blue Bell Listeria outbreak, it added three Texas patients and kicked out a fourth whose isolate did not match. A test that can say “no” is a test whose “yes” means something.

The food is usually gone

A negative food test usually means the contaminated lot is long gone, not that it was ever clean.

  • Time. It typically takes 3 to 4 weeks to determine whether a sick person is part of an outbreak. Lettuce, onions and restaurant ingredients turn over in days.
  • Shelf life. In the 2023 pico de gallo Salmonella outbreak, by the time FDA had enough to name the product, it was past its shelf life. Same with the sprouts in a 2025 E. coli O26 outbreak.
  • Sampling. Contamination is spotty and low-level. A few samples from a later lot or a freshly sanitized plant can easily miss it.
  • Foot-dragging. In the 2018 Yuma romaine outbreak, romaine was implicated in mid-April, but canal water was not sampled until June 4–8. When it finally was, it matched.

CDC admits it doesn’t solve every outbreak because some end before enough information is gathered. Food testing is one of three kinds of evidence it uses, not the price of admission.

How the government actually solves outbreaks

CDC uses three types of data to find an outbreak food: epidemiologic, traceback, and food and environmental testing. It does not need all three, and it names sources on epidemiology and traceback alone all the time. It works like this:

  1. WGS links the people. Genetically matching isolates tell investigators the patients share a source, even if they live in different states and never met.
  2. Epidemiology points to the food. Interviews show what those patients ate, and whether one food shows up far more often than it would by chance.
  3. Traceback points to the source. Investigators follow individual patients’ purchases back up the supply chain, looking for a common point in the distribution chain where the food could have been contaminated.

Now think about what convergence means. Patients in different states, who bought food at different stores and restaurants, all trace back to one grower or one processor. That is not coincidence. That is the answer.

The CIFOR guidelines describe investigations the same way: epidemiology, traceback and environmental assessment, and lab data, integrated. And CDC says it acts when there is clear and convincing information linking illness to a food. That is a higher bar than the more-likely-than-not standard my clients have to meet in a civil case.

The examples, and there are plenty

Every outbreak below was solved by WGS, epidemiology and usually traceback. In none of them did anyone find the outbreak strain in a food sample.

OutbreakPathogenIllnessesWhat tied illnesses to the foodFood and site testing
McDonald’s slivered onions (Taylor Farms), 2024E. coli O157:H7104 in 14 states; 34 hospitalized, 1 death (CIDRAP)80 of 81 interviewed ate at McDonald’s; 63 ate an item with slivered onions; traceback to Taylor FarmsOutbreak strain never found; one onion and one grower sample had a different, non-matching STEC
Grimmway Farms organic carrots, 2024E. coli O12148 in 19 states; 20 hospitalized, 1 death (FDA)26 of 27 interviewed ate carrots; traceback found Grimmway as the common supplierTwo environmental STEC positives did not match (summary)
Pico de gallo, 2023Salmonella Paratyphi B37Epidemiology and tracebackAll samples negative; product past shelf life
Indiana cantaloupe, 2022Salmonella Typhimurium88 in 11 states; 32 hospitalizedEpidemiology and traceback to southwest Indiana melonsSalmonella found on farms and in the packinghouse; none matched
California peaches, 2020Salmonella Enteritidis101 in 17 states; 28 hospitalizedEpidemiology and traceback to one large growerNo sample matched
Sprouts, 2025E. coli O26:H1110Interviews and tracebackNone available; past shelf life
Evergreen Fresh sprouts (Idaho), 2011Salmonella Enteritidis25 in 5 states69% of early cases ate sprouts vs. a 4.4% background rate; traceback to one growerEverything tested negative

McDonald’s is the textbook case. FDA said flatly that the outbreak strain was not found in onion or environmental samples, yet epidemiology and traceback showed the recalled onions were the likely source. Taylor Farms recalled. McDonald’s switched suppliers. New cases stopped once the Quarter Pounder came off the menu. Grimmway played out the same way a month later.

Even when the ingredient stays uncertain, WGS still ties the victims to the place. In the 2022 Wendy’s outbreak, WGS identified 109 sick people in six states. More than 80% of those interviewed ate at Wendy’s, and 46 of 68 with detailed histories ate romaine on sandwiches. Traceback never converged on one grower, so CDC did not confirm the romaine. Nobody seriously argued the illnesses came from somewhere other than Wendy’s. And the outbreak strain was closely related to a 2021 spinach outbreak strain, pointing right back at leafy greens.

When the match finally shows up, it lands right where WGS said it would

Sometimes investigators do eventually find the outbreak strain in a field, a canal or a plant. When they do, it confirms what WGS and traceback already told us, sometimes years earlier.

The match was never what made the case. It just proved the science right, again.

What this means for people who got sick

If your isolate is a WGS match to an outbreak strain, and epidemiology and traceback point to a food, you have the same proof the government uses to order recalls. Demanding a positive leftover on top of that asks more of a sick child’s family than CDC and FDA ask of themselves.

Courts get this. In Patterson v. Kevon, LLC (Ga. 2018), the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the idea that food poisoning plaintiffs carry a heavier summary judgment burden than anyone else. In Goldman v. Chop’t Creative Salad Co. (N.Y. App. Div. 2024), negative supplier tests and no other sick diners were circumstantial and not dispositive, and the case moved forward.

Those cases did not even involve an outbreak. WGS adds what older cases lacked: objective, molecular proof that my client’s bacteria came from the same source as dozens of others. When those others all trace back to one supplier, the defense is left arguing that genetically identical infections across multiple states share some cause other than the one food everyone ate.

If you get sick in an outbreak:

  • Get a stool test. No isolate, nothing to sequence.
  • Talk to the health department. Your food history and receipts drive the epidemiology and traceback.
  • Keep everything. Leftovers, packaging, receipts, loyalty card records. A positive sample isn’t required, but it never hurts.

The genome doesn’t lie. Neither does a traceback.

Sources

In 2026 Nara Organics sold its formula as a “European-made” product, manufactured in Germany. But the milk inside those cans started on California dairy farms. It was the same organic milk, from the same supplier, dried by the same cooperative, that FDA tied to the ByHeart infant botulism outbreak in November 2025.

That is the story of the second infant formula botulism outbreak in seven months. It is a supply chain that crossed an ocean twice and passed through six companies before it reached a baby’s bottle. Below, I walk through each link in that chain, what FDA has found so far, and what is still unanswered.
 
The outbreak
 
Four infants in California, Pennsylvania and Washington were hospitalized with type A infant botulism after drinking Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic Powdered Infant Formula. All four fell ill in April and May 2026, all four were boys under five months old, and all four were treated with BabyBIG.
 
FDA and CDC contacted Nara late on Friday, June 12. Nara recalled every lot the next day, calling it a step taken “out of an abundance of caution.” On July 6, FDA reported that an opened can of Nara formula from one sick baby’s home tested positive for Clostridium botulinum.
 
On August 27, FDA declared the outbreak over and released its key supply chain finding. The Nara lots linked to the illnesses were made with milk from Organic West Milk Inc. and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America — the same two suppliers behind the ByHeart botulism outbreak. Whole genome sequencing also matched an infant who drank Nara formula to the ByHeart outbreak. FDA concluded that the two outbreaks share a common source of contamination.
 
The ByHeart outbreak
 
Nara was the second infant botulism outbreak. The first, linked to ByHeart Whole Nutrition infant formula, was far larger. When CDC declared it over on February 26, 2026, it counted 48 infants with infant botulism — 28 confirmed and 20 probable — in 17 states. All 48 were hospitalized. No deaths were reported.
 
California’s Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention Program spotted the problem in early November 2025, after an unusual rise in cases among babies fed ByHeart. ByHeart first recalled two lots, then every ByHeart product days later. Because illnesses traced back as far as December 2023, CDC widened its case definition to cover any infant with botulism exposed to ByHeart since the formula launched in March 2022.
 
Testing found C. botulinum in opened and sealed ByHeart cans, in ByHeart’s base powder, and in organic whole milk powder. FDA identified 17 different strains of the bacteria across patients, product and ingredients. The milk powder came from Organic West Milk and was dried at Dairy Farmers of America’s plant in Fallon, Nevada, where FDA itself collected two matching isolates.
 
The link between Nara and ByHeart
 

FDA has tied the two outbreaks together in three ways.

  1. Same milk. The Nara lots linked to illness were made with organic whole milk from Organic West, ByHeart’s milk supplier.
  2. Same dryer. That milk was spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America, the same processor that dried ByHeart’s milk powder.
  3. Same bacteria. Whole genome sequencing matched a Nara baby’s C. botulinum to bacteria from a ByHeart baby, from ByHeart’s base powder and from sealed ByHeart cans.

From that evidence, FDA concluded that the two outbreaks share a common source of contamination. Put plainly, it appears to be one contamination problem in one supply of organic whole milk powder, sold under two brands. ByHeart’s babies got sick first; Nara’s babies got sick after ByHeart’s recall, because no one had connected Organic West’s milk and Dairy Farmers of America to Nara’s formula.

The common thread is whole milk. Many U.S. infant formulas are built on skim milk with added plant oils. ByHeart and Nara both broke from that model, and both sold parents on whole milk as the reason to pay a premium. That selling point is exactly where the two outbreaks meet: organic whole milk powder was the ingredient they shared, and it is where FDA found C. botulinum. Brands built on that ingredient had every reason to test it for spores.

ByHeart sent its customers to Nara

The connection is not only on paper. When ByHeart recalled all of its formula in November 2025, it pointed its customers to Nara. A November 11, 2025 ByHeart Instagram post recommended Nara products and offered a 20 percent discount code to help families make the switch. ByHeart deleted the post in June 2026, after Healthbeat asked about it, saying it removed the post for safety reasons following the Nara news.

ByHeart says the two companies have no corporate, financial, contractual or manufacturing relationship. But parents who followed ByHeart’s advice moved their babies from one whole milk formula to another that, FDA later found, was made with milk from the same suppliers. The ByHeart recall took one brand off the shelves. It did not take that milk out of the formula supply.

From California dairy to Nara can

Piecing together FDA’s findings, U.S. Customs records and reporting by Food Safety News, eFoodAlert and the Associated Press, the milk traveled this route:

Nara Organics formula supply chain · farm to infant

The milk crossed the Atlantic as powder, became formula in Germany, was canned in Denmark, and came back to the United States under the Nara label. One link — how the powder got from DFA to Elb-Milch, and who sold it — has not been made public.

The branch to ByHeart matters. In January 2026, the AP reported that the organic whole milk powder that tested positive in the ByHeart outbreak came from Organic West milk dried at DFA’s plant in Fallon, Nevada. FDA’s Nara findings name the same two companies. C. botulinum spores survive pasteurization, so contamination that enters at the milk or drying stage can ride all the way into the finished can.

The incomplete customer list

The most troubling fact in FDA’s report is this. During the ByHeart investigation in late 2025, FDA ran a traceforward to learn whether Organic West sold milk to any other powdered infant formula maker. According to FDA, Organic West gave the agency an incomplete customer list — one that did not show its milk was going to the manufacturer of Nara’s formula.

In January 2026, an owner of Organic West told the Associated Press that the company had not sold organic whole milk powder to any infant formula maker other than ByHeart.

Meanwhile, Nara kept importing formula made with that milk. U.S. Customs records show shipments from Elb-Milch through April 30, 2026. The four Nara babies got sick in April and May. Had FDA known in late 2025 that Organic West’s milk was also going into Nara cans, those babies might never have been exposed.

Nara should have asked

Organic West’s list was not the only safeguard that failed. Nara had its own reasons to ask hard questions, and months to ask them.

ByHeart was Nara’s closest competitor: a premium organic whole milk formula sold to the same parents. When ByHeart recalled every can in November 2025, and FDA traced the problem to contaminated organic whole milk powder, every whole milk formula brand in the country should have asked one question: where does our milk powder come from?

Nara knew spore-forming bacteria were a risk. It told customers it had screened for clostridia from its very first batch. A company that understood that hazard, and watched its nearest competitor’s outbreak trace back to milk powder, should have checked whether its own formula used the same milk or the same dryer.

If Nara asked, it either learned it shared ByHeart’s supply chain and kept selling, or it got an answer it did not verify. If it never asked, that is its own failure. Either way, Nara kept importing formula made with that milk until April 2026 — five months after the ByHeart recall — and four more babies got sick.

What we still don’t know

  • Where the spores got in. FDA says there is not yet enough evidence to tell whether the milk was contaminated before drying or during it.
  • Which DFA plant dried Nara’s milk. ByHeart’s powder was dried at DFA’s Fallon, Nevada plant. FDA’s Nara findings name DFA but not the plant.
  • Who sold the powder to Germany. Organic West resold the dried powder to ByHeart. Whether it, DFA or a broker sold the powder to Elb-Milch has not been made public.
  • Who chose U.S. milk. Nara marketed EU standards. Whether Nara or Elb-Milch decided to use U.S. organic whole milk powder is unknown.
  • What anyone tested. Did Elb-Milch or Nara test incoming powder for C. botulinum spores after the ByHeart recall became public?

Why it matters

Parents who paid a premium for Nara bought a promise of European safety standards. What they got was formula built on the same California milk powder that had already sickened babies through ByHeart. A “Made in Germany” label told them where the formula was mixed, not where its main ingredient came from.

This outbreak also shows how little the system knows about who supplies whom. FDA asked the right question in 2025 and, by its own account, got an incomplete answer. Infant formula supply chains should not depend on a supplier’s voluntary customer list. Ingredient sourcing should be traceable, and whole milk powder destined for infant formula should be tested for C. botulinum spores.

That is why I am filing a citizen petition with FDA, joined by 46 parents of 24 infants sickened in the ByHeart and Nara outbreaks. It asks FDA to add C. botulinum and the other botulinum toxin-producing clostridia to the required tests for powdered infant formula, to require that every lot of whole milk powder and other dairy ingredients test negative before it is used, and to require formula makers to keep records tracing each ingredient lot back to its dryer and its dairy farms. Had those records been required, the shared supply chain would have been sitting in Nara’s files when ByHeart sent its families there.

References

WHAT IS INFANT BOTULISM AND CLOSTRIDIUM BOTULINUM?

Clostridium botulinum is an obligate anaerobic, spore-forming, Gram-positive bacillus whose primary, native habitat is the soil.[1] It thrives in low-oxygen environments and produces botulinum neurotoxin, one of the most lethal biological substances known. The spores themselves are widespread in the environment and harmless to most older children and adults, but the toxin the bacteria produce attacks the nervous system and causes botulism, a severe paralytic illness.

Types of Botulism:

  • Foodborne: Caused by eating foods contaminated with the toxin, often from improper home-canning or poorly preserved foods.
  • Infant: Occurs when babies (under one year old) ingest the bacterial spores, which then germinate and produce toxins in the gut. This is why honey should never be given to a child under one year old. Contaminated powdered infant formula has now been identified as a second avoidable vehicle.
  • Wound: Happens when C. botulinum spores infect a cut or wound and produce toxins, commonly associated with the use of contaminated injection drugs.
  • Iatrogenic Botulism: A rare type that occurs if too much botulinum toxin is injected for cosmetic purposes (like wrinkle reduction) or medical conditions (like migraines).
  • Adult Intestinal Toxemia: An extremely rare condition in older children and adults where spores colonize the intestinal tract and produce toxin (like infant botulism).

A.  Where Does Clostridium Botulinum Come From?

1.  Soil and Sediment: The Ultimate Natural Reservoir

Landmark environmental surveys dating back over a century have established that viable C. botulinum spores reside in ground soils, dust, and aquatic sediments across every continent where they have been sought. The distribution of specific toxin types in infant botulism cases typically reflects the geographic prevalence of those strains in the local soil. For example, in the United States, Type A spores are predominantly found in the western states, while Type B spores are more densely concentrated in the eastern and mid-Atlantic states. Because spores are highly resistant to environmental stressors (such as drying, heat, and UV light), they easily become airborne. Dust inhalation or ingestion is now considered a primary and largely unavoidable exposure route.[2] Epidemiological studies have associated infant botulism cases with residence in windy or dusty locations, as well as proximity to dust-generating activities.

2.  Honey: The Longest-Recognized Identifiable and Avoidable Food Source

While environmental exposure is largely unpreventable, honey has long been recognized as the most significant avoidable foodborne vehicle for C. botulinum spores.[3] C. botulinum is not a disease of the honeybee. Instead, honey becomes an accidental repository when bees carry environmental dust, water, or pollen contaminated with spores back to the hive.[4] Because honey is typically consumed raw (unpasteurized and non-irradiated), and because bacterial spores are uniquely structurally adapted to survive low-moisture environments, the dormant spores remain viable inside the honey matrix indefinitely. Globally, about 4% of retail honey specimens test positive for Clostridium botulinum spores, though regional rates vary widely. While some localized surveys find no spores, others report contamination rates as high as 10% to 20% depending on the source and processing methods.[5]

3.  Powdered Infant Formula: A Newly Documented Vehicle

Until recently, honey was the only food widely recognized as a source of C. botulinum spores in infants. That changed in 2025. Beginning in November of that year, FDA and CDC investigated a multistate outbreak of infant botulism among infants fed ByHeart Whole Nutrition powdered infant formula; the outbreak closed with 28 confirmed and 20 probable cases, and C. botulinum was detected in an open can of the formula, in unopened cans from a lot fed to a patient, and in the base mix used to make the product. In June 2026, a second outbreak was linked to Nara Organics powdered infant formula, with four confirmed cases in California, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Both brands’ formulas were made with milk from the same supplier, spray dried by the same processor. Powdered infant formula is not a sterile product, and the heat used in its manufacture does not reliably destroy bacterial spores. Because detection of C. botulinumin powder is scientifically difficult, FDA has cautioned that a negative test does not rule out the presence of the organism in a product.[6]

B.  Infant Botulism and Clostridium botulinum

Infant botulism is a rare but serious paralytic illness of babies, usually affecting infants younger than one year. It is caused when an infant swallows spores of Clostridium botulinum, or rarely related toxin-producing Clostridium species, and those spores survive, germinate, and multiply in the immature intestine. The bacteria then produce botulinum neurotoxin inside the infant’s gut. In plain terms, the baby does not simply ingest a “germ”; the infant’s bowel becomes the place where the toxin is made.[7] [8]

That mechanism is what separates infant botulism from classic foodborne botulism. In foodborne botulism, a child or adult typically swallows toxin that has already formed in contaminated food. In infant botulism, the infant swallows spores, and the toxin is produced after the spores colonize the intestine. Infants are uniquely vulnerable because their gut microbiome, bile-acid profile, immune defenses, and intestinal motility are still developing, and they do not yet have the mature protective intestinal flora that usually prevent C. botulinum spores from gaining a foothold in older children and adults.[9] [10] Infant botulism is the most commonly reported form of botulism in the United States, accounting for roughly 70% of all reported botulism cases, or about 100 to 150 cases in a typical year. Approximately 90% to 95% of cases occur in infants under six months of age, with a median age at onset of about four months. Most cases are caused by toxin type A or type B.[11] Because such spores are so widespread in the environment, in many individual cases the exact source is never identified.[12]

C.  Signs and Symptoms in Infants

Infant botulism often begins subtly and then progresses over hours to days. Constipation is commonly one of the earliest signs, followed by poor feeding, weak suck, weak or altered cry, drooping eyelids, diminished facial expression, reduced gag reflex, poor head control, generalized hypotonia, lethargy, and respiratory difficulty. CDC’s clinical overview specifically lists constipation, poor feeding, ptosis, sluggish pupils, flattened facial expression, diminished suck and gag reflexes, weak or altered cry, and respiratory difficulty or arrest as typical findings.[13] Common signs include:

  • Constipation, often for several days;
  • Poor feeding, with weak sucking and swallowing;
  • A weak, altered, or soft cry;
  • Drooping eyelids (ptosis), sluggish pupils, and reduced eye movement;
  • Generalized weakness and low muscle tone—the classic “floppy baby”;
  • Lethargy and a diminished gag reflex; and
  • Breathing difficulty, progressing in severe cases to respiratory failure—the most dangerous complication.

Because these early signs mimic more common conditions, a high index of suspicion matters. A baby with poor feeding, a weak cry, and increasing floppiness—especially with any breathing difficulty—needs urgent evaluation.[14]

D.  Botulism in Older Children and Adults

The same toxin can cause serious illness in older children and adults, but the exposure pattern is different. Foodborne botulism occurs when a person eats food in which toxin has already formed, classically improperly canned, preserved, fermented, or stored low-acid foods. Wound botulism occurs when spores contaminate a wound and produce toxin in devitalized tissue; in modern U.S. practice, this is often associated with injection-drug use. Iatrogenic botulism can occur after excessive or improperly administered therapeutic or cosmetic botulinum toxin. Adult intestinal colonization botulism is rare but can occur when the adult gut is altered by surgery, antibiotics, bowel disease, or other disruptions.[15] [16]

In non-infant botulism, symptoms often begin with cranial nerve findings such as blurred or double vision, drooping eyelids, slurred speech, difficulty swallowing, dry mouth, and facial weakness. Weakness then typically descends symmetrically from the face and neck to the arms, trunk, and legs. Patients are usually awake and afebrile, and sensation is usually preserved, which can make the paralysis especially frightening. Severe cases require intubation and mechanical ventilation. Id.

E.  Diagnosis and Laboratory Detection

Botulism is first and foremost a clinical diagnosis. Laboratory confirmation is important, but treatment should not wait for test results when the clinical picture is concerning. CDC’s 2021 clinical guidelines emphasize that timely diagnosis is crucial because antitoxin is the only specific therapy and should be administered as quickly as possible. Because the antitoxin works best when given early, clinicians treat as soon as infant botulism is reasonably suspected.[17]

For infants, definitive testing usually requires stool or enema specimens, which can be tested for botulinum toxin and cultured for C. botulinum. Testing is specialized and is generally coordinated through state public health laboratories, CDC, and the California Department of Public Health Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention Program. CDC advises that this specialized testing often takes days and that clinicians should not delay BabyBIG treatment while awaiting confirmation.[18]

In outbreak investigations, public health laboratories may also test leftover foods, unopened products, ingredients, environmental samples, and bacterial isolates from patients. Whole-genome sequencing can compare isolates from patients, products, and ingredients to determine whether they are genetically related. In the 2025 ByHeart outbreak, that genetic comparison was central because isolates from clinical samples, finished formula, and the base mix used to make it clustered together. In the 2026 Nara Organics outbreak, sequencing tied a clinical isolate from an infant fed one brand of formula to a clinical isolate, a base powder sample, and four samples of unopened cans of a different brand. FDA concluded that the matching sequences, together with the supply-chain commonalities, indicated a common source of contamination between the two outbreaks, while stating that it still could not say whether the milk was contaminated before or during spray drying. There is yet no standardized method for detecting C. botulinum or its spores in powdered formula, and only a limited number of laboratories perform the testing. The FDA’s outbreak workflow enriches a 200-gram sample for up to five days, screens the enrichment by quantitative PCR, and confirms positives by mass spectrometry for active toxin and by whole genome sequencing; the FDA describes that workflow as interim, pending method validation and approval.[19] [20]

F.  Treatment

Infant botulism is highly treatable, and the great majority of babies recover fully. Care rests on two pillars: specific antitoxin and supportive care.[21] Treatment has two parts: neutralizing circulating toxin and supporting the patient while nerves recover. For infants, the specific treatment is human botulism immune globulin intravenous, known as BIG-IV or BabyBIG. BabyBIG is FDA-approved for infant botulism types A and B and is obtained in the United States through the Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention Program. The treating physician contacts the program for immediate consultation; if the presentation supports infant botulism, BabyBIG is released and treatment begins without waiting for final laboratory confirmation.[22] [23]

The evidence for BabyBIG is strong. In a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled California trial of 122 infants with laboratory-confirmed infant botulism, reported in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2006, treatment within three days of hospital admission reduced mean hospital stay from 5.7 weeks to 2.6 weeks. It also reduced ICU time, mechanical ventilation time, tube or intravenous feeding time, and hospital charges. In plain language, BabyBIG does not instantly make the baby well, but it stops additional circulating toxin from binding and can substantially shorten the illness.[24]

Supportive care is equally important. Infants may need close ICU monitoring, respiratory support, mechanical ventilation, suctioning, prevention of aspiration, nutritional support through nasogastric or other tube feeding, bowel care, occupational therapy, feeding therapy, physical therapy, and careful discharge planning. Antibiotics are generally not used to treat infant botulism itself because bacterial killing in the gut may increase toxin release; aminoglycosides and certain other medications that impair neuromuscular transmission are avoided because they can worsen weakness.[25]

For older children and adults with suspected foodborne, wound, or other non-infant botulism, the specific antitoxin is generally heptavalent botulinum antitoxin, obtained through public health authorities and CDC. As with infants, antitoxin should be given as early as possible, because it neutralizes toxin that has not yet bound to nerves. Wound botulism also requires wound evaluation and debridement, and antibiotics may be used for wound infection after antitoxin decisions are addressed.[26] [27]

G.  Prognosis, Recovery, and Complications

With prompt recognition, BabyBIG, and modern intensive care, most infants survive and recover. That favorable long-term prognosis, however, should not obscure the severity of the acute illness, which is frightening, often protracted, and frequently requires weeks of intensive hospital care. The recognized complications include:

  • Respiratory failure, apnea, and aspiration—the principal reason a ventilator may be required (on average roughly three weeks when needed);
  • Prolonged feeding difficulty—safe oral feeding can take many weeks to return;
  • Autonomic effects such as urinary retention, and secondary infections (e.g., pneumonia, ear infection) acquired in the hospital;
  • Prolonged general weakness during recovery.[28] [29] [30]

A baby with infant botulism may spend days to weeks unable to feed safely, protect the airway, or breathe without support. Families may experience a prolonged hospitalization, transfer to a tertiary children’s hospital, repeated testing, feeding-tube dependence, ventilator care, and months of follow-up.[31] In the 2025 ByHeart-formula outbreak, CDC EIS preliminary data found that approximately two-thirds of evaluated infants required post-hospitalization physical therapy or feeding support.[32] Reasonable follow-up commonly includes primary care, neurology as needed, feeding or speech therapy, physical and occupational therapy, nutrition monitoring, developmental surveillance, and assessment for residual weakness, dysphagia, oral aversion, motor delay, or caregiver trauma. Id. Lasting neurological after-effects are seldom seen, and most infants regain normal strength and development; severe long-term harm is rare. Follow-up with neurology and physiotherapy is advisable after a severe episode.[33]

THE 2026 NARA ORGANICS INFANT FORMULA BOTULISM OUTBREAK

A.  Extraordinary Circumstances

Infant botulism is normally sporadic; bacterial spores are widely present in soil and dust around the country and therefore may cause sporadic, random infections. A multistate outbreak of infant botulism tied to a manufactured product is therefore unusual,[34] and until 2025, it had never happened. According to the FDA, the 2025 ByHeart outbreak was the first botulism outbreak tied to infant formula in the United States since the infection was first described about fifty years ago.[35] The Nara Organics outbreak of 2026 is the second, and it followed the first by seven months. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concluded that epidemiologic, traceback and laboratory evidence showed that Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic Infant Formula was contaminated with C. botulinum and made infants sick, and that the data indicate a common source of contamination in the Nara Organics outbreak and the 2025 ByHeart outbreak.[36]

B.  What Makes Formula Vulnerable

Powdered infant formula is not sterile, and the pathogens usually tested for (such as Cronobacter and Salmonella) do not form spores and are killed by pasteurization. Spore-forming bacteria, like C. botulinum, are different: their heat-resistant spores can survive normal processing. The 2025 ByHeart botulism outbreak prompted the FDA and international food-standards bodies to begin a formal risk assessment of spore-forming organisms in powdered infant formula. At the Reagan-Udall Foundation’s July 2026 roundtable, a Cornell University dairy microbiologist described spores as ubiquitous in soil, manure, bedding and silage, tracing the routes by which they move from those sources to the cow’s teat and into bulk tank milk, noted that weather may be significant to spore transmission on organic dairy farms when cows are on pasture, and cautioned that processing technologies such as bacterial centrifugation and microfiltration can meaningfully reduce spore loads but are not a complete solution.[37]

Related findings in soft, high-moisture dairy products, such as Italian mascarpone cheese, and in raw milk associated with bovine botulism confirm that C. botulinum can and does contaminate the dairy matrix when conditions allow.[38] It is becoming apparent that dried milk product, such as infant formula, is equally vulnerable to contamination. The studies significant to the link between botulism and infant formula, beyond the current outbreaks, are summarized below:

SourceWhat was testedKey finding
Nadala et al., Front. Microbiol., 2026 (USA)Unopened formula containers and bulk “base powder” (formula before packaging)C. botulinum found in both finished product and base powder, even where the usual indicator organism was non-detectable, so standard screening would have missed it.
Brett et al., J. Med. Microbiol., 2005 (UK, 2001 case)14 home foods from a 5-month-old with infant botulismType B C. botulinum recovered from an opened can of infant formula milk powder; two product isolates matched the infant’s isolate by the molecular typing methods then available.
Luo et al., Chinese J. Food Hygiene, 2023 (China)30 batches of infant formula milk powder from a company tied to a botulism caseWhile its toxin was not detected directly, C. botulinum (type B) was isolated from one batch of milk powder.
Barash et al., J. Pediatr., 2010 (USA)30 patient-used formula samples and nine market-bought formulasClostridium spores in 17% of patient-used and 78% of market formulas — but none were C. botulinum (they were related Clostridium species).

Full citations for the studies above appear at notes 41, 43 and 44, infra.[39]

The literature also establishes both the historical rarity of C. botulinum in commercial dried milk and formula, and the singular significance of the 2025 and 2026 outbreaks:

  • Until 2025, C. botulinum was essentially never found in commercial dried milk or formula. Dedicated surveys, including nonfat dry milk, evaporated milk, and canned formula, historically tested negative.[40]
  • Fluid and raw milk have been found to sometimes carry the organism and toxin due to bovine botulism, and these spores also survive pasteurization, although pasteurization strongly degrades pre-formed toxin.[41]
  • Earlier formula links were single cases with caveats. A 2001 United Kingdom case and a 2023 Chinese investigation each recovered the organism from formula milk powder, but causation was never firmly proven.[42]
  • The 2025 ByHeart outbreak is the turning point and the strongest evidence of milk-powder risk to date. Whole-genome sequencing tied type A C. botulinum in organic whole milk powder to the strain in finished formula and to the strain in sick infants across multiple states.[43]
  • The 2026 Nara Organics outbreak extended the above link to a second brand: an infant who had never consumed ByHeart formula carried a strain indistinguishable from the one in ByHeart’s sealed cans and base powder, with the shared milk powder as the only common element.[44]

In short, across decades of research, C. botulinum in commercial dried milk or formula was always possible but rarely detected until 2025. That rarity of detection is precisely what makes the clear and complete genetic evidence in these recent outbreaks so revealing of the products’ defective and adulterated condition.

C.  The Outbreak Summary

On Friday, June 12, 2026, the FDA and CDC contacted Nara Organics with information about three infants in California, Washington, and Pennsylvania who had been hospitalized with infant botulism after consuming Nara formula. Nara initiated a recall of every lot on the market that day and announced it the next. A fourth case was added in July, and on August 27, 2026, the CDC declared the outbreak over.

Outbreak Summary Facts
FeatureSummary
ProductNara Organics Whole Milk Organic Powdered Infant Formula, 700g (UPC 860013251901) and 400g (UPC 860013251918); manufactured in Germany; sold nationally through Target retail stores, Target.com and Nara.com from July 2025 to June 2026; not distributed outside the United States
Case Count (final)4 infants, all confirmed; no cases added after the July 6, 2026, update
StatesCalifornia (2), Pennsylvania (1), Washington (1)
OutcomesAll 4 infants hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG; no deaths reported
Illness OnsetApril 20, May 17, May 20 and May 31, 2026
Investigation StatusCDC declared the outbreak over on August 27, 2026; FDA’s root cause investigation remains open
Toxin TypeType A
Laboratory EvidenceC. botulinum detected in an open can of Nara formula fed to one of the ill infants; whole genome sequencing of the Washington infant’s (I.N.’s) clinical isolate was closely related (5 SNPs) to a clinical isolate from the 2025 ByHeart outbreak, a ByHeart base powder sample, and four samples of unopened cans of ByHeart formula
SourceThe Nara lots linked to illness were made with organic whole milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America — the same suppliers implicated in the 2025 ByHeart outbreak; FDA concluded the sequencing match and the shared supply chain indicate a common source of contamination between the two outbreaks; FDA has not determined whether the milk was contaminated before or during drying, and its incident summary states that the evidence was not sufficient to confirm the sources and routes of contamination
RecallInitiated June 12 and announced June 13, 2026: all sixteen Nara Organics infant formula lots on the market, including the three lots the first three infants were fed (709125280E14F2, 709125288E14F2 and 708125174E14F2)

Sources: see note 46.[45]

D.  The FDA and CDC Investigations

The investigation began with that June 12 call. The three infants the agencies described to Nara had been fed lots 709125280E14F2, 709125288E14F2 and 708125174E14F2. Nara initiated the recall that day, and on June 13 it announced the recall of those and 13 other lots that were on the market at the time while stating that, “[t]o date, Nara infant formula has not tested positive for C. botulinum.”[46]

In June 2026, the FDA reported three known, confirmed C. botulinum type A cases with onsets in April and May 2026. It also reported that the Nara lots linked to these cases had been made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America, the same suppliers of organic whole milk powder implicated in the ByHeart outbreak. Notably, the customer list Organic West Milk had given the FDA during the ByHeart outbreak investigation did not disclose that Organic West Milk also supplied the manufacturer of Nara Organics formula.[47] On July 6, 2026, the CDC and FDA reports included a fourth case, from California, and reported that laboratory testing had detected C. botulinum in an open can of Nara Organics formula, fed to one of the outbreak cases.[48]

On August 27, 2026, the CDC declared the outbreak over and stated that traceback and laboratory data showed that Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic Infant Formula was contaminated and made infants sick. CDC reported that whole genome sequencing had linked a case sample from this outbreak to patient, product, and ingredient samples from the prior 2025 ByHeart outbreak, and that the formulas sold by both Nara Organics and ByHeart were made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America,[49] leading the FDA to conclude that the matching sequencing results, together with the supply chain commonalities, indicate a common source of contamination between the two outbreaks, while also stating that there is not yet enough evidence to determine whether the milk was contaminated before drying or during the drying process. The FDA’s incident summary for the Nara investigation identifies the case whose isolate matched: it was the Washington clinical isolate — I.N.’s. The summary also confirms the ingredient supplier commonalities between the two investigations, records that a firm whose name the FDA redacted was placed on Import Alert 40-05 on June 25, 2026, and states that the evidence was not sufficient to confirm the sources and routes of contamination.[50]

The FDA’s incident record follows liquid whole milk from twenty dairies that was delivered to Dairy Farmers of America’s plant in Fallon, Nevada, where it was spray dried into organic whole milk powder; then Organic West Milk, acting as broker, sold that powder to formula manufacturers and delivered it to them by a third-party carrier.[51] Nara’s own account of its supply chain confirms that, from October 2024 to April 2025, Nara purchased whole milk from Organic West Milk, which was turned into milk powder at Dairy Farmers of America in Nevada, and that powder went into the formula Nara manufactured in Germany and sold in the United States at the time of the outbreak.

The ByHeart outbreak investigation had already established that the powder from the same supply chain carried viable C. botulinum. At least seventeen product samples tested positive in the ByHeart outbreak investigation — five of them were the organic whole milk powder. Whole genome sequencing sorted the outbreak isolates into seventeen strains, and two of those strains directly linked the Dairy Farmers of America milk to ByHeart’s milk powder and finished product, which was also linked to an unopened can from an Arizona case’s home and to a New Jersey infant case. 

The recovery of the outbreak organism from unopened formula cans denies any suggestion that the strain that infected the outbreak cases was introduced in a home, in retail, or after a seal was broken; it was present in formula made from contaminated milk before the formula left the manufacturer.[52] Similarly, the identification of a second wave of infant botulism cases following ByHeart’s recall and closeout of its own outbreak suggests that the original source was not yet fully identified and dealt with. Likewise, two infants with botulism who were fed different brands of formula, manufactured by different companies on different continents, were linked to outbreaks seven months apart; the only link between the two cases was the dairy ingredient their formulas shared, which points to the original source of contamination. All these details clearly indicate that milk and/or milk powder were the original source of contamination in both recent infant botulism outbreaks. 

The FDA completed its onsite inspections of ByHeart’s facilities without identifying any facility deficiency that could explain the root cause and has said that its root cause investigation is focused on incoming ingredients and the dairy supply chain. In its presentation to the Reagan-Udall Foundation roundtable in July 2026, ByHeart reported that all 472 environmental tests at its Iowa and Oregon facilities were negative for C. botulinum and that the only ingredient confirmed positive by culture was whole milk powder — they stated that their own internal investigation with their outside laboratory and consultants, and the FDA, had identified the common source of C. botulinum as the whole milk powder. ByHeart has since delisted the supplier.[53]

The ByHeart outbreak records also show why Nara Organics was not identified at the time. On January 28 and February 3, 2026, FDA’s CORE team issued traceability assignments to six firms that had received lots of Organic West Milk powdered milk that tested positive for C. botulinum, asking for all distribution of that powder to infant formula manufacturers over the prior two years. The result: “None of the firms identified any infant formula manufacturers as customers that were supplied whole milk powder.” Separately, the customer list Organic West Milk itself had given the FDA during the ByHeart investigation omitted Nara Organics.[54]

In late January 2026, the Associated Press reported that Organic West Milk and Dairy Farmers of America’s Fallon, Nevada plant were the source of the botulism-positive milk powder in the ByHeart outbreak and quoted Dairy Farmers of America’s statement that the powder had met all required tests.[55] Nara Organics learned from those media reports “in early 2026” that Organic West Milk and Dairy Farmers of America supplied ByHeart. The company then conducted a “rigorous review” of its existing formula containing Organic West Milk, confirmed that its whole milk powder lots did not match those in the implicated ByHeart formula, reviewed its sulfite-reducing clostridia results, and consequently “determined that Nara formula could stay on the market.” As late as June 23, 2026, ten days after their recall, Nara was still stating that “to date, there have been no positive tests or evidence of C. botulinum in Nara’s formula supply chain.”[56] The four infants linked to the Nara outbreak became ill in April and May 2026, while formula made with that milk remained on sale.

E.  Issues with Nara’s Response

Nara has stated in its June 13, 2026, recall notice, its June 23, 2026, supply chain page, and its August 27, 2026, update that it intends to return the product to market with European dairy and “rigorous C. botulinum testing protocols.” That recall notice also stated that Nara formula “has not tested positive for C. botulinum.” Three weeks later the CDC reported that it had: on July 6, 2026, the agencies announced that the organism had been recovered from an open can of Nara formula fed to one of the ill infants.[57]

Its August 27 update says that the FDA’s finding “may be linked to one of our former dairy suppliers.” The FDA, by contrast, states the finding directly: that the matching sequencing results and the supply chain commonalities indicate a common source of contamination between the two infant formula outbreaks. Nara’s update then devotes most of its length to what the sequencing could not do — that the infant’s strain did not match the open can from the family’s home, that the other two infants’ strains were unique in the NCBI database and do not match each other, and that the open can is not linked to anything — and closes by stating that FDA’s tests on sealed cans of Nara formula “have returned negative for C. botulinum toxin type A and toxin type B.”[58] The update, however, concedes that C. botulinum was recovered from a can of Nara formula.

First, the FDA identified seventeen distinct strains from patient, product and ingredient samples in the ByHeart outbreak, and it attributed the breadth of contamination to the distribution and cross-contamination of the ingredients.[59]As such, an open can that was sampled from an infant’s home weeks after the illness and found to be carrying a different strain than that of the infant is not remarkable, since many strains were associated with the outbreak. Second, a strain that is absent from a public database of environmental C. botulinum sequences indicates that the database is thin, not that the illness is unexplained. What the update passes over in a single sentence is the match that the FDA did find, which links I.N.’s own clinical isolate, at five SNPs, to four sealed cans of ByHeart formula, which were made from the same milk product as the Nara infant formula, and the undeniable association between the ingredients and the cases. 

Third, infant botulism is caused by swallowed spores that germinate and produce toxin inside an infant’s intestine; the toxin is made in the baby, not in the product. The detectable hazard in a can of formula is the spore, and a negative toxin result on a sealed can does not show that the lot was free of spores. That said, there is no standardized method for finding those spores; the FDA’s own outbreak workflow is pending validation; and the Reagan-Udall Foundation’s report on its July 2026 roundtable states that, on the data presented, this contamination should be considered non-homogeneous and to occur at very low levels, which makes detection significantly more difficult. The FDA itself has cautioned that a negative test does not rule out the organism in a product.[60]

The testing Nara relies on is the testing that failed. Nara screens each batch for sulfite-reducing clostridia as a proxy for C. botulinum and reports every result at or below the limit of detection. The 2026 JEMRA expert group concluded that hygiene indicators do not replace or reduce the need for pathogen-specific testing; the peer-reviewed analysis of the ByHeart product found C. botulinum in finished formula and base powder where the usual indicator organism was non-detectable. ByHeart’s own data, presented at the Reagan-Udall Foundation roundtable, make the point directly: every sample in which its laboratory presumptively detected C. botulinum by PCR—17 in finished product, 3 in base powder and 13 in ingredients—had sulfite-reducing clostridia below 10 CFU/g by direct plating, the same below-detection result Nara reports for its batches. ByHeart’s conclusion was that the results show the limited reliability of direct-plating SRC as an indicator, and the Foundation’s report states that trace amounts of spores can be present at levels too low for SRC detection by direct plating and yet enough to make infants sick.[61] Dairy Farmers of America likewise told the Associated Press that its powder met all required tests. Both Nara and Dairy Farmers of America have treated the existing test as a badge of security when the outbreaks and research reveal that the test is in fact faulty.

F.  FDA’s Response

On July 13, 2026, the FDA shared a letter for the infant formula industry — addressed to manufacturers, packagers, distributors, exporters, importers, and retailers involved in the manufacture or distribution of infant formula and infant formula ingredients — signed by Donald A. Prater, DVM, Acting Deputy Commissioner for Food. The letter was a response to the two multistate outbreaks of infant botulism linked to powdered infant formula and a separate cereulide intoxication event traced to a contaminated formula ingredient. The letter declared that a manufacturer’s responsibility for safety and quality extends to every ingredient, every supplier, and every link in the supply chain.[62]

The letter confirms facts central to this claim. It states that FDA collected samples at Dairy Farmers of America, the processor for Organic West Milk; that two samples from one lot of organic whole milk powder matched a clinical sample and an infant formula sample by whole genome sequencing; that its ongoing root-cause investigation is focused on ingredients and their production environments; and that Organic West Milk also supplied Nara Organics, which recalled all lots of its formula after the June 2026 outbreak.[63]

Reiterating its March 2023 letter to the industry, the agency states that suppliers of ingredients that do not receive treatment at the formula plant are still an extension of the manufacturing process. Under 21 C.F.R. Part 106, manufacturers must maintain production and in-process controls from the receipt of raw materials through distribution, including ingredient specifications, quarantine and disposition of nonconforming ingredients, and scheduled audits. Under 21 C.F.R. Part 117, manufacturers and their supply chain partners must implement a food safety plan with a hazard analysis, preventive controls, and a risk-based supply chain program that identifies hazards in ingredients, approves suppliers and verifies them, including by onsite audits.[64]

Most significant for this claim, the FDA directs manufacturers to stay abreast of recall notifications and outbreak investigations, which “may serve as safety signals” that an ingredient or supplier is substandard, and warns that ignoring or downplaying such signals can lead to public health events that could have been avoided. The agency expects manufacturers to act swiftly to assess and address the risk when a contaminated ingredient or supplier concern is identified whether by the FDA or through the manufacturer’s own monitoring.[65] Nara had exactly such a signal. Its milk supplier and spray dryer were publicly identified as the source of botulism-positive milk powder in January 2026. By its own account Nara reviewed the signal, relied on the same indicator testing that had failed to detect the hazard in ByHeart’s product, and left the formula on the market. The four Nara-associated infants became ill over the following four months.

The scientific response has reached the same conclusions. The joint FAO/WHO expert meeting convened in Rome in June 2026 formally added botulinum neurotoxin-producing Clostridia to the priority list of hazards for powdered formula, concluding that dairy ingredients have been demonstrated as a vehicle for such spores; recommended that manufacturers implement supplier risk management programs to address such spores, stating that control starts with on-farm practices; and concluded that hygiene indicators do not replace or reduce the need for pathogen-specific testing. Each of these findings is an acknowledgment that the controls in place when these infants were exposed to finished formula were not adequate.[66]

On September 3, 2026, the Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA published its report on a July 13, 2026, roundtable on C. botulinum in powdered infant formula, a meeting convened in collaboration with ByHeart and the International Dairy Foods Association. Even this industry-funded forum arrived at compatible findings. The report states that, before November 2025, C. botulinum had not been demonstrated to cause outbreaks of infant botulism through infant formula, and that the recent outbreaks demonstrated that they can. It states that the industry cannot rely on testing alone to ensure the safety of products for the most vulnerable populations; that direct-plating SRC testing can miss spores present at levels sufficient to make infants sick; that there are no standardized methods for detecting the organism or its spores in infant formula; and that data on the prevalence of C. botulinum on farms and in the supply chain are limited. Its first recommendation is an assessment of that prevalence on farms, along the supply chain and in finished goods, and its seventeenth asks the FDA to provide guidance on fit-for-purpose tests and thresholds and to establish standardized testing methods and requirements.[67]

The FDA’s post-outbreak work has continued since the close-out. In the September 22, 2026, update of its post-outbreak response page, the agency reported that its root cause investigation continues, with its assessment directed at the supply chain and dairy-based ingredients; that a February 2026 surveillance sampling of 48 powdered milk samples from four suppliers to infant formula manufacturers found two samples, both organic nonfat milk powder from a single firm, positive by PCR, with whole genome sequencing confirming Clostridium sporogenes carrying a gene highly associated with botulinum toxin B1; that it has engaged Cornell University’s Pathogenic Spore Consortium on strategies to reduce C. botulinum and other spore-formers in milk; and that it has asked the International Commission on Microbiological Specifications for Foods — the body whose recommendation Nara cites for its sulfite-reducing clostridia screen — to revisit its publication on the usefulness of testing for C. botulinum in powdered infant formula and dairy-based ingredients for infant formula, in light of the recent outbreaks.[68]


[1] Jin, J. (2023). What is botulism? Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 330(1), 90. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/issue/330/1

[2] Dabritz, H. A., Chung, C. H., Read, J. S., & Khouri, J. M. (2025). Global occurrence of infant botulism: 2007–2021. Pediatrics, 155(4), e2024068791.

[3] Harris, R. A., & Dabritz, H. A. (2024). Infant botulism: in search of Clostridium botulinum spores. Current Microbiology, 81(10), 306. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00284-024-03828-0

[4] Schneider, K. R., Schneider, R. M. G., Kurdmongkoltham, P., & Bertoldi, B. (2025). Preventing foodborne illness: Clostridium botulinum. https://ask.ifas.ufl.edu/publication/FS104

[5] Harris, R. A., & Dabritz, H. A. (2024). Infant botulism: in search of Clostridium botulinum spores. Current Microbiology, 81(10), 306. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00284-024-03828-0

[6] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Infant Formula, November 2025 (update of Mar. 5, 2026), https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-nov-2025/index.html (the outbreak included 28 confirmed cases and 20 probable cases); U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025) (content current as of June 3, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025 (case counts: 28 confirmed, 20 probable; sample results: opened container of ByHeart formula tested by CDPH and unopened container collected by Arizona, each positive for C. botulinum type A; a sample of base mix matching four isolates from one lot of ByHeart formula reported by a patient; spores are heat-resistant and require special activation before they can be detected; “a negative test result does not rule out the presence of the bacteria in the product”); FDA, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), supra note 1 (Nara outbreak; milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America for both brands); Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA, Applying the Science of Infant Formula Safety: Insights from Recent Recall Activity and the Latest Research on C. botulinum (Sept. 2026), https://reaganudall.org/publications/applying-science-infant-formula-safety (report of an invitation-only roundtable held July 13, 2026, convened in collaboration with ByHeart and the International Dairy Foods Association, which provided funding for the project; the report states that listing a contributor does not represent that contributor’s endorsement) [hereinafter Reagan-Udall Report], at 5 (before November 2025, C. botulinum had not been demonstrated to cause outbreaks of infant botulism through its presence in infant formula; the recent U.S. outbreaks demonstrated that pathway), 8–9 (contamination should be considered non-homogeneous and to occur at very low levels; trace amounts of spores can be present at levels too low for detection of sulfite-reducing clostridia by direct plating but enough to make infants sick) & App. B, slide 3, at 22 (CDC investigation summary for the ByHeart outbreak, as presented by ByHeart: 48 cases, 28 confirmed and 20 probable; 48 hospitalizations; no deaths; 17 states; illness onsets Dec. 24, 2023 to Nov. 29, 2025). See also Section II.B, infra.

[7] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[8] Rao AK, Sobel J, Chatham-Stephens K, Luquez C. (2021). Clinical Guidelines for Diagnosis and Treatment of Botulism. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2021;70(2):1-30. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/rr/rr7002a1.htm

[9] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[10] Rosow LK, Strober JB. Infant Botulism: Review and Clinical Update. Pediatr Neurol. 2015;52(5):487-492. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pediatrneurol.2015.01.006

[11] Dabritz et al., supra note 3; CDC, National Botulism Surveillance Summary, 2021, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/php/national-botulism-surveillance/2021.html.

[12] Harris & Dabritz, supra note 4; American Family Physician (AAFP), Infant Botulism, https://www.aafp.org/pubs/afp/issues/2002/0401/p1388.html.

[13] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[14] CDC, Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism, supra note 8; Jin, supra note 2.

[15] Rao AK, Sobel J, Chatham-Stephens K, Luquez C. (2021). Clinical Guidelines for Diagnosis and Treatment of Botulism. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2021;70(2):1-30. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/rr/rr7002a1.htm

[16] Jeffery IA, Nguyen AD, Karim S. Botulism. [Updated 2024 Nov 25]. In: StatPearls [Internet]. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing; 2026 Jan-. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459273/

[17] Rao AK, Sobel J, Chatham-Stephens K, Luquez C. (2021). Clinical Guidelines for Diagnosis and Treatment of Botulism. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2021;70(2):1-30. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/rr/rr7002a1.htm

[18] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[19] CDC. Investigation Update: Infant Botulism Outbreak, November 2025. March 4, 2026. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-nov-2025/investigation.html

[20] FDA. Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025). Content current as of June 3, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Powdered Infant Formula, June 2026, and its investigation, locations and timeline subpages, update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/index.html; investigation update at https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html; Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 8 (no standardized methods for detecting the organism or its spores in the infant formula industry; only a limited number of laboratories perform testing) & App. D, at 41 (FDA, Summary C. Botulinum Workflow (outbreak): 200 g sample of powdered infant formula or milk powder, enrichment with incubation of up to five days, qPCR, EndoPep mass spectrometry, whole genome sequencing and mouse bioassay; “Interim Workflow, finalization pending method validation and approval”).

[21] Jeffery IA, Nguyen AD, Karim S. Botulism. [Updated 2024 Nov 25]. In: StatPearls [Internet]. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing; 2026 Jan-. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459273/

[22] CDC. Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism. April 24, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/hcp/clinical-overview/infant-botulism.html

[23] Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[24] Arnon SS, Schechter R, Maslanka SE, Jewell NP, Hatheway CL, Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism, 354 N. Engl. J. Med. 462 (2006) (the randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled trial of 122 infants described in the text); Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[25] Rao AK, Sobel J, Chatham-Stephens K, Luquez C. (2021). Clinical Guidelines for Diagnosis and Treatment of Botulism. MMWR Recomm Rep. 2021;70(2):1-30. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/rr/rr7002a1.htm

[26] Jeffery IA, Nguyen AD, Karim S. Botulism. [Updated 2024 Nov 25]. In: StatPearls [Internet]. Treasure Island (FL): StatPearls Publishing; 2026 Jan-. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK459273/

[27] Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[28] Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[29] Morris, V., Wians, R., Wilson, J., & Stevens, G. (2022). Infant Botulism. Journal of Education & Teaching in Emergency Medicine, 7(2), S48. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10332751/

[30] Rosow & Strober, supra note 11.

[31] Scarborough, A. P., Khouri, J. M., Chung, C. H., Dabritz, H. A., & Read, J. S. (2025). International Experience with Human Botulism Immune Globulin for the Treatment of Infant Botulism. Medical Research Archives, 13(10). https://esmed.org/MRA/mra/article/view/7026

[32] CDC EIS Conference. Severity of Illness and Clinical Outcomes of Infants Linked to an Infant Botulism Outbreak Caused by Powdered Infant Formula — United States, 2025. April 17, 2026. https://www.cdc.gov/eis-conference/php/abstracts/infant-botulism-outbreak-caused-by-powdered-infant-formula.html

[33] AAFP, supra note 13; Rosow & Strober, supra note 11; Botulism Sequelae: A Systematic Review, PMC, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12798721/.

[34] Harris, R. A., & Dabritz, H. A. (2024). Infant botulism: in search of Clostridium botulinum spores. Current Microbiology, 81(10), 306. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00284-024-03828-0

[35] FDA. Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025). Content current as of June 3, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025; Letter from Donald A. Prater, DVM, Acting Deputy Comm’r for Food, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Human Foods Program, to Infant Formula Industry (July 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/media/193534/download, at 1 (ByHeart outbreak was the first botulism outbreak definitively tied to infant formula in the United States since infant botulism was first described as a distinct clinical entity nearly fifty years ago); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 5 (prior to November 2025, C. botulinum had not been demonstrated to cause outbreaks of infant botulism due to its presence in infant formula, consistent with guidance from the International Commission on Microbiological Specifications for Foods).

[36] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Powdered Infant Formula, June 2026, and its investigation, locations and timeline subpages, update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/index.html; investigation update at https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html (epidemiologic, traceback, and laboratory data showed that Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic Infant Formula was contaminated and made infants sick; data indicate a common source of contamination for this outbreak and the 2025 ByHeart outbreak).

[37] U.S. FDA, FDA’s Actions to Respond to Clostridium botulinum Illnesses Associated with Consumption of Powdered Infant Formula, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/fdas-actions-respond-clostridium-botulinum-illnesses-associated-consumption-powdered-infant-formula; Contemporary Pediatrics, Infant botulism outbreak linked to powdered formula under FDA investigation, https://www.contemporarypediatrics.com/view/infant-botulism-outbreak-linked-to-powdered-formula-under-fda-investigation; Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, App. C, slides 1–19, at 31–40 (Nicole Martin, PhD, Cornell University, Bacterial spore prevalence in the dairy system and mitigation strategies).

[38] Franciosa G, et al., Clostridium botulinum spores and toxin in mascarpone cheese and other milk products, 62 J. Food Prot. 867 (1999), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/10456738/; Aureli P, et al., an outbreak in Italy of botulism associated with a dessert made with mascarpone cream cheese, 16 Eur. J. Epidemiol. 913 (2000), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/11338122/.

[39] Nadala et al., infra note 44 (C. botulinum present in finished product and bulk “base powder,” with genetic identity between a finished lot and a base powder, and detectable even where the usual indicator organism, sulfite-reducing clostridia, was non-detectable — such that standard screening would have missed it); Brett, Johnson and Luo, infra note 43; Barash, infra note 41.

[40] Guilfoyle DE, Yager JF, Survey of infant foods for Clostridium botulinum spores, 66 J. Assoc. Off. Anal. Chem. 1302 (1983), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/6355058/; Barash JR, et al., Clostridial spores in powdered infant formula, J. Pediatr. (2010), https://www.jpeds.com/article/S0022-3476(10)00070-3/fulltext.

[41] Böhnel H, et al., Presence of Clostridium botulinum and botulinum toxin in milk and udder tissue of dairy cows with suspected botulism, Vet. Rec. (2013), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23585115/; Lindström M, et al., Clostridium botulinum in cattle and dairy products, 50 Crit. Rev. Food Sci. Nutr. 281 (2010), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20301016/; Weingart OG, et al., The Case of Botulinum Toxin in Milk: Experimental Data, 76 Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 3293 (2010), https://aem.asm.org/content/76/10/3293.full.

[42] Brett MM, et al., A case of infant botulism with a possible link to infant formula milk powder, J. Med. Microbiol. (2005), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16014431/; Johnson EA, et al., Characterization of Clostridium botulinum Strains Associated with an Infant Botulism Case in the United Kingdom, 43 J. Clin. Microbiol. 2602 (2005), https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1151885; Luo H, et al., Isolation and typing of Clostridium botulinum from milk powder of an enterprise associated with a case of infant botulism, 35 Chinese J. Food Hygiene 1475 (2023), https://doaj.org/article/30d4cb5e20434fad9a47a75d7afcd132.

[43] FDA. Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025). Content current as of June 3, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025; Nadala C, et al., Detection and characterization of Clostridium botulinum isolated from powdered infant formula, 17 Front. Microbiol. 1800624 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2026.1800624 (authors from IEH Laboratories and Consulting Group, the laboratory that performed ByHeart’s microbiological testing, and from ByHeart); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, App. B, slides 10 & 13, at 26–27 (whole genome sequencing clusters linking whole milk powder, base powder, finished product and clinical isolates across laboratories).

[44] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026 (one Nara Organics clinical isolate matched four samples of unopened cans of ByHeart formula and a ByHeart base powder sample).

[45] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Powdered Infant Formula, June 2026, and its investigation, locations and timeline subpages, update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/index.html; investigation update at https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html; CDC, Investigation Update on Infant Botulism Outbreak, June 2026 (update of July 6, 2026) (four confirmed type A cases: California (2), Pennsylvania (1), Washington (1), all hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG; laboratory testing detected Clostridium botulinum in an open can of Nara Organics formula fed to one of the infants; FDA testing an unopened can from the same lot), https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html; Nara Organics, Nara Organics Recalls All Lots of Nara Infant Formula Because of Possible Health Risk(company announcement posted by FDA, June 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/nara-organics-recalls-all-lots-nara-infant-formula-because-possible-health-risk; Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/nara-organics-whole-milk-supplier (formula manufactured in Germany; Organic West Milk purchased October 2024 to April 2025 and spray dried at Dairy Farmers of America in Nevada); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, App. B, slide 3, at 22 (CDC investigation summary for the ByHeart outbreak, as presented by ByHeart: 48 cases and 48 hospitalizations; no deaths; 17 states).

[46] Nara Organics, Nara Organics Recalls All Lots of Nara Infant Formula Because of Possible Health Risk (company announcement posted by FDA, June 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/nara-organics-recalls-all-lots-nara-infant-formula-because-possible-health-risk (FDA and CDC contacted Nara Organics late Friday, June 12, 2026 with three cases; the three infants were hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG in California, Washington, and Pennsylvania; exposure lots 709125280E14F2, 709125288E14F2 and 708125174E14F2; sixteen lot codes recalled; distribution through Target retail stores, Target.com and Nara.com between July 2025 and June 2026); Nara CORE Summary, supra note 1 (Nara initiated a voluntary recall of all lots on the market on June 12, 2026).

[47] U.S. FDA, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026) (initial June 2026 posting: three confirmed type A infant-botulism cases in California, Pennsylvania, and Washington linked to Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic powdered infant formula, onsets April–May 2026; Organic West Milk and its processor, Dairy Farmers of America, identified as suppliers shared with ByHeart; Organic West Milk’s earlier customer list to FDA was incomplete and omitted Nara Organics), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026.

[48] CDC, Investigation Update on Infant Botulism Outbreak, June 2026 (update of July 6, 2026) (four confirmed type A cases: California (2), Pennsylvania (1), Washington (1), all hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG; laboratory testing detected Clostridium botulinum in an open can of Nara Organics formula fed to one of the infants; FDA testing an unopened can from the same lot), https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html.

[49] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Infant Botulism Outbreak Linked to Powdered Infant Formula, June 2026, and its investigation, locations and timeline subpages, update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/index.html; investigation update at https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html (no new cases added since the July 6, 2026 update; four cases; whole genome sequencing linked a patient sample from this outbreak to a patient sample, product samples, and an ingredient sample collected during the 2025 ByHeart investigation; the formulas sold by both Nara Organics and ByHeart were made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America).

[50] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026 (one clinical sample from an infant in this outbreak is a genetic match to a clinical sample from an infant in the 2025 ByHeart outbreak, a powdered infant formula base sample from the ByHeart investigation, and four samples of unopened cans of ByHeart powdered infant formula; Nara Organics lots linked to illness were made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America; matching WGS results and supply-chain commonalities indicate a common source of contamination; not enough evidence to determine whether milk was contaminated before drying or during the drying process; root cause investigation ongoing); Nara CORE Summary, supra note 1 (CDPH sequenced the open-can isolate and three clinical isolates, California (2) and Washington (1); the Washington clinical isolate was closely related (5 SNPs) to one clinical, one powdered infant formula base and four unopened-can isolates from the 2025 ByHeart investigation; the two California clinical isolates and the open-can isolate were not closely related to existing isolates in the national database; firm placed on Import Alert 40-05 on June 25, 2026 (name redacted); evidence not sufficient to confirm sources and routes of contamination).

[51] CORE Record, Executive Incident Summary at 3–6, 8–9 (assignments 3–5; Tables 1–2; WGS strains 2 and 11; Traceback Abbreviated Summary); ICS 202, entries of Nov. 25, 2025 (traceback records: liquid whole milk supplied by twenty dairies to Dairy Farmers of America, Fallon, Nev., where it is spray-dried into organic whole-milk powder; Organic West Milk acts as a broker and uses a third-party carrier to deliver the powder), Jan. 21, 2026 (FDA firm call informing Dairy Farmers of America, ByHeart, and Organic West Milk of the positive sample and whole-genome sequencing results), and Feb. 9, 2026 (FDA firm call with Dairy Farmers of America and Organic West Milk on FDA Sample #1319424). U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation (CORE) Network, Executive Incident Summary: Clostridium botulinum/Infant Formula/Nov 2025, CARA #1350 (May 1, 2026), released with Incident Objectives (ICS 202, Operational Period #7), Incident Briefing (ICS 201, CORE Incident No. 1350), Human Foods Program Signal Detection & Bioinformatics Branch, WGS Analysis Report: WGS-Report-ByHeart-260224 (Feb. 24, 2026), and Human Foods Program Health Hazard Evaluation, HHE #11418, RES #97959 (Dec. 5, 2025), in response to FOIA Request No. 2026-4033 (redacted under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6) and (b)(7)(D)) [hereinafter CORE Record]; Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), supra note 46 (Nara’s own account: whole milk purchased from Organic West Milk from October 2024 to April 2025, spray dried at Dairy Farmers of America in Nevada, and used in the formula Nara manufactured in Germany and sold in the United States at the time of the outbreak).

[52] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026), update of Aug. 27, 2026, https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026; Nara Organics, August 27 Update (Aug. 27, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/formula-recall-update-august-27-2026 (Nara’s own summary of the FDA sequencing: one clinical sample “clustered with a strain of C. botulinum found in a ByHeart clinical patient sample from 2025, as well as base powder and unopened cans of ByHeart formula powder”; the other two clinical isolates and the open-can isolate matched nothing in the NCBI database).

[53] CORE Record, Executive Incident Summary at 5–10 (Laboratory Sample Overview, Tables 1–4; WGS analysis; Traceback Abbreviated Summary) (at least seventeen product samples positive for C. botulinum: eight finished-formula, four base-mix, five whole-milk-powder; FDA’s two positives were a base-mix retain from Blendhouse Allerton, Iowa and a powdered-milk retain from Dairy Farmers of America, Fallon, Nevada; a second Dairy Farmers of America milk-powder retain was positive at the New York State Wadsworth Center; strain 11 links two FDA milk-powder isolates, three ByHeart whole-milk-powder isolates, a ByHeart finished-product isolate, an unopened can from an Arizona case household, and a New Jersey clinical isolate at a mean of 7.5 SNPs; strain 2 links a ByHeart finished-product isolate from lot 251261P2 to a second Dairy Farmers of America milk-powder retain at eight SNPs); see also U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Post-Outbreak Response Activities: Clostridium botulinum Illnesses Associated with Consumption of Powdered Infant Formula (content current as of Sept. 22, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/post-outbreak-response-activities-clostridium-botulinum-illnesses-associated-consumption-powdered (two isolates from one lot of organic whole milk powder sampled at Dairy Farmers of America matched a clinical isolate and a positive finished-formula sample; no ByHeart facility deficiency identified that could explain the root cause; ongoing root-cause investigation focused on incoming ingredients and the dairy supply chain); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, App. B, slides 9, 13, 16 & 18, at 25, 27–29 (ByHeart presentation: environmental testing at Allerton, Iowa (406 tests) and Portland, Oregon (66 tests), all negative for C. botulinum; one culture-confirmed positive ingredient, whole milk powder; IEH Laboratories found nine C. botulinum positives among 4,675 samples and concluded that the contamination originated from the whole milk powder ingredient, not from ByHeart’s manufacturing processes; FDA whole genome sequencing cluster including one clinical isolate, two closed powdered infant formula samples, and five isolates from the same lot of organic whole milk powder (three tested by ByHeart and two by FDA), including samples collected at Dairy Farmers of America, the processor for Organic West Milk; “Internal, external and FDA investigations identified a common C. botulinum source in whole milk powder”; whole milk powder supplier delisted; entry point into the ingredient not yet established).

[54] CORE Record, Executive Incident Summary at 4–5 (Field Investigations & Findings, assignments 7–12); ICS 202, entry of Jan. 28, 2026 (“None of the firms identified any infant formula manufacturers as customers that were supplied whole milk powder.”); U.S. FDA, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Powdered Infant Formula (June 2026) (initial June 2026 posting: three confirmed type A infant-botulism cases in California, Pennsylvania, and Washington linked to Nara Organics Whole Milk Organic powdered infant formula, onsets April–May 2026; Organic West Milk and its processor, Dairy Farmers of America, identified as suppliers shared with ByHeart; Organic West Milk’s earlier customer list to FDA was incomplete and omitted Nara Organics), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-powdered-infant-formula-june-2026 (Organic West Milk’s customer list was incomplete and omitted Nara Organics); Nara Organics, Nara Organics Recalls All Lots of Nara Infant Formula Because of Possible Health Risk (company announcement posted by FDA, June 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/nara-organics-recalls-all-lots-nara-infant-formula-because-possible-health-risk (Nara Organics formula distributed from July 2025).

[55] Associated Press, Companies that supplied dried milk powder linked to botulism outbreak identified, republished by ABC News (Jan. 28, 2026), https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/companies-supplied-dried-milk-powder-linked-botulism-byheart-129650215 (naming Organic West Milk and the Dairy Farmers of America plant in Fallon, Nevada as the source of the botulism-positive milk powder; Dairy Farmers of America statement that the milk powder met all required tests; Bill Van Ryn, an owner of Organic West Milk, stating that the company “didn’t sell organic whole milk powder to any infant formula maker besides ByHeart”).

[56] Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/nara-organics-whole-milk-supplier (“When we learned from media reports in early 2026 that Organic West and DFA supplied ByHeart, we immediately began a rigorous review to determine the safety of Nara’s existing formula containing Organic West milk”; “it was determined that Nara formula could stay on the market”; whole milk powder lots did not overlap with ByHeart’s; sulfite-reducing clostridia results ≤10 CFU/g on every batch; “to date, there have been no positive tests or evidence of c. botulinum in Nara’s formula supply chain”).

[57] Nara Organics, Nara Organics Recalls All Lots of Nara Infant Formula Because of Possible Health Risk (company announcement posted by FDA, June 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls-market-withdrawals-safety-alerts/nara-organics-recalls-all-lots-nara-infant-formula-because-possible-health-risk (“To date, Nara infant formula has not tested positive for C. botulinum.”); compare CDC, Investigation Update on Infant Botulism Outbreak, June 2026 (update of July 6, 2026) (four confirmed type A cases: California (2), Pennsylvania (1), Washington (1), all hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG; laboratory testing detected Clostridium botulinum in an open can of Nara Organics formula fed to one of the infants; FDA testing an unopened can from the same lot), https://www.cdc.gov/botulism/outbreaks-investigations/infant-formula-june-2026/investigation.html.

[58] Nara Organics, August 27 Update (Aug. 27, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/formula-recall-update-august-27-2026.

[59] FDA. Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025). Content current as of June 3, 2026. https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/outbreak-investigation-infant-botulism-infant-formula-november-2025 (whole-genome sequencing identified 17 distinct strains across patient, product, and ingredient samples in the ByHeart outbreak); CORE Record, Executive Incident Summary at 10 (“[t]he distribution and comingling of ingredients likely contributed to the widespread nature of the contamination”).

[60] Nara Organics, August 27 Update (Aug. 27, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/formula-recall-update-august-27-2026 (“All their tests on sealed cans of Nara infant formula have returned negative for C. botulinum toxin type A and toxin type B.”); CDC, Clinical Overview of Infant Botulism, supra note 8 (infant botulism results from ingestion of spores that germinate and produce toxin in the intestine); Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 8–9 & App. D, at 41; FDA, Outbreak Investigation of Infant Botulism: Infant Formula (November 2025), supra note 21 (“a negative test result does not rule out the presence of the bacteria in the product”).

[61] Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), https://nara.com/pages/nara-organics-whole-milk-supplier (ICMSF-recommended sulfite-reducing clostridia screening at a suggested maximum of <100 CFU/g; all Nara batches ≤10 CFU/g, the limit of detection); Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meeting on Microbiological Risk Assessment (JEMRA) on Powdered Formula for Infants and Young Children, FAO HQ, Rome, Italy, June 15–19, 2026, Summary and Conclusions (issued July 2026) (hygiene indicators such as Enterobacteriaceae monitoring do not replace or reduce the need for pathogen-specific testing during environmental monitoring); Nadala et al., supra note 44; Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 9 & App. B, slide 11, at 26 (sulfite-reducing clostridia results for C. botulinum PCR presumptive positives: finished product (17), base powder (3) and ingredients (13), all <10 CFU/g; “Results demonstrate limited reliability of SRC by direct plating as an indicator”).

[62] Letter from Donald A. Prater, DVM, Acting Deputy Comm’r for Food, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Human Foods Program, to Infant Formula Industry (July 13, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/media/193534/download, at 1 (letter directed to manufacturers, packagers, distributors, exporters, importers, and retailers involved in the manufacture or distribution of infant formula and infant formula ingredients; issued in response to two multistate outbreaks of infant botulism linked to powdered infant formula and to cereulide intoxication associated with a contaminated ingredient; a manufacturer’s responsibility for safety and quality extends to every ingredient, every supplier, and every link in the supply chain).

[63] Id. at 1–2 (FDA inspected and collected samples at Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., the processor for Organic West Milk, which supplied ByHeart; two samples from one lot of organic whole milk powder matched a clinical sample and an infant formula sample by whole genome sequencing; ongoing root-cause investigation focused on ingredients and their production environments; Organic West Milk also supplied Nara Organics, which voluntarily recalled all lots of its powdered infant formula).

[64] Id. at 2–3 (reiterating FDA’s March 2023 Letter to the Powdered Infant Formula Industry that suppliers of raw materials or other ingredients that will not receive a lethal treatment at the infant formula manufacturing facility are an extension of the infant formula manufacturing process; production and in-process control obligations under 21 C.F.R. Part 106; food safety plan, preventive control, and supply-chain program obligations under 21 C.F.R. Part 117, including subpart G supplier verification; redundancy risk management plan requirement of section 424(b) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. § 350m(b)).

[65] Id. at 3–4 (recall notifications, outbreak investigations, and import alerts may serve as safety signals that an identified ingredient or supplier presents risk; ignoring or downplaying such signals can lead to public health events that could have been avoided; FDA expects manufacturers to act swiftly to assess and address the risk when a contaminated ingredient or supplier concern is identified, whether by FDA or through the manufacturer’s own monitoring).

[66] Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meeting on Microbiological Risk Assessment (JEMRA) on Powdered Formula for Infants and Young Children, FAO HQ, Rome, Italy, June 15–19, 2026, Summary and Conclusions (issued July 2026) (adding botulinum neurotoxin-producing clostridia to the priority hazard group for powdered formula; finding that dairy ingredients have been demonstrated as a vehicle for such spores resulting in contamination of powdered formula; recommending supplier risk management programs; stating that control starts with on-farm practices; stating that hygiene indicators do not replace or reduce the need for pathogen-specific testing; noting that current consumer preparation recommendations designed for Salmonella and Cronobacter spp. may not be effective against these spores; recommending revisions to CXC 66-2008). The summary notes that a full report will be published by FAO and WHO, and its Annex 2 recommendations carry the disclaimer that they may be updated following availability of risk assessment results.

[67] Reagan-Udall Report, supra note 7, at 1, 4–5, 7–10, 16, 20–21 & 44 (funding by ByHeart and the International Dairy Foods Association; roundtable of July 13, 2026; illness pathway demonstrated by the recent outbreaks; prevalence data on farms and in the supply chain limited; no standardized detection methods; testing alone cannot ensure quality or food safety; limitations of sulfite-reducing clostridia testing by direct plating; Recommendations 1 and 17; contributors’ inclusion does not represent endorsement).

[68] U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Post-Outbreak Response Activities: Clostridium botulinum Illnesses Associated with Consumption of Powdered Infant Formula (content current as of Sept. 22, 2026), https://www.fda.gov/food/outbreaks-foodborne-illness/post-outbreak-response-activities-clostridium-botulinum-illnesses-associated-consumption-powdered (February 2026 surveillance sampling: 48 powdered milk samples from four suppliers to infant formula manufacturers, 46 negative by PCR; two organic nonfat milk powder samples from the same firm positive by PCR, with whole genome sequencing confirming Clostridium sporogenes carrying a gene highly associated with botulinum toxin B1, the two sequences nearly identical, no match to any clinical or non-clinical sequence previously reported, and the powder confirmed not to have been used to manufacture infant formula; continued root cause investigation “including assessment of the supply chain and dairy-based ingredients”; engagement with Cornell University’s Pathogenic Spore Consortium; request that the International Commission on Microbiological Specifications for Foods revisit its publication “Usefulness of testing for Clostridium botulinum in powdered infant formula and dairy-based ingredients for infant formula”; Reagan-Udall report released September 3, 2026); Nara Organics, Nara’s Whole Milk Supply Chain (June 23, 2026), supra note 57 (ICMSF-recommended sulfite-reducing clostridia screening).

Saturday, October 31, 2026

Last Saturday’s edition was about two sets of books — the record the agencies keep and the one they publish. This week (week 17) the published record started saying what the working record already knew, some of it in writing from people who rarely put things in writing. The Justice Department told FDA that its own regulations keep supply-chain names secret and that it can rewrite them. CDC stopped saying Little Wicomico River oysters may be making people sick and said they did. FDA marked the chicken wrap outbreak ended and wrote that telling consumers more would have given them nothing to do. A federal workgroup wrote that forty years of national targets have not moved Salmonella. And three county health departments wrote, release after release, that children who visited a pumpkin patch or a petting zoo are in intensive care. That is where this week starts.

Three animal-contact outbreaks in three states put ten confirmed and seventeen suspected STEC infections on the record in one week, and three of the confirmed cases have hemolytic uremic syndrome. San Luis Obispo County Public Health said Friday it has five laboratory-confirmed E. coliO157 infections and eight more people with matching symptoms who visited Brookshire Farms between October 16 and October 26; three of the confirmed cases have HUS, a fourth was hospitalized and released, and the farm will stay closed for the season. The Will County Health Department is still at five confirmed Shiga toxin-producing E. coli cases, ages four to thirty-eight, tied to the petting zoo at Bengtson’s Pumpkin Farm in Homer Glen, Illinois, four of them hospitalized; more than two hundred visitor surveys are under review, animal, bedding and water samples went to the state lab Monday, and the petting zoo is closed while the rest of the farm stays open through November 8. Dallas County’s health director told reporters the county is looking at nine suspected cases in children who visited the State Fair of Texas petting zoo, some in intensive care at two hospitals; the fair says it has no confirmed link, and as of Friday the county’s press release page carried nothing about it. I wrote this week about twenty-five years of outbreaks exactly like these, about the county whose first concrete advice was about washing the pumpkins, and about the thirteen-person count. At Food Safety News I answered my own twenty-two-year-old question about banning petting zoos: not all of them, but no contact between children under five and the highest-risk animals, no animal contact anywhere without soap and running water at the exit, and no petting zoo without a permit. The firm has been retained by the family of a hospitalized Brookshire Farms visitor and is investigating for a Bengtson’s family.

CDC dropped the hedge on the oysters Friday, and the count moved to twenty-eight sick in thirteen states. The October 30 update says oysters harvested by Little Wicomico Oyster Company from the Little Wicomico River made people sick in this outbreak; the October 19 notice had said they may be. Five of twenty-two people with information were hospitalized, nobody has died, and illnesses now run from May 29 to October 6 — the first onset inside the September 18 to October 8 harvest window the recall covers. Eleven of fourteen people interviewed ate raw oysters, against 1.6 percent in CDC’s population survey. The Pennsylvania distributor sample turned out to be Salmonella Litchfield, which matches no sick person, so the laboratory link now rests on Virginia’s river oysters, some of which carried the outbreak strain alongside Salmonella Newport and Salmonella Hartford. Virginia’s own page, re-dated Friday, adds that the second round of four hundred oysters pulled October 21 came back positive from three of four leases with sequencing pending, that fecal samples taken October 22 and public harvest grounds sampled October 26 have no results posted, and that the river stays closed until three consecutive rounds come back clean. Virginia now counts only three of its own residents plus CDC’s cluster; the fifty-five sick in nineteen states it posted October 21 is no longer on the page. The company’s website notice says a voluntary recall was conducted at the state’s direction and never uses the word Salmonella. I asked last Saturday how the bacteria got into the river and wrote Friday about what the dropped hedge means. The firm filed suit this week in federal court in Colorado against Whole Foods Market Rocky Mountain/Southwest and The Little Wicomico Oyster Company for a Lafayette woman who bought a dozen raw oysters at the Superior store on June 5 — a hundred and five days before the first harvest date the recall reaches.

The Justice Department put in writing Monday what FDA has spent a decade saying it could not do, and two days later FDA closed the chicken wrap outbreak with a sentence that proves the point. The Office of Legal Counsel’s eight-page opinion to the Acting General Counsel of HHS, dated October 26, concludes that under FDA’s current regulations the agency is generally not authorized to disclose supply-chain information, that the enforcement-action exception in 21 CFR 20.91 is exceedingly narrow in practice, and that FDA may amend those regulations under section 705(b) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to authorize disclosure where there is imminent danger to health or gross deception of the consumer. It adds that a rule allowing names to be released after an outbreak has ended would likely be inconsistent with the statute. I rewrote both of my disclosure petitions around the opinion within hours and will file them in November. On Wednesday FDA’s outbreak table marked file #1421, the fifty-person E. coli O157:H7 outbreak tied to Trader Joe’s Tarragon Chicken Salad Wraps, as ended while its investigation stays active; the product column still says suspect wrap. FDA’s explanation, posted on its own page and reported by Food Safety News, is that the illnesses fell in one week in August, the wraps were past shelf life and already pulled before the link was made, and more detailed product information would not have given consumers an action they could take. That is the first epidemiological fact FDA has released about this outbreak, offered to explain why the rest stays sealed; I wrote Thursday about why withholding a confirmed source is the gross deception 705(b) is written for. The same page posted an incident summary for the eighteen-person Cyclospora file #1384: a catered lunch, two hospitalized, no samples collected, and the caterer, the distributor and the states all redacted.

FDA opened a fifty-nine-person file with no food, no traceback, no inspection and no sampling, and the no-food ledger passed six hundred and ninety. Wednesday’s table added reference #1424, Salmonella Javiana, fifty-nine sick, product not yet identified, every action box blank and no CDC notice; the Listeria file #1417 moved from forty-six to fifty with an inspection and sampling under way; the jalapeño file #1395 and the Cyclospora file #1384 moved to the closed list. Fifteen rows remain. Ten name no food and carry 693 illnesses — 630 across nine rows last Saturday — and 743 counting the wrap row. CDC’s dashboardlists twenty-five active multistate investigations, down from twenty-nine: seventeen Salmonella, five E. coli, two Listeria, one Campylobacter. I keep the running record at Food Poison Journal. West Virginia’s health department told its clinicians Thursday it has forty-one Salmonella Typhimurium infections since early September, five hospitalized, ages three to fifty-four, no source identified; the Morgantown cluster stood at sixteen on October 1, and nobody has said whether it is part of the forty-one (my note is here). The pages with sources did not move: CDC’s alfalfa sprout outbreak is still seventy-six sick in sixteen states as of October 1, the Evergreen broccoli sprout outbreak is still thirty-two as of September 24, the Graziers raw milk cheese outbreak is still thirteen sick, eight hospitalized and three with HUS as of September 25, and FDA’s sprout advisory is still dated October 9 and still does not name Wild West Seed. The FSIS outbreak page could not be reached from here all week.

Two companies told FDA no this week, and one of them changed its mind four days later. Haifa Smoked Fish of Jamaica, New York, which declined FDA’s October 23 request to recall cold smoked sprats made without controls for Clostridium botulinum, recalled every lot Tuesday: about 560 pounds, shipped loose in bulk cardboard boxes to retail stores in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, no lot codes, no retailer names, no illnesses, and a notice that never mentions the refusal (the record is here). Darwin’s Natural Pet Products of Tukwila, Washington, already facing a Justice Department injunction action, drew another FDA advisory Monday for two lots of chicken cat food that sickened two cats, with FDA writing that the firm has not initiated an adequate recall. Vitality Works recalled one lot of 365 Whole Foods Market ashwagandha capsules Friday for Salmonella after routine sampling of a single retail bottle — a lot on sale for eleven months in thirty states, the District of Columbia and on Amazon (details). Imperio Distribution of Elgin, Illinois, recalled about 946 pounds of beef jerky produced without federal inspection and stamped with another plant’s establishment number, shipped to seven Midwestern states; I could not reach the FSIS notice itself, and Phyllis Entis’s ledger at eFoodAlert shows FSIS posted nothing else all week. Her roundups (Friday’s is here) also carry a lead recall of Wise Wife ground cinnamon (FDA notice), a sixty-six-person Salmonella cluster at a hospital in Costa Rica, a 251-person Salmonella outbreak from a fruit ice drink in Indonesia and a waterborne outbreak in Brazil approaching 2,600 cases; her October 24 roundup logged a fifth downstream broccoli-seed recall, Fortuna Marketing’s ZestiGreens sprouting seeds, that I could not verify on FDA’s own database.

FDA proposed the first update to infant formula nutrient standards in nearly thirty years, and the testing page it launched the same day has no row for the bacterium that paralyzed fifty-two babies. The proposed rule, announced Thursday in Des Moines by Secretary Kennedy and Acting Commissioner Diamantas, raises the floor on iodine and vitamin D, lowers the ceiling on vitamin A, sets one for manganese, reaffirms four other nutrients and asks whether DHA, ARA and L-carnitine should be required; comments run until February 26, 2027. Credit where it is due — the new testing page and contaminants dashboard are real transparency. What they report is testing for heavy metals and other chemicals. Nothing on them reports a test for Clostridium botulinum, which hospitalized forty-eight infants in the ByHeart outbreak and four more in the Nara Organics outbreak, every one on BabyBIG and many on ventilators — the reminder I posted Thursday. Comments on my citizen petition to require botulinum testing of finished formula and its dairy ingredients closed Friday, and it goes to the docket next. The same day, Perrigo told the SEC it is selling its store-brand infant formula business for up to $175 million to MeridianMade, the company run by ByHeart’s two founders, while a company spokesperson told Bloomberg that ByHeart itself is discontinued and not coming back — my note on that is here.

A federal workgroup wrote down that forty years of national targets left one pathogen exactly where it was in 1997, and the Washington Post wrote down that FDA has inspected about two percent of the Mexican facilities shipping us produce. The Healthy People Food Safety Workgroup’s paper in the Journal of Food Protection puts Salmonella at 15.2 infections per hundred thousand against a 1997 baseline of 15.3 and a 2030 target of 11.5, with Campylobacter, Shiga toxin-producing E. coli and Listeriaall above their baselines and FoodNet cut from eight pathogens to two last year; my tip of the pen and ten suggestions ran Wednesday. The Post’s analysis found FDA completed 1,024 foreign food inspections last year against a FSMA target of 19,200, and an acting deputy commissioner answered that inspections are not a good proxy for oversight — my note is that Congress sent letters and a newspaper did the oversight. At USDA, the court stay on the reorganization that would move FSIS to Iowa is still in place, and the department sent a new round of reassignment letters anyway Wednesday while the Secretary said the plan is proceeding at full speed. Congress is out until November 9, the continuing resolution runs to December 11, FDA’s lot-level traceability meeting is Friday, November 6, and the comment windows on my raw milk cheese and sprout warning-label petitions closed Friday along with the formula petition; those go to the docket next, and the two disclosure petitions file in November. Everything else waits for the election.

That’s the week — twenty-seven sick after two pumpkin patches and a petting zoo with three children in kidney failure, a government lawyer telling FDA the secrecy is its own rule and FDA answering two days later that you did not need to know, oysters that made people sick in thirteen states with three of four leases still positive, a fifty-nine-person Salmonella outbreak with every box blank, a smoked fish company that said no and then yes, and a formula rule that tests for everything but the thing that put fifty-two babies on BabyBIG. Next week brings the animal and water results from Illinois, Virginia’s third round, a traceability meeting and an election. Check back next Saturday.

About Bill Marler

William “Bill” Marler has spent more than thirty years as a food safety lawyer and advocate, work that began with the 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak and has never really stopped since. In the years that followed, he has represented victims in nearly every major foodborne illness outbreak in the United States. That case, and the movement it launched, is the subject of the book “Poisoned” and the Emmy Award–winning Netflix documentary of the same name.

Bill’s work has been profiled in The New Yorker (“A Bug in the System”), the Seattle Times (“30 years after the deadly E. coli outbreak, a Seattle attorney still fights for food safety”), the Washington Post (“He helped make burgers safer. Now he’s fighting food poisoning again”), and many others.

Dozens of times a year, Bill speaks to industry, regulators, and universities across the United States, Canada, Europe, Africa, China, and Australia about a simple idea: outbreaks are preventable. He has testified before Congress on the Food Safety Modernization Act and teaches food safety at institutions including the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. He writes regularly about food litigation and food safety at Marler Blog, and in 2009 he founded Food Safety News, which he continues to publish.

CDC updated its investigation of the Salmonella Telelkebir outbreak linked to raw oysters from Little Wicomico Oyster Company (VA-1421-SP) this morning, October 30, 2026. The count is now 28 sick in 13 states, one new case and one new state since the October 19 notice. Five people have been hospitalized (23 percent of the 22 with information). No deaths.

The bigger change is in the wording. On October 19, CDC said epidemiologic, laboratory and traceback data showed the oysters “may be contaminated” and “may be making people sick.” Today CDC says the oysters harvested by Little Wicomico Oyster Company from the Little Wicomico River “made people sick in this outbreak.” No hedge.

What changed since October 19

The illness window moved. Illnesses now run from May 29 to October 6, 2026. On October 19 the last known onset was September 14, which meant every illness CDC had counted came before the September 18 to October 8 harvest dates in the recall. An October 6 onset falls inside that window. CDC also warns, as it always does, that recent illnesses take three to four weeks to show up in the count.

The food history got stronger. Eleven of 14 people interviewed (79 percent) ate raw oysters in the week before they got sick, compared with 1.6 percent of healthy people in CDC’s FoodNet Population Survey.

The oysters carried the outbreak strain. The Virginia Department of Health pulled oysters from Little Wicomico Oyster Company cages in the river on October 13. Whole genome sequencing showed some samples are the same strain making people sick. Those oysters also carried Salmonella Newport and SalmonellaHartford, which do not match any sick person in PulseNet. CDC now reports sequencing results for six food samples.

The Pennsylvania sample was not a match. The oyster sample Pennsylvania officials took from a distributor that supplied restaurants where sick people ate, the one CDC flagged as Salmonella-positive on October 19, turned out to be Salmonella Litchfield. It does not match any sick person in PulseNet. So the lab link rests on Virginia’s river samples, not Pennsylvania’s.

The recalled oysters are past shelf life. CDC says the recalled oysters should no longer be on the market and nothing is being harvested from the Little Wicomico River right now.

What Virginia is saying

VDH’s October 27 update reports three Virginia residents among the cases. Of the seven sick people with traceback, two ate oysters from a single source, Virginia, and five had multiple possible sources, with the Little Wicomico River the one in common. VDH took a second round of 400 oysters from the company’s cages on October 21 and collected fecal-contamination samples on October 22; those results were not posted as of October 27.

The river stays closed until three consecutive rounds of product testing come back negative. The initial emergency closure runs 30 days from October 9. VDH lists recalled oysters as shipped to Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Texas.

VDH also added a line I will be reading more than once: to its knowledge, routine and follow-up inspections have not found deficiencies at the company’s dealer facilities that link its operations to the illnesses. That is a statement about the shucking house, not the water. Eight of eight oyster samples from the river tested positive for Salmonella, and the outbreak strain was there.

The bigger Telelkebir picture

The 28 cases are a genetic subcluster. VDH says CDC is investigating additional Salmonella Telelkebir cases beyond the subcluster to figure out where those people got sick; VDH’s October 21 update had put the broader group at 55 cases in 19 states. And this is the second year running for raw oysters and this rare serotype. In December 2025, CDC reported 64 people in 22 states sick with Salmonella Telelkebir after eating raw oysters, and the source was never publicly identified. Someone should be asking whether those two outbreaks share a river.

Our case

Yesterday Marler Clark filed suit in federal court in Colorado against Whole Foods and Little Wicomico Oyster Company on behalf of a Colorado woman who got Salmonella after eating raw oysters bought at Whole Foods in Superior.

What oyster eaters should do

Check the tag. Recalled oysters were harvested from the Little Wicomico River or Little Wicomico River Lower, Virginia, between September 18 and October 8, 2026, by dealer VA-1421-SP. If you have them, throw them out or return them, and wash anything they touched. Restaurants and retailers should keep shellstock tags; they are how investigators find the source.

See a doctor if you have diarrhea with a fever over 102°F, diarrhea for more than two days that is not getting better, bloody diarrhea, vomiting so bad you cannot keep liquids down, or signs of dehydration. Children under 1, adults 65 and older, and people with weakened immune systems are at greater risk of severe illness. And if you got sick after eating raw oysters, ask to be tested; that stool sample is how cases get counted.

The County of San Luis Obispo Department of Public Health today updated its investigation into the outbreak of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) suspected to be linked to an exposure at Brookshire Farms, the pumpkin patch and corn maze on Los Osos Valley Road in San Luis Obispo.

The investigation now includes five laboratory-confirmed E. coli O157 cases and eight more cases under investigation – people with symptoms consistent with STEC infection who visited the farm between October 16 and October 26. Three people have developed Hemolytic Uremic Syndrome (HUS). One additional person was hospitalized and released. That is up from the five confirmed cases the County announced earlier this week.

Brookshire Farms remains closed. The County says the farm has been cooperative and is working with Public Health, but the source of the infections on the farm is still under investigation.

“We encourage anyone who visited the farm during the exposure period and develops symptoms consistent with an E. coli infection to immediately contact their health care provider,” said Public Health Officer Dr. Christy Mulkerin.

Three HUS cases out of five confirmed is a terrible ratio, and the eight cases under investigation tell me this number is not done growing. We have been here before – pumpkin patches, corn mazes, petting zoos and fairs, where kids, animals, dirt and food all share the same space. This fall alone, Brookshire joins Bengtson’s Pumpkin Farm in Illinois on the list of agritourism E. coli outbreaks, and we are still dealing with last year’s Arizona State Fair petting zoo cases. Handwashing signs are not a food safety plan.

What to watch for

Symptoms of STEC infection include severe stomach cramps, diarrhea that is often bloody, vomiting and sometimes fever. Symptoms usually start 3 to 5 days after exposure but can take up to 10 days to appear. Children under 10 are at the highest risk of complications, including HUS.

Anyone who visited Brookshire Farms between October 16 and October 26 and develops these symptoms should contact a health care provider immediately and mention the farm visit. Bloody diarrhea or signs of dehydration call for prompt medical attention. Parents of a child recovering from diarrhea should watch for the warning signs of HUS – decreased urination, unusual paleness, fatigue and irritability – and get the child seen right away if they appear. According to the California Department of Public Health, STEC spreads through contaminated food or water, contact with animals and their environments, contaminated surfaces, and person to person when handwashing falls short.

With Halloween here, the County also recommends washing pumpkins and any surfaces they touch, avoiding further handling once a pumpkin is carved, and washing hands with soap and water after handling pumpkins.

Today HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., standing at a children’s center in Des Moines, announced the first major update to infant formula nutrient standards in nearly thirty years. The FDA issued the first of three planned proposed rules. It would update the requirements for iodine, manganese, vitamin A and vitamin D, reaffirm the requirements for chloride, potassium, selenium and sodium, and ask whether nutrients most manufacturers already add, such as DHA, ARA and L-carnitine, should be required. Comments are due February 26, 2027, in docket FDA-2026-56789. The agency also released another round of chemical contaminant testing, launched an Infant Formula Testing Webpage and a Chemical Contaminants Dashboard, and said it is working toward action levels for certain contaminants under its Closer to Zero initiative.

That is real work, and I want to say so plainly. The nutrient requirements have not had a comprehensive review since 1998. Putting contaminant results on a public dashboard is exactly the kind of transparency I have spent years asking agencies for. Operation Stork Speed and the Make America Healthy Again push forced the first serious federal look at infant formula in a generation. I said that to the Senate HELP Committee in June, and I will keep saying it.

Secretary Kennedy said today that “Parents deserve confidence in every bottle they feed their baby.” I agree. Which is why I read the release twice.

What the release does not say

The subheading says the new testing data “reaffirms safety of infant formula.” The testing it describes is for chemical contaminants. The words Clostridium botulinum do not appear in it. Neither do Cronobacter, Salmonella, nor the word pathogen. Nothing in today’s announcement touches the hazard that actually put American babies in intensive care this year and last.

Since November 2025, fifty-two infants have been hospitalized with botulism after being fed powdered infant formula: forty-eight in the ByHeart outbreak across seventeen states, and four in the Nara Organics outbreak in California, Pennsylvania and Washington. Many were on ventilators. Everyone was treated with BabyBIG, which the State of California prices at $69,300 a dose. Not one of them was hurt by a heavy metal or an outdated vitamin D requirement. They were paralyzed by spores of a soil organism that came in with the milk.

On August 27, CDC closed the Nara investigation and said, without a hedge, that the formula was contaminated with C. botulinum and made infants sick. Whole genome sequencing tied a Nara infant to a ByHeart infant, ByHeart base powder and four sealed cans of ByHeart formula. Both brands were made with milk supplied by Organic West Milk and spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America. One contamination, two brands, two outbreaks.

And the rule has not moved. Under 21 C.F.R. § 106.55, powdered infant formula makers must test finished product for two organisms, Cronobacter and Salmonella. C. botulinum is not on the list. It was not on the list when the FDA named the organism by genus and species in its March 8, 2023, Call-to-Action letter to the entire powdered formula industry. It was not on the list when the FDA wrote to industry again on July 13, 2026, after both outbreaks, telling manufacturers that their responsibility reaches every ingredient and every supplier. It is not on the list today.

The agency’s own record says testing is needed

The FDA added Cronobacter to the testing list in 2014 on a record of roughly one reported illness a year, because voluntary testing might not be enough for a food that is an infant’s sole source of nutrition. The botulism record is fifty-two hospitalized infants in two outbreaks.

The FDA’s own post-outbreak response page reports that when it sampled 48 powdered milk samples from four suppliers to infant formula makers in February 2026, two came back positive for a Clostridium carrying a gene associated with botulinum toxin. The Reagan-Udall Foundation’s September report, from a roundtable funded in part by ByHeart and the International Dairy Foods Association, found that there is no standardized method for detecting these spores in formula and that the indicator test the industry relies on can miss spores at levels high enough to make babies sick. The FAO/WHO expert group that met in Rome in June added botulinum neurotoxin-producing clostridia to the priority hazards for powdered formula and said dairy ingredients have been shown to carry them.

Letters, roundtables and referrals to international bodies are not a rule. Guidance has been tried twice now, and it has a body count.

No reply to the letters, no reply to the t-shirts

I wrote the House Energy and Commerce Committee in support of H.R. 7867, the Infant Formula Safety Modernization Act, on June 23, with fourteen families’ statements attached, and again on August 28 after CDC confirmed the genetic link. I wrote the Senate HELP Committee on June 29 and again on August 28. Four letters. No reply to any of them. In September, two “For Babies sake, Test for Botulism in Infant Formula” t-shirts, compressed into the shape of a baby bottle, were hand-delivered to every one of the 77 offices on those two committees, and one went to every other member of Congress. H.R. 7867 has sat in Energy and Commerce since its April 29 hearing without a markup.

So, I am going where the rule is actually written.

The petition

I posted a draft citizen petition earlier this month asking the FDA to add botulinum neurotoxin-producing clostridia to the finished-product testing table at § 106.55(e), and, because the organism arrived in a dairy ingredient, to require that each lot of whole milk powder, nonfat dry milk, whey and similar ingredients be tested before it is used. It also asks for one-business-day notice to the FDA of any confirmed positive, a validated test method within 180 days, lot-level records tracing ingredients back to the dryer and the farm, and environmental monitoring as a secondary control. Each request stands on its own so the Commissioner can grant in part what he will not grant in whole. Forty-six parents of twenty-four of the infants are Co-Petitioners.

The comments have made it better. A pediatrician and neonatologist wrote to endorse every request and to add that cans should tell parents the product was tested and found negative. A veteran food microbiologist answered the question I asked about testing raw milk at the dryer: test the fluid milk at the gate, where a low-level contaminant is more evenly mixed and has not yet been diluted across lots, and hold powder from any presumptive-positive tanker until the result is confirmed. Comments close tomorrow, October 30. I will file shortly after.

What I am asking

Of the FDA: you just showed you can open Part 106 and 107 and do the work in phases. Make botulism the next phase. If the agency can review thirty nutrients in three rounds, it can add one organism to a table that has two. And when you update the testing webpage and dashboard you launched today, put the pathogen results there too.

Of readers: the nutrient docket is open until February 26. If you comment, and you should, tell the FDA that a modern infant formula rule has to cover what is in the can as well as what is supposed to be in it. And when my petition is docketed, I will post the number so you can comment there too.

Nutrition matters. So does a baby who can still swallow, hold up his head and breathe on his own. Parents deserve confidence in every bottle, and confidence comes from testing for what has actually hurt babies.

Perhaps I need to order more t-shirts.

A hat tip to Anna Edney at Bloomberg News, who has done as much as any reporter in the country to keep infant formula safety in front of the public, for breaking the news today that the people who ran ByHeart are about to become major players in the store-brand formula business.

According to Edney’s story, a company led by ByHeart co-founders Ron Belldegrun and Mia Funt – a brother and sister who are now CEO and president of MeridianMade, a contract manufacturer – has agreed to buy Perrigo’s infant formula business for up to $175 million. Dublin-based Perrigo makes the store-brand formula sold under retailer labels across the country. Perrigo says the sale, expected to close in the first half of 2027, will let it focus on its consumer self-care products.

Most important for the families: a MeridianMade spokesperson told Bloomberg that ByHeart has been “discontinued” and will not relaunch. ByHeart formula is not coming back.

So, ByHeart is gone for good. The babies it sickened, and their families, are not. Before everyone moves on, here is a reminder of what happened and why.

What Happened

In October 2025, California’s Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention Program noticed that three infants with suspected infant botulism had all been fed the same powdered formula – ByHeart Whole Nutrition. The signal was hard to miss. ByHeart had roughly one percent of U.S. powdered formula sales, yet of the 36 infants treated with BabyBIG between August 1 and November 10, 2025, who had any powdered-formula exposure, 15 – more than 40 percent – had been fed ByHeart. The FDA’s own internal outbreak record called that “highly unusual.”

It was the FDA, not ByHeart, that asked for the recall: two lots on November 8, 2025, then every ByHeart product on November 11. ByHeart’s own testing soon found Clostridium botulinum in five of 36 unopened cans spanning three lots.

When the CDC declared the outbreak over on February 26, 2026, the final count was 48 infants – 28 confirmed and 20 probable – in 17 states. Every one of them was hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG. Thankfully, none died. But illness onsets ran from December 24, 2023, to November 29, 2025, and ByHeart reported that one positive lot had a production date of November 15, 2024 – meaning contaminated formula was being made and sold nearly a year before the recall. Preliminary CDC data found that about two-thirds of the infants evaluated needed physical therapy or feeding support after they left the hospital. According to the FDA, this was the first botulism outbreak tied to infant formula anywhere in the world since infant botulism was first described about fifty years ago.

Why It Happened

Edney accurately reports that federal inspectors found no evidence ByHeart’s production process caused the outbreak. That is where the story starts, not where it ends. C. botulinum was found in finished formula, in the base mix, and in the organic whole-milk powder ByHeart bought from Organic West Milk, which was spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America in Fallon, Nevada. The FDA sequenced 37 isolates and sorted them into 17 strains. One of those strains tied together a milk-powder retain at Dairy Farmers of America, ByHeart’s own whole-milk powder, its finished formula, an unopened can from an Arizona family, and a sick baby in New Jersey.

Powdered infant formula is not sterile, and heat that kills Salmonella and Cronobacter does not reliably kill botulism spores. Nor did the indicator tests the industry relies on see the hazard – ByHeart itself reported that every sample in which its lab presumptively detected C. botulinum had sulfite-reducing clostridia below the level those tests flag.

None of that lets a formula maker off the hook. The FDA has said for years, and repeated in its July 13, 2026, letter to the entire infant formula industry, that suppliers of ingredients that will not receive a lethal treatment at the formula plant are an extension of the manufacturing process. If you put it in the can and sell it to parents, you own it. And ByHeart’s compliance history was hardly spotless: an FDA Warning Letter at its former Reading, Pennsylvania plant in 2023, and Form 483 inspection findings at its Allerton, Iowa base-powder plant in February 2025 and again in January 2026.

Then there is Nara Organics. When ByHeart recalled its formula, it steered its customers to Nara with a 20 percent discount code in a since-deleted Instagram post. Nara’s formula was made with milk from the same Organic West Milk, spray dried by the same Dairy Farmers of America. During the ByHeart investigation, Organic West Milk gave the FDA a customer list that left out Nara’s manufacturer. In June 2026, Nara recalled all of its whole-milk formula; the CDC closed that outbreak on August 27 with four confirmed infant botulism cases in California, Pennsylvania and Washington, all hospitalized. Whole genome sequencing matched a Nara baby’s isolate to a ByHeart baby, to ByHeart’s base powder, and to four sealed, unopened ByHeart cans. The FDA concluded the matching sequences, and shared suppliers indicate a common source. It still has not said whether the milk was contaminated before or during drying, and its root-cause investigation remains open.

What Comes Next

The outbreaks forced a real response. The FDA’s July 2026 industry letter, a joint FAO/WHO expert meeting that added botulinum-producing clostridia to the priority hazard list for powdered formula, and a Reagan-Udall Foundation roundtable all reached the same conclusion – there is no standardized method to find C. botulinum in formula, and the industry cannot rely on indicator testing to catch it.

Which brings me back to today’s news. Perrigo makes the store-brand formula that a great many families on tight budgets depend on – and Perrigo’s own Wisconsin formula plant received an FDA Warning Letter on the same day in August 2023 that ByHeart did. That business is about to be run by the people who ran ByHeart. Before it was discontinued, ByHeart said it would not resume production without C. botulinum-specific testing of every dairy ingredient and every finished batch. ByHeart will never resume, so that promise was never tested. MeridianMade should make that same commitment, publicly, for every can that leaves the Perrigo plants.

Better yet, safety should not depend on any one company’s promise. That is why I am pushing for required C. botulinum testing of powdered infant formula and its dairy ingredients – both through H.R. 7867 and through the FDA citizen petition I am filing with ByHeart and Nara parents as Co-Petitioners. Public comments on the draft petition are due tomorrow, October 30.

Marler Clark represents families whose babies were hospitalized in both the ByHeart and Nara Organics outbreaks. Executives can sell, buy and rebrand. These families do not get to start over.

On October 28, the FDA declared over the E. coli O157:H7 outbreak linked to “multi-ingredient wraps with chicken” – FDA reference #1421, USDA 2026-04. Fifty people sick. Here is the agency’s explanation, in full:

“The wrap identified through the investigation is past shelf life and no longer available for purchase. The implicated wraps were proactively removed from the market before the link to the outbreak was established. At the time of this action, illnesses occurred during one week in August. Since these products were removed from sale and the wraps people ate were out of shelf life, more detailed product information would not have provided consumers with an action they could take to prevent illness. FDA’s outbreak investigation remains active.”

The product column on the FDA table still reads “Multi-ingredient wrap with chicken (suspect).” Suspect. That is five days after USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service confirmed to USA Today that the wraps came from Trader Joe’s, eight days after Trader Joe’s told the same paper that FDA had notified it in September and that it had pulled its Tarragon Chicken Salad Wraps from shelves in nine states, and thirteen days after we filed Gottlieb v. Trader Joe’s Co. (I represent the plaintiffs). Food Safety News has the update.

I wrote last week that naming the product cost the government nothing on October 23 and would have cost nothing on September 23. It would cost nothing today. So, let’s take the explanation apart.

“Illnesses occurred during one week in August.” That is the first epidemiological fact FDA has disclosed about this outbreak – not the states, not the hospitalizations, not the HUS cases, just a week. FDA first posted the outbreak on September 23, weeks after the last of those illnesses. It named the food, as a category, on October 7. Of course, the wraps were past shelf life by the time the public heard about them. The delay produced the shelf-life excuse, and now the shelf-life excuse is offered to justify the delay.

“More detailed product information would not have provided consumers with an action they could take.” This assumes the only reason to name a food is so you can throw it out. Fifty people are already sick. Their doctors need to know what they ate. The health departments interviewing them need to know. The people who ate a Trader Joe’s wrap in August, got sick, and were never tested need to know. And anyone who bought another product made with the same contaminated ingredient – which, by FDA’s own account, it is still trying to identify – needs to know.

“No ongoing risk” and “investigation remains active.” Both agencies have said they are looking for a contaminated ingredient and whether it went into other products. If you have not found the ingredient, how do you know there is no ongoing risk?

Frankly, withholding this information is the definition of gross deception of the consumer.

Two days before FDA closed this outbreak, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion to HHS on exactly this question. It concluded that FDA’s current regulations largely block disclosure of supply chain information, but that FDA can rewrite them under section 705(b) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 375(b), which lets the Commissioner disseminate information about food “in situations involving, in the opinion of the [Commissioner], imminent danger to health or gross deception of the consumer.” A regulation like that, OLC said, would be “authorized by law” under the Trade Secrets Act.

OLC also said a regulation authorizing disclosure “after a foodborne illness outbreak has already ended would likely be inconsistent with section 375(b).” That is imminent-danger logic. An outbreak’s danger ends. And two days later, FDA declared this one ended.

But the statute has two triggers, and OLC treated them as independent – FDA may authorize disclosure when “either of the statutory conditions” is met. Deception does not end when people stop getting sick. And deception is not only a false statement. It is also an omission.

Think about who the consumer is. It is a parent deciding what to put in a child’s lunch. It is the buyer at Walmart, or for a school district or a hospital, deciding which supplier to keep and which to drop. Every one of them makes that decision on the information available. When FDA knows which company’s food made people sick and keeps it to itself, every one of those decisions is made on a record the government knows is materially incomplete. The parent cannot avoid the brand, and the buyer cannot avoid the supplier, that FDA has already identified. That is deception of the consumer, and when it is about the source of an outbreak, it is gross. Section 705(b) does not say deception by the seller. It says situations involving gross deception of the consumer.

It is not just the chicken wraps. The same week FDA declared #1421 over, it posted an Executive Incident Summary Abstract for an 18-person Cyclospora outbreak traced to a catered lunch. The unredacted text says the traceback ran through a single caterer to its sole produce distributor, that two people were hospitalized, that no samples were collected, and that no product or firm actions were taken. Everything else is blacked out – the health department that investigated, the caterer, the foods of interest, the distributor, where the produce came from, and even the states where people got sick. Every fact a school, a hospital, an employer planning a lunch, or a produce buyer could use to decide whether to keep buying from that caterer or that distributor is redacted.

That is the same pattern as the 2024 romaine outbreak, where the traceback converged on one processor and one grower and the public learned their names more than a year later, through records requests and lawsuits. The government had the answer the whole time.

What I changed in the petitions. I have revised my two pending FDA citizen petitions to put this outbreak, and this argument, on the record:

Outbreak firm disclosure petition. The requested 705(b) rule now rests on both grounds. It asks FDA to define when it will find gross deception of the consumer: when an implicated firm or its customer makes a public statement about the food that the agency’s own investigative record contradicts; when the public record names only a commodity, so consumers blame firms that were not implicated; and when the agency’s own record still calls a food “suspect” after it or a partner agency has confirmed the link. It adds the case where FDA has identified the firm whose food caused an outbreak and withholds it, so that consumers and commercial buyers choose among products and suppliers on a record the agency knows is incomplete. The limiting principle is FDA’s own knowledge: the deception ground reaches what FDA has confirmed, not its working hypotheses. The petition also puts the Cyclospora abstract on the record and asks that FDA’s declaring an outbreak “ended” not, by itself, close the window for disclosure while the contaminated ingredient remains unidentified – which is exactly where #1421 sits today.

Retail consignee list petition. The removal that made the wraps “unavailable” is the same removal that, because no one called it a recall, produced no consignee list. The petition asks FDA to treat the removal of an outbreak-implicated food as what it is – a recall – whatever the firm calls it.

I plan to file both petitions together in November. If you would like a copy of either draft, or have comments, email me at bmarler@marlerclark.com – before October 30, if you can.

Fifty people got sick. The government knows the retailer, the product, and the manufacturer. FDA’s answer is that you did not need to know. The same goes for the people who ate lunch at that catered event. That is not “radical transparency.” It is the definition of gross deception of the consumer. (See also: Fifty Sick in an E. coli Outbreak, Two Federal Agencies, and Still No Names.)

On Tuesday, October 27, the County of San Luis Obispo Department of Public Health confirmed five cases of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli and said it is investigating a possible link to Brookshire Farms, the pumpkin patch and corn maze at 4747 Los Osos Valley Road on the edge of San Luis Obispo. The suspected exposure window is October 16 through 26. Two of the sick are adults and three are children, and all five visited the farm, county spokesman Tom Cuddy told ABC News. The three children are in serious condition in a pediatric intensive care unit, according to the county. The farm closed voluntarily on Tuesday. No source has been identified.

This one does not look like a petting zoo outbreak, at least not yet.

Last week in Illinois, the first thing Bengtson’s Pumpkin Farm closed was its petting zoo. Nothing San Luis Obispo County has said so far points at animals. Brookshire’s promotional listings, as compiled by Food Safety News, describe hayrides, grain-cart rides, pedal carts, a jumping pillow, duck races, a playground, a hay climb, a hay maze and the corn maze. A U-pick directory does list farm animals, and that deserves a straight answer, but neither of the county’s statements mentions animal contact, an animal area or animal sampling. What the county did add, at 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday, was advice about the pumpkins themselves: throw away carved pumpkins from Brookshire, scrub intact pumpkins that will be handled a lot with hot, soapy water, and wash your hands after handling them.

Why the pumpkin advice matters.

The county calls the guidance precautionary, and I take it at its word. But health departments do not tell people to throw things away for no reason, and this tells me investigators are at least considering that the pumpkins, or what was on them, carried the bacteria off the farm. A pumpkin sits on the ground for months. Its rind carries whatever the field put on it: soil, manure or compost if the field was amended, irrigation water, wildlife droppings, runoff from livestock on or near the property. Carving opens the pumpkin up, and children scoop out the seeds and pulp with their bare hands. That is a plausible route. It is not the only one. A hay bale, a dusty maze path, a pedal-cart handle, a hand-wash station that was out of soap, a concession stand: any of them can move Shiga toxin-producing E. coli from the environment to a child’s mouth. I do not know which it was. Neither does the county, yet.

Halloween is Saturday. Pumpkins from Brookshire are sitting on porches and kitchen tables across the Central Coast right now, and many of them were carved this week. That is why the guidance should have come out with the first announcement on Tuesday, not a day later, and why it should be pushed out through schools, pediatricians and the farm’s own social media, not just appended to a county web page.

The exposure window moved, and that tells you something.

The first version of the county’s release gave an exposure window of October 16 through 18, and that is what KSBY and others first reported. At 4 p.m. the same day, the county widened it to October 16 through 26, and for a time the Spanish-language version of the release still carried the old three-day window. Going from three days to eleven can mean the county has cases with later visit dates, or that it could not rule out ongoing exposure. Either way, it suggests whatever made these people sick may have been on the farm until the day it closed. That also makes the Spanish translation more than a clerical point. Families who read the release in Spanish needed the same dates as everyone else.

DateWhat happenedSource
Oct. 16–26Suspected exposure period at Brookshire FarmsSLO County Public Health
Oct. 27, 2:29 p.m.County confirms five STEC cases and a possible link to Brookshire; first release gives an Oct. 16–18 windowSLO County Public Health; KSBY
Oct. 27Farm closes voluntarilySLO County Public Health; Paso Robles Daily News
Oct. 27, 4:00 p.m.Exposure window widened to Oct. 16–26SLO County Public Health
Oct. 27Cases are two adults and three children, all farm visitors; three children in serious condition in pediatric ICUABC News; SFGATE / SLO Tribune
Oct. 28, 2:30 p.m.Precautionary pumpkin guidance: discard carved pumpkins, scrub intact ones, wash handsSLO County Public Health

Sources: County of San Luis Obispo Department of Public Health release and updates (October 27–28, 2026); ABC News; SFGATE and The San Luis Obispo Tribune as reported via Yahoo News; KSBY; Paso Robles Daily News. Read October 28.

Every pumpkin patch outbreak I can find ran through the animals.

I went back through OutbreakDatabase.com, Fair-Safety.com and the health department reports looking for E. coli outbreaks at pumpkin patches. The pattern is consistent. In October 2012, Cowlitz County reported at least ten people sick with E. coli after visiting the petting zoo at Willow Grove Gardens Pumpkin Patch in Longview, Washington; both O157:H7 and O121 were isolated from patients. In 2013, three children between 15 months and seven years old were infected with O157:H7 after contact with goats or cattle at Dehn’s Pumpkins in Dayton, Minnesota, and one developed hemolytic uremic syndrome. The Minnesota Department of Health’s annual summary adds that goats and cattle were on site and that multiple animal fecal and environmental samples there tested positive for Shiga toxin 2. The Compendium cites a British Columbia pumpkin patch outbreak where there was no running water and the sanitizer was mounted too high for some children to reach. And this month, the first thing Bengtson’s in Illinois closed was its petting zoo.

I have not found a U.S. outbreak where the pumpkins themselves were the vehicle. That does not mean it cannot happen. Produce picks up Shiga toxin-producing E. coli in the field all the time; in the 2006 spinach outbreak, investigators found the outbreak strain in cattle manure and water on a San Benito County ranch within a mile of the implicated fields, a couple of hours up the road from San Luis Obispo. A pumpkin is not eaten raw the way spinach is, but it is handled, carved and scooped out by children with their bare hands. If the Brookshire investigation lands on the pumpkins, it would be something new, and the county should say so plainly and publish how it got there.

In yesterday’s post I grouped Brookshire with Bengtson’s and the State Fair of Texas as investigations tied to animals at fall attractions, and in Tuesday’s I put the two pumpkin farms side by side. The county’s pumpkin guidance suggests Brookshire may not belong in that group, and I would rather say so now than wait. What the three share is the season: tens of thousands of small children in close contact with soil, hay, produce and sometimes animals at the tail end of the peak months for these infections.

What the county should tell the public now.

Is this E. coli O157:H7 or a non-O157 strain, and have the five patient isolates been sequenced and found to match? Has any patient developed hemolytic uremic syndrome? What has been sampled: pumpkins, soil, irrigation water, hay, compost, surfaces, and any animals on or next to the property? Were the pumpkins grown on the farm or brought in, and if brought in, from where? That last question matters, because if the pumpkins came from somewhere else, the problem may not stop at Brookshire’s gate. The county should also ask the farm to reach visitors through its ticketing and card records, post a weekly update with case counts, ages and hospitalizations, and, when the investigation is done, put the whole file online so the next farm operator can learn from it.

What parents should do.

If your family visited Brookshire Farms between October 16 and 26, or has been handling a pumpkin bought there, watch for diarrhea, especially bloody diarrhea, and severe stomach cramps. Symptoms usually appear three to five days after exposure but can take up to ten. Hemolytic uremic syndrome can follow a week or more after the diarrhea starts; decreased urination, unusual paleness and lethargy are the warning signs. Tell the doctor about the farm visit and ask for a stool culture. Do not give anti-diarrheal medicine, and ask before using antibiotics. The consumer version of this post is on Food Poison Journal; prevention material for families and farm operators is at Fair-Safety.com; and what HUS is, and why it follows E. coli in young children, is at about-hus.com.

How many people are sick in the Brookshire Farms E. coli outbreak? Five confirmed as of October 27, 2026: two adults and three children, all of whom visited the farm. The three children are in serious condition in pediatric intensive care.

Has the source been found? No. On October 28 the county issued precautionary guidance on Brookshire pumpkins, but it has not named a source.

Is it a petting zoo outbreak? Nothing the county has released points to animals. The farm’s listed attractions are hayrides, rides, play areas and the corn maze, though one directory lists farm animals.

Have pumpkins caused an E. coli outbreak before? Not that I can find. Past pumpkin patch outbreaks, including Willow Grove in Washington in 2012 and Dehn’s in Minnesota in 2013, were tied to petting zoo animals, not the pumpkins.

Is Brookshire Farms open? No. The farm closed voluntarily on October 27 while the investigation continues.

What should I do with a pumpkin from Brookshire Farms? The county says to throw away carved pumpkins, scrub intact pumpkins that will be handled often with hot, soapy water, and wash your hands after handling them.