On November 16, 2026, Senators Patty Murray of Washington, Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire and Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin asked HHS Inspector General T. March Bell to investigate how staffing and policy changes at FDA and CDC affected the federal response to this summer’s Cyclospora outbreak. Their letter ends with thirteen questions.

The Inspector General should open that investigation. The questions are the right ones, most of them can be answered from records the agencies already hold, and nobody with authority to pull those records has yet done it. In the interest of disclosure: my firm represents people sickened in this outbreak.

Why an independent review is warranted

The outbreak that CDC and FDA tied to shredded iceberg lettuce from Taylor Farms de Mexico closed at 12,883 illnesses, 570 hospitalizations and two deaths in 21 states. CDC declared it over on September 11. FDA closed its investigation on October 2 after finding the parasite in a tank of outgoing wastewater at the processing plant and in a drainage ditch at a grower in its traceback. FDA could not say how the parasite got onto the lettuce.

It is the largest Cyclospora outbreak recorded in the United States. An event of that size calls for an after-action review by an office that can read internal email, pull inspection assignments and interview staff. No such review has been made public.

What the letter gets right

The inspection gap. The Associated Press reported that FDA inspectors reached the Taylor Farms site in Guanajuato in mid-August, about a month after the July 17 recall, and that it was the agency’s first visit there in more than seven years. The senators ask why it took a month and why the facility had gone uninspected since 2019. Both answers are sitting in FDA’s files.

The people behind the inspectors. The letter says the administration removed the support staff who arranged inspectors’ travel, scheduling and paperwork, and it cites FDA’s own data dashboard for the point that 2025 had the lowest inspection count since 2011 outside the pandemic years. In January 2025 the Government Accountability Office made three recommendations on retaining food investigators. The letter says FDA agreed with them and, as of June 2026, had not acted on key parts. An inspector general can confirm or correct each of those statements quickly.

The laboratory and the surveillance network. The letter says the CDC laboratory that responds to Cyclosporaoutbreaks went from eleven people to three last year. Separately, in July 2025 HHS cut FoodNet’s required surveillance list from eight pathogens to two, which made active Cyclospora surveillance optional. HHS has defended that change as removing duplicate work and has said tracking continued through other systems. Secretary Kennedy has called criticism of the response invalid. Those are testable claims, and testing them is what the Inspector General’s office is for.

The influence question. The letter says Taylor Farms “reportedly” met with the White House and made political contributions to change the course of the investigation. What is on the public record is narrower than that. The Wall Street Journal reported that the company called the White House to try to delay the recall. Federal Election Commission records, as ABC News reported, show a $1 million donation from Taylor Fresh Foods to MAGA Inc. in March 2025. The company told ABC that it acts on science and consumer health, “not politics.” That is a news report, a public filing and a denial. Whether any of it moved the date of a recall or an inspection is unknown. I do not assume the answer. I want someone with access to the call logs and email to find it.

Where I would widen the lens

The decline did not start in January 2025. The same AP reporting found FDA’s foreign food inspections down nearly 35 percent since 2019, that the agency was missing its congressionally mandated foreign inspection targets before the pandemic, and that former regulators say Congress never funded those targets. A credible review should cover the whole decade and both branches. That cuts in a useful direction: all three signers sit on the Appropriations Committee, and the remedy for an underfunded inspectorate is written there.

The cases with no food named. As of its September 15 update, CDC’s national case data showed 19,883 laboratory-confirmed domestic cases for the May 1 to August 31 season. The lettuce outbreak accounts for 12,883. That leaves 7,000 confirmed illnesses with no food identified. The letter does not ask about them. The Inspector General should ask what CDC and FDA did to find those sources and whether they had the staff to try.

Traceability. The letter’s seventh question notes that FDA’s Food Traceability Rule now takes effect in July 2028. Its original compliance date was January 2026. A traceback that runs through a processor to several farms in another country is the case the rule was written for. The review should say plainly what the delay cost in this investigation, and Congress should not extend the date again.

Hold hearings, and invite the public

Mr. Bell was confirmed on December 18, 2025, and leads an office of about 1,370 auditors, evaluators and investigators. A request from three senators in the minority does not obligate him to act. When FDA closed its investigation on October 2, I counted fifteen congressional letters about this outbreak with no published answer.

An inspector general’s review, if it comes, will take months and happen behind closed doors. Congress should not wait for it. The committees with jurisdiction over FDA and CDC in both chambers should hold hearings this winter, and the chairs, who hold the gavel and the subpoena, should call them. Food safety has not been a partisan subject for most of my career. The Food Safety Modernization Act passed in 2010 with votes from both parties.

The public belongs in the room. Put the people who were sick at the witness table next to the agency heads, along with state epidemiologists, growers and the company. Hold at least one field hearing in Michigan, where both of the people who died lived. Stream every session and open a record for written statements from anyone who was ill or lost income. I will testify if asked, and I will bring clients who are willing.

What we need to do in the short run: before May 1, 2027

The next Cyclospora season, as CDC defines it, opens May 1. Before then:

Inspector General Bell should open the review and publish its scope and a completion date.

FDA and CDC should answer the thirteen questions in public. None requires an investigation to answer.

HHS should put Cyclospora back on FoodNet’s required list and restaff the CDC parasitology laboratory.

FDA should restore the support staff its inspectors lost and inspect the Mexican iceberg operations that ship here before the season starts.

CDC and FDA should report what they have done to find the source of the 7,000 unexplained cases.

Taylor Farms should publish the independent third-party review that its own information page says its decisions will rest on.

What we need to do in the long run

Set and fund inspection targets for foreign food facilities comparable to the domestic ones, which is the letter’s eighth question.

Hold the traceability date at July 2028 and stop moving it.

Carry out the GAO’s recommendations so that FDA keeps the inspectors it trains.

Fund FDA, CDC and state health department surveillance at the level the job requires, year after year, so that the next response does not depend on who was laid off the year before.

Bring retail produce sampling back, as USDA’s Microbiological Data Program once did, so that contamination is found before thousands of people are sick.

I have been asking the leafy greens industry and its regulators to put me out of the lettuce business. Thirteen answered questions and a public hearing would be a start.

Last summer we had the biggest Cyclospora outbreak in U.S. history. Nobody should have been surprised.

We ignored this parasite for decades, for two reasons. Cyclospora isn’t considered endemic in the United States. And, candidly, it rarely kills anyone. If a pathogen doesn’t make headlines with deaths, it doesn’t get attention, regulation or money

Then came 2026.

The Outbreak We Chose Not to See Coming

By mid-September, CDC had recorded 19,883 laboratory-confirmed cases of cyclosporiasis nationwide. More than 12,000 of them were tied to one outbreak: shredded iceberg lettuce from central Mexico, recalled by Taylor Farms de Mexico and served at Taco Bell. Those are only the confirmed cases. Most people with diarrhea never get tested, so the real number is many times higher.

The recall was enormous, too. At least 3.1 million pounds of lettuce were recalled. The previous record for a Cyclospora recall was about 31,000 pounds of parsley in 2025.

The damage didn’t stop with the sick people, Taco Bell and Taylor Farms. It spread through the whole leafy greens and fresh produce industry. Buyers got nervous. Diners stayed away. Restaurant traffic took a hit. Growers who had nothing to do with central Mexico paid for it anyway, and they’re still paying.

The investigation itself showed how weak our tools are. FDA announced a positive lettuce sample and then took it back the next day as a false positive from a rapid screening test. In the end, FDA found Cyclospora in a wastewater tank at the processing facility and in a drainage ditch at a lettuce farm. But it couldn’t say how the lettuce became contaminated.

That’s the takeaway. The biggest outbreak of this parasite ever recorded ended with nobody able to explain how it happened.

Why This Was Predictable

We’ve seen this movie before. Raspberries from Guatemala in the 1990s. Cilantro from Puebla, Mexico, which was serious enough to earn its own FDA import alert. Salads at McDonald’s and vegetable trays in 2018. Then outbreaks almost every summer since.

The pattern doesn’t change: warm months, fresh produce eaten raw, and a parasite that comes from human feces.

And Taylor Farms has been here before. In the summer of 2013, 631 people in 25 states got Cyclospora, and FDA traced the Iowa and Nebraska cases to bagged salad mix from Taylor Farms de Mexico, served at Olive Garden and Red Lobster. The plant was the company’s facility in San Miguel de Allende, Guanajuato. It’s the same plant that was at the center of the 2026 recall. Same company, same plant, same parasite.

Here’s the part that should stop you cold. Back in 2013, FDA’s environmental assessment couldn’t get a clear read on the plant’s recycled wash water and recommended looking at whether the company should re-evaluate its washing procedures. The company shut down, then reopened after FDA found its conditions met known food safety protocols. There was no recall. Thirteen years later, FDA’s best lead was a wastewater tank at a Taylor Farms de Mexico processing facility.

It didn’t stop in 2013, either. In May 2023, Colorado health officials investigated Cyclospora illnesses among patrons of Taco del Gnar in Ridgway, with the produce supply chain running back to Taylor Farms. No recall then, either. I’ve laid out the company’s full outbreak and recall history here.

Not only a Mexican Problem – A US Problem too

It would be easy to read last summer as a Mexican problem: lettuce grown and shredded in central Mexico, and a foreign supply chain we can blame and inspect. That would be a mistake.

Remember 2020. Fresh Express bagged salads were linked to more than 700 cyclosporiasis cases across 14 states. The salads held iceberg lettuce, red cabbage and carrots, and the suspect farms were here in the US. FDA found Cyclospora in the surface water of a canal near a farm suspected of supplying the red cabbage, and it sent Fresh Express a warning letter. Sound familiar? A ditch in Mexico in 2026, a canal in the US in 2020. Same parasite, same route: human waste in water near the crop.

And this isn’t only an import problem. Researchers have found Cyclospora in samples of domestically grown romaine lettuce and cilantro. Scientists have studied the sources and prevalence of Cyclospora in growing environments in the southeastern U.S., testing irrigation water and sludge. A federal advisory committee, NACMCF, has written a full report on contamination of both domestically grown and imported produce. So “not endemic here” is a comfortable assumption, not a settled fact.

The 2018 season was the wake-up call. That year brought the first detection of Cyclospora on US-grown produce and an outbreak tied to US-grown produce. Researchers then went looking in Georgia. They tested irrigation ponds, packing house dump tanks, portable toilets on farms, and municipal sewage sludge. Cyclospora was confirmed in 9% of wastewater sludge samples, and the human fecal marker HF183 turned up in 33% of irrigation pond samples. USDA-funded scientists have also looked for the parasite in irrigation water in Arizona and Texas, worried about leaky septic systems and broken sewer pipes.

The industry already knows this. As I wrote last summer, the Center for Produce Safety has spent more than $1.6 million since 2014 showing this parasite is here in the US and can be recovered from wastewater and irrigation water. We paid to find the problem. Then we didn’t act on it.

So yes, we need to watch imports. But Cyclospora is homegrown, too, and the fixes have to apply on both sides of the border.

So, what to do before Cyclospora season 2027?

Short-Term Fixes: Deal With Human Feces

Cyclospora is a human fecal parasite. That makes the short-term fix simple to describe, even if it’s hard to do: keep human waste away from the food we eat raw.

Here’s where to start.

Sewage and sewer overflows. We have to look at what’s upstream of the fields: towns without proper sewage treatment, septic systems that fail, and sewers that overflow when it rains. If raw sewage can reach irrigation water, it can reach the lettuce.

Toilets and handwashing for workers. Every farmworker in every field needs a clean, working toilet and a place to wash their hands, close enough that they’ll actually use them. This is about decency as much as food safety.

Irrigation water. Testing water for generic E. coli, which is what the Produce Safety Rule relies on, tells you little about Cyclospora. Water that touches the edible part of the crop during Cyclospora season, in areas with a history of contamination, should be treated or not used.

Wash water. Cyclospora oocysts survive the chlorine levels used in produce wash. Water that gets recirculated can spread contamination instead of removing it. That wastewater tank finding should worry every processor out there. Use single-pass water or controls that have been proven to work.

Foreign Supplier Verification. Importers are already legally required to verify that their foreign suppliers control known hazards. For high-risk produce from high-risk regions during the season, Cyclospora needs to be named as one of those hazards, and importers should have to prove the controls are in place.

None of this applies only to imports. Domestic growers have the same need for toilets, clean water and safe wash systems.

FDA’s Plan, and Where It Falls Short

FDA closed its investigation on October 2 and released a 10-point plan to carry out before the 2027 growing season.

Here’s what FDA promises:

  • An outbreak investigation report with recommendations to prevent the next one.
  • More surveillance of the produce historically linked to Cyclospora.
  • More inspections of importers.
  • Lab capacity in Mexico, so samples can be analyzed there and results come back faster.
  • More outreach to growers, and food safety training with Mexico.
  • An updated Cyclospora Prevention, Response and Research Action Plan.

That’s not nothing. But look at what’s missing.

No root cause. FDA couldn’t gather enough evidence to determine how the lettuce was contaminated, and the plan doesn’t explain it.

No deadlines. The plan gives no deadline for any single step beyond the start of the 2027 season.

No requirements. Surveillance, outreach and training are things FDA does. None of them obligate a grower, a processor or an importer to change anything. There’s no sanitation standard, no wash water rule and no Cyclospora requirement under FSVP.

Nothing domestic. The plan looks south. The science says look here, too.

If we want a different 2027, the rules have to change. Outreach alone won’t do it.

Long-Term Fixes: Pay for the Science

The short-term fixes buy time. The long-term fix is science, and science costs money. Here’s where I’d spend it.

Better, faster testing, shared by FDA, CDC and the state labs. Last summer showed what bad testing costs: a positive result announced and retracted in a day, and no confirmed positive product sample at all. The Georgia study saw qPCR “detections” that sequencing never confirmed, meaning the tests were reacting to something else. Even the NACMCF committee flagged the limits of current PCR methods. We need one validated method that FDA, CDC and every state lab use the same way, plus large-volume water sampling that actually catches oocysts. In an outbreak, the test has to be right the first time and come back in days, not weeks.

A viability test. Right now, we can’t easily tell whether an oocyst we find is alive and infectious. Without that, we can’t validate a single control.

Kill steps that work. What actually inactivates Cyclospora on delicate greens without destroying them? We don’t know. That’s a basic gap.

How oocysts behave in the environment. We still don’t know the basics. How long does an oocyst survive in a ditch, a pond, soil or sludge? How long does it take to mature and become infectious in the heat of a growing season? How does it get from a wastewater tank or a drainage ditch onto a leaf of lettuce: through irrigation, splash, dust or equipment? And since it can’t multiply outside a human, where do the big loads come from, and when? Without those answers, every control we write is a guess.

An animal model or culture method. Cyclospora infects only humans and can’t be grown in a lab. That’s a big reason the science is stuck.

Genotyping and source tracking. FDA and CDC began building a genotype database in 2024. It needs to grow fast, with more samples from food and the environment in both the U.S. and the source countries, so investigators can match sick people to fields.

Mapping domestic risk. We need real surveillance of U.S. growing areas, so we stop assuming the problem is somewhere else.

Where to do it, and who pays. This research belongs in the growing regions themselves: Mexico’s central highlands, Guatemala, and US growing areas like the Southeast, Arizona, Texas and California. It should run through FDA’s labs and CDC, with the state labs, land-grant universities and the Center for Produce Safety, which already funds work on viability, detection and filtration.

What will it cost? Honestly, I don’t know, and neither does anyone else, because nobody has priced it. What I do know is that CDC confirmed nearly 20,000 cases last summer, more than 3 million pounds of lettuce were destroyed, and an entire industry lost the public’s trust. Compared with that, a serious, multi-year research budget is cheap. Congress and the produce industry should share the bill.

The Bottom Line

We knew Cyclospora was out there. We knew it came from human waste. We knew washing didn’t kill it and that our tests were weak. We treated it as a minor, foreign nuisance because it rarely kills people.

Tens of thousands of sick people and a damaged industry later, that bet failed. Fixing toilets, water and wash systems costs money. Research costs money. But last summer cost a lot more.

I have been doing this for nearly 40 years. I have read hundreds of answers to complaints. I have seen boilerplate. I have seen defense lawyers throw everything at the wall to see what sticks.

I have never seen anything like what Nara Organics just filed.

In two federal lawsuits brought on behalf of two babies who came down with infant botulism after drinking Nara’s powdered formula, Nara has pled 61 affirmative defenses in one case and 59 in the other. Sixty-one. And a remarkable number of them point the finger at the people who did nothing wrong: the moms and dads.

The babies

I.N. was born on March 1, 2026, in Olympia, Washington. His mother spent months researching formula before choosing Nara, because she wanted to give her son something “a little better.” He was a vigorous, healthy baby who could lift his head during tummy time.

In late May, he stopped eating. He could not lift his head. He could barely cry. On June 5 he was admitted to Mary Bridge Children’s Hospital in Tacoma, where his parents were told the toxin could weaken the muscles he breathed with and that an intensive care bed was ready if he needed it. He was on oxygen that first night. He was treated with BabyBIG flown in from California. He spent eleven days in the hospital and went home on a feeding tube. The FDA’s whole genome sequencing tied the botulism strain from his own body to a ByHeart patient, ByHeart base powder and four sealed cans of ByHeart formula, all made with milk powder from the same supplier and dryer.

The California Department of Public Health cultured the opened can of Nara formula from his family’s kitchen. It grew Clostridium botulinum type A.

W.G. is the Pennsylvania baby in the same outbreak. He was a healthy two-month-old who lost the strength to hold up his head and then the strength to feed. He went to the pediatric intensive care unit at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, a few points from the threshold for a breathing tube. His stool tested positive for botulinum toxin type A. His parents bought Nara formula at Target and through Nara’s own website.

The CDC declared the Nara outbreak over on August 27, 2026, finding that epidemiologic, traceback and laboratory data showed Nara’s formula was contaminated with C. botulinum and made infants sick. The FDA tied it to the same supply chain as the ByHeart outbreak months earlier: organic whole milk from Organic West Milk, spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America in Fallon, Nevada.

What Nara knew, and when

This is the part that makes my blood boil.

The ByHeart infant botulism outbreak broke in November 2025. By the time the CDC closed it, it counted 28 confirmed and 20 probable cases, 48 hospitalized babies across 17 states. By late January 2026, the FDA had identified whole milk powder as the suspected vehicle, and on January 28 the Associated Press named the suppliers: Organic West and DFA.

Those were Nara’s suppliers too.

By Nara’s own account, it learned from media reports in early 2026 that its milk came from the same supply chain implicated in the largest infant botulism outbreak ever recorded. It “reviewed” the situation. It relied on indicator testing for sulfite-reducing clostridia, not testing for botulism itself. And it decided its formula “could stay on the market.”

It warned no one. Not parents. Not pediatricians.

Nara had already told the world, in its January 7, 2026 launch announcement, that its screening was designed to “identify and prevent contamination from spore-forming bacteria — like those related to botulism.” It knew exactly what the risk was. It said so in a press release.

Both babies were born weeks after the AP named Nara’s suppliers. Both drank that formula from their first weeks of life.

Sixty-one defenses

Now Nara has been sued. And here is what it says.

It says the parents misused the formula. It says the parents altered or modified the formula. It says the parents used it “in contravention of warnings.” It says the parents “knowingly, voluntarily, and willfully assumed any and all risks.” In the Pennsylvania case it says, in so many words, that the parents “were negligent, careless, at fault,” and that their conduct “contribute[d] substantially” to their own baby’s injuries.

What risk did a mother assume when she mixed formula in a bottle? What warning did she ignore? There was no warning. That is the whole point. Nara knew its milk came from the botulism supply chain and chose to say nothing.

It says the parents failed to mitigate their damages. Both families rushed their sons to doctors again and again until someone figured out what was wrong.

It says the babies’ injuries may have been caused by “an allergic, idiosyncratic, or idiopathic reaction,” or by a “pre-existing condition.” The pre-existing condition was being three months old and drinking Nara formula. Infant botulism is not an allergy. It is a toxin made by bacteria in a baby’s gut after the baby swallows the spores.

It says the claims may be barred by the statute of limitations. These babies got sick this past spring.

It even says the parents cannot show they relied on anything Nara told them. Both mothers chose Nara precisely because of what Nara told them: organic, European-made, tested batch by batch, meeting “both U.S. and EU food safety standards, some of the strictest in the world.”

The spoliation defense

The one that really got me is spoliation of evidence. Nara says the families’ claims may be barred because they failed “to preserve evidence.”

Think about that in the Washington case. The Nam family handed their opened can to public health officials, and the state’s laboratory grew botulism from it. They gave three sealed cans from the same lot to the county health department, which sent them to the FDA. That family preserved everything. The evidence they preserved is the evidence that proves the case.

The Goldfins did the same thing they were asked to do: when the health department came, they handed over what they had, down to the residue in their formula dispenser. They had used up the cans bought before their son got sick because they were feeding a baby. That is what formula is for.

“Not foreseeable”

Nara also says the babies’ injuries “were not foreseeable” given “the state of scientific knowledge and state of the art.” That is breathtaking.

By the time these babies were drinking Nara formula, the FDA had written to the entire infant formula industry in 2023 naming C. botulinum as a historical hazard in powdered formula. The ByHeart outbreak had sickened dozens of babies. The FDA had traced it to whole milk powder. The AP had named Nara’s suppliers. And Nara had put botulism in its own press release.

After the outbreak, the FDA’s July 2026 letter to the industry told manufacturers that outbreak investigations “may serve as safety signals” and warned that ignoring or downplaying them can lead to illnesses that could have been avoided. Nara had that signal in January. It looked at it and kept selling.

And in Pennsylvania, Nara says its punitive damages exposure is barred because the formula was made “in accordance with the terms of the Food and Drug Administration’s approval.” The FDA does not approve infant formula. There is no approval.

Blaming everyone but itself

Then there is the crossclaim. In Pennsylvania, while denying it did anything wrong, Nara sued Organic West and DFA, alleging that their “acts, omissions and/or product(s)” were “the primary cause” of the damages.

So, Nara agrees the milk powder was the problem. It just does not want to be the one responsible for selling it to babies after it knew where the powder came from.

I understand that defense lawyers plead defenses to preserve them. I have been on the receiving end of boilerplate my whole career. But there is a difference between preserving a defense and accusing the parents of a paralyzed infant of misusing, altering and assuming the risk of baby formula. Rule 11 requires that defenses have factual support or be likely to have it after discovery. Nara will have to show us the facts behind every one of these. We will be asking. We will also be asking the Court to hold its lawyers accountable.

What this tells us

When the FDA, CDC and two state laboratories have traced your product to a botulism outbreak, and your own supplier sits at the center of an earlier outbreak you knew about, you have a choice. You can own it. Or you can file 61 defenses and blame the parents.

Nara chose the second. Juries in Tacoma and Philadelphia will get to decide what they think of that.

These families did everything right. They researched. They chose what they thought was the safest formula on the market. They fed their sons. And they watched those boys lose the strength to lift their heads.

They deserve better than to be called careless by the company that sold them the can.

On Friday I wrote that the cluster of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) infections at Ohio University had gone from four cases to eleven in two days. It has kept going. WSAZ reported on Monday afternoon, November 16, 2026, that the Athens City-County Health Department now counts 16 confirmed cases, every one of them an Ohio University student. Earlier Monday, WOWK reported 15. The news is ahead of the health department. The department’s own most recent public update, posted to its Facebook page on Friday afternoon, November 13, still says eleven.

That Friday update said the source had not been identified, that staff epidemiologists and environmental health specialists were looking at possible exposures, and that public health nurses were interviewing each student who tested positive about symptoms, onset, food and other exposures. Students who test positive get a call about precautions and about when they can go back to class or work.

What is new, according to WSAZ, is that the department believes the risk of infection is “rapidly declining” and that there is no ongoing contamination. The cause, the station says, is still under investigation.

Those two statements need to be reconciled in public. If no source has been named, on what basis is contamination ruled out as ongoing? There may be a perfectly good answer. If the illness onset dates fall in a narrow window, that is the signature of a point source, a single meal or event, and the window may have closed. If that is what the data show, the department should publish the epidemic curve and say so. On Friday the health commissioner, Carl Ortman, MD, told WOUB, “I anticipate that this is not the end of what we’re seeing.” He was right.

Where the outbreak stands

  • Sixteen confirmed cases as reported by WSAZ on November 16; 15 as reported by WOWK the same day; eleven in the joint release of November 13; four on November 11.
  • All are students on Ohio University’s Athens campus.
  • No source identified. No food, dining hall, restaurant, event, animal or water exposure has been named.
  • No serotype has been made public, and no number has been given for hospitalizations or hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS).
  • The university says it has stepped up cleaning and disinfection, and its food safety staff walked through campus culinary facilities, according to The Post.
  • Thanksgiving is November 26. Students start leaving Athens in about a week.

Who is covering it

The student reporters got there first and have stayed on it. At The Post, Kaitlin Hogg reported the first four cases and Liv Jacobs reported the jump to eleven. WOUB Public Media’s news team got the health commissioner on the record. Gabriel Scotto is covering it for the Athens Messenger, Shahid Meighan for the Columbus Dispatch, and Lydia Taylor for Spectrum News 1. On television, Donovan Varney and Keith Conner of WOWK, WSAZ’s news staff and 10TV in Columbus have carried the counts. Joseph James at Medical Dailywrote a useful piece for students heading home, and Food Safety News, which I publish, has it as well.

What reporters need to know

  • A confirmed count is a floor. It includes only students who felt sick enough to seek care, gave a stool sample and tested positive.
  • The count lags the exposure. Symptoms usually start three to four days after exposure and can take up to ten. A case confirmed today likely reflects something eaten or touched more than a week ago.
  • STEC spreads person to person. In residence halls and shared houses, secondary cases can follow a food exposure and blur the picture.
  • The HUS window is open now. CDC says HUS, the kidney complication, typically shows up about a week after symptoms begin. Students who got sick last week are in that window this week.
  • Sequencing answers two questions. Whole genome sequencing shows whether the students share one strain, and whether that strain matches illnesses elsewhere. A match outside Athens points to a commercially distributed food.
  • Campuses have been here before. In 2008, Michigan State students were part of a multi-county E. coli outbreak traced to lettuce, and more than 400 students answered a case-control survey in under a day. In 2010, a romaine outbreak reached students at Ohio State, Michigan and Daemen College.

What reporters should be asking

  1. What is the serotype, O157:H7 or a non-O157, and which Shiga toxin genes does it carry?
  2. Have isolates gone to the Ohio Department of Health laboratory for sequencing? Do the students match one another? Do they match anyone outside Athens County?
  3. What are the earliest and latest illness onset dates, and will the department release the epidemic curve?
  4. With no source identified, what is the basis for saying there is no ongoing contamination?
  5. How many students have been hospitalized? Has anyone developed HUS? Has anyone been transferred out of Athens for care?
  6. How many probable or suspect cases and pending tests are there beyond the confirmed count? Are there any cases among dining workers, staff or town residents?
  7. Do the students live on campus or off? Which residence halls and dining halls? Have meal plan card records been pulled to show who ate where and when?
  8. Is there a common restaurant, catered event, tailgate, club or Greek function, animal contact or water exposure?
  9. Are well students being asked the same questions, in a case-control study, to see what the sick ate that the well did not?
  10. Have food and environmental samples been collected? Were any food workers ill, and have they been tested?
  11. Have supplier invoices and lot codes been pulled for leafy greens, ground beef, sprouts and other raw produce? Has any state or federal agency been asked to trace product?
  12. What are the Ohio Department of Health and CDC doing? When did the first positive result reach the health department, and how long before the November 11 notice?
  13. What is the plan for Thanksgiving? Will clinicians statewide and the students’ home health departments be told what to look for?
  14. Will the department publish a final report, and will the dining facility inspection records be released under Ohio’s public records law?

If you are a student or a parent

Severe cramps and diarrhea, especially bloody diarrhea, mean a visit to a provider and a request for a stool test. If you are home for the holiday, say you were in Athens. CDC advises against antibiotics and anti-diarrheal medicines for a suspected STEC infection unless a provider directs otherwise. Urinating less, unusual tiredness and loss of color in the cheeks or lower eyelids are reasons to go to an emergency room. The health department’s number is 740-592-4431.

If I was a leader at the FDA or in Congress I would not let this happen, or I would make damn sure it did happen

Congress has about four weeks to decide whether the Food Traceability Rule survives in a form that works. The decision will not be announced. It will happen in the text of whatever funding bill passes before the stopgap expires on December 11, and it will turn on whether one section, Section 780, is carried forward or left behind. This post is about what needs to be done, why it matters, and the dates that govern it.

What Section 780 does

Section 780 of the fiscal year 2026 agriculture appropriations act bars FDA from using appropriated funds to administer or enforce the Food Traceability Rule, 21 C.F.R. Part 1, Subpart S, before July 20, 2028. It also directs FDA to identify “additional flexibilities” in the rule’s lot-level tracking requirements.

The first part changed nothing. FDA had already moved the compliance date from January 20, 2026 to July 20, 2028 by regulation in August 2025. The second part is new, and it is the reason this matters. The traceability lot code, assigned where food is first packed and carried through every shipping, receiving and transformation step to the store or restaurant, is the only element of the rule that shortens a traceback. Everything else is paperwork. Tell FDA to be flexible about the lot code and you have told it to keep the paperwork and lose the point.

Why it matters now

This summer more than 20,000 people were sickened with Cyclospora in an outbreak linked to lettuce served at Taco Bell restaurants. My firm represents many of them. The traceback took weeks, and a large part of the delay came from a familiar gap: the records between the packer and the restaurant likely did not record a lot code that matched the one assigned at the start. Investigators read invoices instead of pulling product. Every week of traceback was a week of exposure.

Lot-level records would not have kept the parasite off the lettuce. They would have shortened the outbreak and narrowed the recall. That is what Congress asked for when it wrote section 204(d) of the Food Safety Modernization Act in 2010 and told FDA to issue the rule by January 2013. Enforcement is now set for July 2028. Fifteen and a half years is long enough.

The companies that asked for the delay are named in their own filings, and I have written about who they are and which members of the subcommittee that funds FDA wrote the bill. Several of their competitors built lot-level systems to the original 2026 date and say the systems work. The question is no longer whether it can be done. The answer is on the shelves of the companies that did it.

The calendar

Three dates matter.

Early December: the FDA docket closes. FDA held public meetings on June 15 and November 6 on “challenges and solutions in lot-level food traceability” and is taking written comments in docket FDA-2014-N-0053. The comment period closes in early December; check the docket for the exact day. This is the record FDA will cite when it decides what “flexibility” means.

December 11: the stopgap expires. The continuing resolution now in effect carries Section 780 forward on last year’s terms. The House-passed fiscal 2027 agriculture bill, H.R. 8646, passed June 4 by a vote of 213 to 210 and carries the rider again. The Senate has not marked up its bill. Whatever Congress passes to keep the government open either carries Section 780 into 2027 or lets it lapse.

January 3: the new Congress. Section 780 limits only funds “appropriated by this Act.” It does not need to be repealed. It needs to be left out of the next act. A new majority writing a full-year bill can simply not include it.

What needs to happen

At FDA. The agency should say, in whatever comes out of the November meeting, that flexibility will be limited to how firms keep and transmit records, not what they must record. The lot code travels with the food or the rule does not work. FDA should also use the time before 2028 to build the system GAO reported in January it does not yet have: a way to receive a sortable spreadsheet within 24 hours and read it. I am filing a comment in the docket this week saying exactly that, and anyone who cares about this should file one too. A paragraph is enough.

In the lame duck. The Senate agriculture appropriations subcommittee, Chairman Hoeven and Ranking Member Shaheen, should leave Section 780 out of its bill. If the vehicle is another continuing resolution, the rider should be dropped from it or allowed to expire with it rather than carried into 2027. If it must stay, the “additional flexibilities” sentence should be struck and the words “full enforcement no later than July 20, 2028” put in bill text where they cannot be read away. I have asked Congresswoman DeLauro, who will chair the House Appropriations Committee in January, to make it a condition of the year-end deal.

In statute. A short bill should be introduced now that puts the lot code and the 2028 date in the Food Safety Modernization Act itself and requires any future appropriations rider that changes them to say so expressly. It will not pass in December. Introduced now, it gives the new Congress a number and cosponsors on day one, and it gives FDA a reason to hold the line this month.

From the people who already do it. The leafy greens growers in California and Arizona have kept lot-level records under their marketing agreements for years. They are the ones named in regional advisories when a traceback fails. A public statement from them that lot-level traceability works, and that the industry’s interest is in a rule that names a lot instead of a region, would do more to answer the “cannot be done” argument than anything I can write. I have asked.

What I am asking of you

If you run a company that complies with the rule today, say so, in the docket and to your senators. If you work for one of the consumer, public health or labor groups that signed the August 12 letter asking Congress to rescind the rider, file a comment and send the letter again. If you got sick this summer, or your child did, your senators’ offices need to hear from you before December 11, not after.

I have been asking the produce industry to put me out of business since a lunch with the Salinas growers in February 2007. A traceability rule with lot codes intact, enforced in July 2028 and not a day later, is one of the few things that would actually do it.

The rule has been law since 2022. Nobody has had to follow it. The next four weeks decide whether anyone ever will.

For eleven years, this country had one program that went out into the marketplace, picked up fresh produce and tested it for the bugs that put people in the hospital.

It was called the Microbiological Data Program. It cost about $4.5 million a year. It did about 80 percent of federal pathogen testing of fresh produce.

On December 31, 2012, we turned it off.

I have complained about that ever since. Here is the history, who killed it, why we need it more now than we did then, and the ways we can bring it back.

Born bipartisan

The MDP had parents in both parties. It grew out of President Clinton’s 1997 Food Safety Initiative. In fiscal 1999, USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service ran a $100,000 pilot, testing 96 samples of lettuce and tomatoes in New York and Ohio.

A Republican Congress funded the real thing in the 2001 agriculture appropriations bill, about $6.2 million. Sampling began in April 2001, three months into George W. Bush’s first term, and his administration ran the program for eight years.

AMS built it smart. It copied the design of its Pesticide Data Program. Statisticians from the National Agricultural Statistics Service drew up the sampling plans. Samples were pulled at terminal markets and distribution centers, weighted by population and volume, so the results meant something nationally. State agriculture labs did the testing, ten states at the start and eleven later, covering about half the country.

By the end it was testing 10,000 to 15,000 samples a year, more than 111,000 from 2002 through 2012 alone. Cilantro, parsley, spinach, lettuce, sprouts, hot peppers, tomatoes, cantaloupe and green onions. Salmonella, Listeria, E. coli O157:H7 and the other Shiga toxin-producing E. coli. About a quarter of the samples were imported.

They wanted it blind

The produce industry hated it from day one.

At the program’s first public meeting, in January 2002, the Food Marketing Institute, United Fresh, Western Growers, the International Fresh-cut Produce Association, the California Strawberry Commission, U.S. Apple and the California melon boards lined up to object. They said it duplicated FDA. They said reporting generic E. coli would “scare consumers away from purchasing produce.” They said states would use the data for enforcement.

They won the big one. In its written responses, AMS said “congressional language” required a “blind survey.” So it stripped grower, packer and distributor names off its sample forms.

Read that again. Taxpayers paid to test food, and the testers were told not to write down whose food it was.

AMS even conceded that by the time a sample was confirmed positive, “the product would no longer be in the marketplace.” And at FDA’s request, Listeria and E. coli O157:H7 were left out at the start.

The program got better anyway. By 2008, positives were going to FDA and the states, and product was getting pulled. But the public never learned whose produce tested positive.

What it found

From 2009 to 2012, the MDP found Salmonella 111 times, E. coli O157:H7 twice, other Shiga toxin-producing E. coli 82 times and Listeria 12 times. Those findings led to 38 recalls. Forty-four of its Salmonella isolates, both O157:H7 isolates and nine of the twelve Listeria isolates matched sick people.

On July 16, 2012, a New York Department of Agriculture inspector pulled a Burch Farms cantaloupe for MDP testing. Listeria. The positive went to FDA on July 26, the company recalled on July 28, and the recall grew to about 188,000 melons. No illnesses were reported. That was eleven months after Listeria in Jensen Farms cantaloupe sickened 147 people and killed 33. My firm represented 46 of those families. Their medical bills topped $15 million.

That spring, MDP testing triggered a spinach recall. That September, a single MDP sample led to a Salmonella recall of California cantaloupes.

MDP testing found a Salmonella strain in California sprouts in 2008 that matched the strain behind a 2011 California sprout recall. It had apparently survived in the seed for three years.

FDA and USDA scientists studied 132 Shiga toxin-producing E. coli strains from produce, 105 of them from the MDP. About 9 percent carried the eae gene linked to severe illness, including O157:H7 and O26:H11. Spinach carried STEC in about 1 in 200 samples, even after the reforms that followed the 2006 spinach outbreak. A Michigan cilantro isolate was more than 95 percent similar to the strain from a Michigan patient with bloody diarrhea.

In 2016, those same scientists wrote that low prevalence still matters, because produce is grown in volume, shipped widely and eaten raw, and that monitoring must continue. It never did.

Who killed it, and why

David Acheson, FDA’s former top food safety official, summed up the fight in 2012: “the industry hates it and consumer organizations love it.”

The industry. It was not subtle. United Fresh’s Food Safety & Technology Council put it in writing in January 2011: “We do not believe this program is adding to public safety.”

David Gombas, United Fresh’s senior vice president for food safety and technology, told the Chicago Tribunethat over time the MDP “got twisted and it turned into a regulatory program.” What he meant was that it found contamination, sent it to FDA, and caused recalls. In other words, it worked.

Gombas told Food Safety News that by the time the MDP found something, “That produce is gone.” He told the Associated Press that “none of the product recalled has ever been traced to an outbreak.” The program’s own record tells a different story. Of the 23 recalls MDP testing triggered in 2010 and 2011, 15 involved human illnesses.

United Fresh’s 2012 lobbying agenda called for finishing the MDP off, and its lobbying firm reported working on MDP funding in the agriculture spending bill (see Eat Drink Politics). The industry’s line was that the MDP cost growers millions in recalls, unfairly targeted farmers, and belonged at FDA (see David Acheson’s summary).

Then, that same year, United Fresh announced it would build its own industry testing database, blinded to protect the identity of data sources.

The Obama administration. Its fiscal 2013 budget called the MDP a low-impact, lower-priority program outside AMS’s core marketing mission (Food Safety News). When Rep. Rosa DeLauro grilled Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack at a February 2012 hearing, he defended the cut on the same grounds. Even when USDA gave the program a reprieve through December, a spokesman said it “does not align with USDA’s core mission.”

Congress. DeLauro fought nearly alone. After the Burch Farms recall, she said it “reinforces MDP’s value.”Neither the House nor the Senate spending bill funded it.

FDA. It did not ask for the program and said it lacked the resources to take it on while implementing FSMA. Vilsack said he would like to see FDA get the money to absorb it. It never did.

But the real cause of death is simpler: the MDP never had its own statute. AMS ran it under its general authority in the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 and a yearly appropriation. When the money stopped, the program stopped.

Compare the Pesticide Data Program. Same agency. Same design. It is still running, because section 301 of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 tells USDA to do it. Pesticides got a law. Pathogens got a line item.

Why we need it now

The lights went out fast. Within weeks of the shutdown, people began falling ill with Salmonella Saintpaul from cucumbers imported from Mexico, at least 73 of them. The MDP never tested cucumbers. That is the lesson, not an excuse. In 2015, imported cucumbers sickened 907 people and killed six. A testing program has to follow the outbreaks.

Then came 2026. The Cyclospora outbreak tied to Taylor Farms de Mexico iceberg lettuce sickened more than 12,000 people and killed two, in a summer when CDC counted 19,595 confirmed Cyclospora cases. Congress sent fifteen letters and has no published answers. There is no kill step for Cyclospora.

Without product testing, every outbreak becomes an argument. FDA tied this one to Taylor Farms lettuce, retracted the one positive product test it had announced, and the company has told the public that FDA never found the parasite in its product. The argument goes on. Data would end it.

What does FDA do instead? Episodic sampling assignments. Its first large survey of fresh basil, cilantro and parsley ran from 2017 to 2021, slowed by the pandemic, and tested 1,383 samples. The results came out in 2024. The MDP tested more produce than that every six weeks.

Growers need this too. In 2008, FDA warned consumers off tomatoes during the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak. The real source was jalapeño and serrano peppers from Mexico. House Agriculture Committee Republicans put the tomato industry’s loss at about $100 million. Growers sued the government to get it back and lost. Years of baseline data on which commodities carry which bugs helps investigators rule products out as well as in.

And the tools are better now. In 2012, labs compared strains with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. Today whole-genome sequencing ties a produce isolate to sick people with far more precision, and FDA’s new traceability rule will put lot codes on much of this produce. A positive sample today points somewhere.

I am not the only one saying it. In September, Dr. Donna Garren, FDA’s new director of the Office of Produce Safety, told state agriculture officials that FDA should bring back a national approach to produce testing like the MDP (Lancaster Farming). On transparency, she put it this way: “When bad actors know they will be named … behavior changes.”

Garren knows the industry side of this fight. She spent six years as United Fresh’s vice president for scientific and technical affairs, including the years when United Fresh first objected to the MDP (see her bio).

As I keep saying, food safety is not expensive. Outbreaks are.

How we bring it back

There is more than one road.

1. USDA restarts it now. No new law is needed. The MDP ran under authority the Department still has, and the Pesticide Data Program still has the sites, the state agreements and the people. I have drafted a petition to Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins asking USDA to restart the program in fiscal 2027 and put full funding in the fiscal 2028 budget – See below.

2. Appropriations. A line item and report language in the agriculture spending bill. Rep. Andy Harris, a physician from Maryland, one of the original MDP states, chairs the House subcommittee. Its top Democrat, Rep. Sanford Bishop, signed one of this year’s Cyclospora letters.

3. A statute. I have a draft Produce Pathogen Surveillance Act. It provides permanent authorization on the PDP model and at least 15,000 samples a year. It requires whole-genome sequencing of every isolate, testing for Cyclospora and viruses, a commodity list that follows the outbreaks, and surge testing when CDC or FDA asks. And it ends blind sampling: firms behind confirmed positives get named – See below.

4. The farm bill. The same language could ride on the next one.

5. States go first. A state like Washington, an original MDP state, could fund its agriculture lab to run an MDP-style program and show Congress how it is done.

What are not real alternatives? FDA’s one-off assignments, which take years. Genome networks like GenomeTrakr, which sequence what someone else finds; somebody still has to test the food. And industry’s private testing, which the public never sees. Prevention matters, but testing is how you know prevention is working.

Make produce safe again

The MDP was conceived under a Democrat, funded by Republicans, run for eight years by a Republican administration and killed under a Democrat. Protecting people from E. coli, Salmonella, Listeria and Cyclospora is not a partisan project. I said it two years ago and I will keep saying it.

For a rounding error in the federal budget, we can put the trip wire back in the produce supply.

And this time, let’s write down the names.

https://www.marlerblog.com/files/2026/11/MDP-Petition-to-the-Secretary-of-Agriculture-2026-11-15.pdf

https://www.marlerblog.com/files/2026/11/Produce-Pathogen-Surveillance-Act-of-2027.pdf

Sources

USDA AMS, Microbiological Data Program

USDA AMS, Microbiological Data Program; Public Meeting, 67 Fed. Reg. 65777 (Oct. 28, 2002)

Reddy, Wang, Adams & Feng, Prevalence and Characteristics of Salmonella Serotypes Isolated from Fresh Produce Marketed in the United States, J. Food Prot. (2016)

Feng & Reddy, Prevalences of Shiga Toxin Subtypes … in Shiga-Toxigenic E. coli Strains Isolated from Fresh Produce, Appl. Environ. Microbiol. (2013)

Monday et al., Produce Isolates of the E. coli Ont:H52 Serotype, Appl. Environ. Microbiol. (2006)

Food Safety News, The Fight Over the Microbiological Data Program (Feb. 2012)

Food Safety News, Tainted Spinach Detected by Program Budget Cuts Will Ax (May 2012)

Food Safety News, USDA Budget Cut Could Slash 80 Percent of Produce Testing (2012)

David Acheson, Should the Microbiological Data Program Be Saved?, Food Safety News (July 2012)

Eat Drink Politics, letter to Michelle Obama on United Fresh and the MDP (2012)

Associated Press, Produce-Safety Testing Program on Chopping Block (via Cullman Times)

The Produce News, United Fresh to Create Shared Database on Food-Safety Tests (2012)

Center for Public Integrity, Federal Produce-Testing Program Spared, for Now (July 17, 2012)

Rep. Rosa DeLauro, Statement on Recall of Possibly Contaminated Cantaloupes (July 31, 2012)

Food Safety News, Listeria Cantaloupe Recall Expanded to 188,000 Melons (Aug. 2, 2012)

Food Safety News, California Cantaloupes Recalled Over Salmonella Test (Sept. 2012)

Food Safety News, USDA Begins Shutdown of MDP, Cutting 80 Percent of Pathogen Testing for Produce (Nov. 2012)

Food Safety News, MDP Officially Shut Down; Pathogen Testing for Produce Halted (Jan. 2013)

CDC, Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Saintpaul Infections Linked to Imported Cucumbers (2013)

House Committee on Agriculture (Republican), Food Safety Policy Brief

Food Safety News, Tomato Growers Want to Be Compensated for Losses in 2008 Outbreak (Aug. 2013)

Food Safety News, Produce Experts Say Preventive Strategies Are More Valuable Than Testing (May 2016)

FDA, FDA Releases Summary Report on Fresh Herbs Sampling Assignment (July 26, 2024)

Food Safety Magazine, Congress Oversight Committee Probes Taylor Farms (July 29, 2026)

FDA, Post-Outbreak Response Activities: Multistate Outbreaks of Cyclospora Illnesses (2026)

Lancaster Farming, FDA Director Takes Lessons From Cyclospora Outbreak (Sept. 2026)

Marler Blog, FDA’s Donna Garren Says Never Let a Good Crisis Go to Waste (Sept. 18, 2026)

Speaker biography, Donna Garren, Ph.D.

Marler Blog, FDA Closed the Cyclospora Investigation … Fifteen Congressional Letters Have No Published Answer (2026)

Marler Blog, Ode to the MDP: It’s Past Time for a Comeback

Food Safety News, Time to Bring Back the MDP to Help Make Produce Safe Again (Nov. 2024)

Food Safety News, Publisher’s Platform: There Is No Kill Step for Cyclospora (July 2026)

Food Safety News, Publisher’s Platform: Food Safety Is Not Expensive. Outbreaks Are Expensive. (Aug. 2026)

On Saturday, Nov. 14, the County of San Luis Obispo Department of Public Health reported a new E. coli O157 infection in a person who never visited Brookshire Farms. The county believes the infection was passed person to person at a preschool in San Luis Obispo, from one of the five people confirmed ill after visiting the farm in October. The new patient developed hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS), was hospitalized, and is now recovering at home.

This is the outbreak the county closed on Nov. 6 with five laboratory-confirmed cases and 10 suspect cases, and in which it confirmed a death on Nov. 10. The file was closed. The outbreak was not.

What The Tribune has reported

The county has released almost nothing about the people who were sickened. The San Luis Obispo Tribune has filled in some of it.

  • The person who died was an 18-month-old girl. Her grandmother told The Tribune that the child visited Brookshire Farms with her family in mid-October, became ill a few days later, developed HUS, spent 10 days at Stanford’s Lucile Packard Children’s Hospital, and died on Nov. 4. That was two days before the county closed its investigation and six days before it confirmed a death.
  • A 6-year-old boy from Nipomo was still hospitalized more than three weeks after he got sick. The Tribune reported that he visited the farm on Oct. 17, had symptoms by Oct. 20, was admitted to a Santa Maria hospital the next day, and was transferred to Stanford on Oct. 27 with kidney failure and other complications.
  • No source was ever identified. The Tribune reported that environmental testing did not find the O157 strain that made people sick, and that the county listed corn cups, pumpkins, hay and non-potable water among the exposures the patients had in common.

The county reported three people with HUS among the farm cases on Oct. 30. The preschool case is a fourth, in someone who was never there.

What the county has said

  • The infection is laboratory-confirmed E. coli O157, confirmed by the county Public Health Laboratory after the patient’s medical provider reported it.
  • The person did not visit Brookshire Farms.
  • The county calls it secondary, person-to-person transmission from one of the five primary cases, and says the transmission is thought to have occurred at the preschool.
  • The person developed HUS, was hospitalized, and is recovering at home.
  • Families were notified, cleaning was started, and the affected classrooms will be closed Monday, Nov. 16.
  • Doctors heard first. The county’s provider notice carrying the same facts is dated Nov. 13.

The county has not given the patient’s age, the name of the preschool, the date the illness began, whether the isolate has been sequenced against the five farm cases, or whether the confirmed count now stands at six.

What is a secondary case of E. coli?

A primary case is a person infected at the source: the hamburger, the lettuce, the petting zoo. A secondary case is a person who never touched the source and caught the infection from someone who did. Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) leaves the body in stool, and it takes very little to make the next person sick. Researchers put the infectious dose at roughly 100 organisms. A diaper change, a shared toilet, a toy that goes from one mouth to another, or a hand that was not washed is enough.

How common are secondary E. coli cases?

More common than most people think.

  • About one in five outbreak cases. A review of 90 E. coli O157 outbreaks in the United States, Canada, Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia and Japan found that secondary cases averaged 19.5 percent of the cases in an outbreak.
  • About one in nine of all cases. Ten years of whole-population surveillance in Scotland classified 11 percent of E. coli O157 cases as secondary.
  • Just as severe. The same research found that people infected secondhand face a risk of HUS similar to people infected at the source. The San Luis Obispo case is the proof.

Where do secondary cases happen?

Two places, over and over: child care and the home.

The 90-outbreak review found significantly higher secondary rates in outbreaks where the median patient was younger than 6 and where the spread ran through nurseries. A Japanese study of 16 day care STEC outbreaksmeasured household spread from zero to 34.4 percent, with a median of 4.4 percent. Siblings aged 6 to 9 were infected most often, and mothers more often than fathers. In England, secondary cases turned up in 7 percentof the child care settings attended by an infectious child.

There is a near-identical precedent. In a 2014 Kansas E. coli O157 outbreak, a child with a mild illness passed the infection to another child in a home day care. The second child developed HUS. And this is not new. When CDC wrote up the 1993 Jack in the Box outbreak, it reported that secondary transmission in families and child day care settings was under investigation.

Why a new case can surface nearly four weeks after the farm visits

All five confirmed patients visited Brookshire Farms on Oct. 17 or 18. The provider notice went out Nov. 13. The gap is explained by how long children carry the bacteria. In the English study, children shed STEC for a median of 31 days, and 24 percent were still shedding at six weeks or longer. A child can feel fine, look fine, and still be infectious.

That is why public health departments keep infected children out of group care. The California Department of Public Health tells local health departments that, because of the low infectious dose, they may need to restrict people with STEC from day care until the department has examined and cleared them.

Questions the county should answer

  • Is the confirmed count now six, and has the new isolate been matched by whole genome sequencing to the five farm cases?
  • When did the new patient become ill?
  • Did the primary case attend the preschool while still shedding, and was that person cleared by Public Health before returning?
  • Have classmates and staff in the affected classrooms been tested, or only told to watch for symptoms?
  • Were the families of the 10 suspect cases given the same exclusion instructions as the five confirmed ones?

None of this is about blame for a preschool that, by the county’s account, has cooperated. It is about whether the next secondary case can be prevented.

What families should do

  • Call a doctor right away if a child has bloody diarrhea or severe stomach cramps, and say that the child may have been exposed to E. coli O157.
  • Watch for signs of HUS in the week or two after diarrhea starts: less urination, pale skin, unusual tiredness, easy bruising.
  • Keep a sick child home from preschool or day care, and do not send the child to a different one.
  • Wash hands with soap and water after every diaper change and bathroom trip. At home, that includes brothers, sisters and parents.

Secondary cases and the law

A person who never touched the source has the same legal claim as a person who did. My firm tried that question to a jury and defended it on appeal. In Almquist v. Finley School District No. 53, 114 Wn. App. 395, 57 P.3d 1191 (2002), ten children at Finley Elementary in eastern Washington were infected with E. coli O157:H7 after a 1998 school taco lunch. The eleventh plaintiff, and the most seriously injured, was a two-year-old who did not attend the school and never ate the meal. She had spent time with two children who did, one of them a confirmed case, and the health district’s investigators classified her as a secondary case. The school district argued on appeal that the jury had too little evidence to tie her illness to the lunch. The Washington Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the facts fit the experts’ description of a typical secondary infection, that the district had offered no plausible alternative explanation, and that the jury could reasonably find the tainted meal caused her illness. The verdict stood, and the Washington Supreme Court declined review in 2003. The reasoning is simple and it travels: person-to-person spread is a known, predictable consequence of an E. coliO157 outbreak, and the law treats a predictable injury as one the source is responsible for. A child infected at a preschool by a classmate who was infected at a farm stands in the same place that two-year-old stood.

More on preventing illness at farms, fairs and petting zoos is at fair-safety.com.

Marler Clark represents two families sickened in the Brookshire Farms outbreak. More about E. coli infections and HUS is on the firm’s site.

Saturday, November 14, 2026

Last Saturday’s edition was about files getting closed. This week (week 19) was about where the E. coli came from: a death in the Brookshire Farms outbreak the county had closed four days earlier; a baby goat at Bengtson’s Pumpkin Farm matched by DNA to the people who got sick, 166 of them; nine children with O157 from the water at Capitola Beach; and Ohio University going from four sick students to eleven in two days with no source. Not one of the four has been traced to a food, and FDA opened two more Salmonella files with no food named either. Then on Friday FDA told Stop Foodborne Illness no, it would not stop treating the names of outbreak companies as confidential, and in the same letter wrote down the legal route to doing exactly that.

One person has died in the Brookshire Farms outbreak, and the county confirmed it four days after closing the file. San Luis Obispo County Public Health confirmed Tuesday evening, through spokesman Tom Cuddy to The Tribune and KSBY, that one person in the E. coli O157 outbreak had died; no age, no other detail. The November 6 closing release stands at five confirmed cases from visits on October 17 or 18 and ten suspect cases from visits between October 16 and 26, fifteen in all; the October 30 release reported three children with hemolytic uremic syndrome. Nobody has said whether the person who died was one of the five or one of the ten, or had HUS, and the county’s public health news page still shows the closing release as its newest item. I asked the county Tuesday for the fourth sequencing result, a final report and a review by the California Department of Public Health. Marler Clark represents two families sickened in this outbreak.

Will County put a name on its source, and the name is a baby goat. The Will County Health Department announced Tuesday that whole genome sequencing found the bacteria from one baby goat in the Bengtson’s Pumpkin Farm petting zoo closely related to the bacteria from the people who got sick, with other petting zoo animals also positive for STEC. The count is seven laboratory-confirmed cases, up from five, plus 159 probable cases from the 270 people who answered the county’s survey, 166 in all; four of the first five confirmed were hospitalized as of October 26, and there is no current hospitalization count, HUS count or serotype. The farm had the handwashing signs and stations, closed the petting zoo when the county first called and brought in its own veterinarian, and the county’s Sean Conners credited that cooperation; the signs and sinks were there, and more than 160 people got sick anyway. Marler Clark is investigating on behalf of the family of one child. In Dallas, nine possible cases tied to the State Fair of Texas petting zoo have had no update; the firm represents three families there.

Nine children got O157 from a beach, and the creek that feeds it has failed its water tests for thirty years. Santa Cruz County’s November 10 release counts nine E. coli O157 cases, all children, four from Santa Cruz County and five from other Bay Area counties, all linked to Capitola Beach or the surrounding waterways; the beach is closed and four sites were sampled, with the samples at CDC. Health Officer Dr. Lisa Hernandez told KSBW two children were hospitalized, all nine have recovered, and she cannot promise a source; one child developed acute kidney failure. Soquel Lagoon has been on the Clean Water Act impaired list for pathogens since 1996, the Regional Water Board’s 2008 cleanup plan gave the city, county and sanitation district thirteen years to comply, a $600,000 treatment wetland built in 2009 found E. coli above the state guideline at the beach in every round, and Heal the Bay graded Capitola the third most polluted beach in California in 2020–21. Marler Clark has been retained by one of the nine families and is gathering the medical, sequencing and public records.

Eleven Ohio University students have STEC, up from four on Wednesday, and nobody has a source. The Athens City-County Health Department and the university said in a joint release Friday that eleven laboratory-confirmed Shiga toxin-producing E. coli cases have been identified, every one a student on the Athens campus, and that investigators are working out whether they share a common source; the count was four on Wednesday. The release gives no serotype, no hospitalizations, no onset dates and no word on whether the Ohio Department of Health or CDC is involved, and the students scatter for Thanksgiving in twelve days. Credit to The Post, the student newspaper carrying the reporting; I said so Friday.

FDA opened two more files this week with no food named, and the no-food ledger is back to 216. The CORE table was re-stamped Wednesday: new reference #1427, Salmonella Enteritidis, 14 sick, and new #1425, Salmonella Enteritidis, 35 sick, both traceback only; #1424 Salmonella Javiana rose from 65 to 70 and for the first time carries an inspection and sample collection; the Listeria file #1417 went to 52; the chicken wrap file #1421 was adjusted from 50 to 51 and still names no brand. Seven active rows carry no food, 216 illnesses, 182 of them in outbreaks FDA calls ongoing. CDC’s dashboard went from 28 to 26 on Wednesday with no new notice. The same update moved the 488-person jalapeño file to the closed side with a closing abstract carrying eleven redactions, one apparently a name FDA itself published on Import Alert 99-35 on September 22; written up this morning.

Virginia’s oysters tested positive a third time, and the river is closed with no end date. The Virginia Department of Health reports that the third round of Little Wicomico River oysters, collected November 2, came back three of eight positive for Salmonella from two of the four leases, after eight of eight on October 13 and three of four leases on October 21; bird feces were negative, the October 22 water survey found no sewage release, and a fourth round collected November 9 is pending with the UNC water samples from November 4. Reopening takes three consecutive clean rounds; there have been none, and the closure went indefinite November 8 under Shellfish Area Condemnation 010-105. CDC’s count stands at 28 sick in 13 states, five hospitalized, as of October 30; Food Safety News covered the third round Thursday; the company’s notice still does not say Salmonella. Marler Clark represents a Colorado resident in this outbreak and filed suit October 30.

Yakima County reports no new human bird flu cases, 41 infected dairy herds, and Oregon now has its first. The Yakima Health District updated Thursday: three confirmed human H5N1 cases, one death, no new cases, and 41 Yakima County dairies since October 8, the last two confirmed November 5. USDA confirmed Oregon’s first infected herd November 10, a Morrow County dairy found by routine milk surveillance, and the state agriculture and animal health associations have asked Secretary Rollins for a voluntary emergency cattle vaccination framework. Washington still licenses raw milk for retail sale.

The recall ledger carried a second raw cheese recall from the same dairy, a biscuit sandwich from a company with an outbreak history, and two more bags of sprouting seed. Family Farmstead Dairy of Worcester, New York, recalled all of its raw cheddar Tuesday for Listeria monocytogenesin twelve states, four weeks after recalling one lot for Shiga toxin-producing E. coli found in a Maryland state sample; no illnesses in either. Fresh & Ready Foods of Renton, Washington, recalled 2,414 Fresh to You biscuit sandwiches sold to break rooms, vending machines and cafeterias in Washington and Oregon October 25 to November 4, because the biscuit came from a CH Guenther & Son lot recalled for Listeria; the company’s San Fernando plant was the source of a 2025 outbreak of Listeria that put ten people in the hospital and killed one. Two more alfalfa recalls, Country Creek Acres seed and Francisco Family Foods sprouts, for possible E. coliand Salmonella, landed the same week CDC closed the Everything Sprouts outbreak at 77 sick in 16 states, six hospitalized, with the seed supplier named in a recall link and nowhere in the text; two sprout outbreaks are over and the seed problem is not. Laub’s Feeding and Cubing recalled up to 89 tons of hay cubes for Clostridium botulinum after horses died in Utah, Nevada and Arizona. FSIS’s list carried nothing new. As every week, Phyllis Entis at eFoodAlert kept the ledger I check mine against.

FDA said no to naming outbreak companies, and then wrote down how it could. On Friday FDA denied the petition Stop Foodborne Illness filed in February to stop treating the name of a company linked to an outbreak as confidential, and in the same letter said a company’s name itself is not confidential, adopted the Justice Department’s October 26 opinion that section 705(b) of the Act would let FDA write a rule making disclosure lawful, and called actively exploring rulemaking an important next step; I explained Friday why the denial is the map. Two petitions built on that letter go to FDA next week, and the other five follow by the first week of December. Congress came back Monday with funding running out December 11 and the fifteen-item lame duck list still on the table; CSPI’s Sarah Sorscher laid out what the next Congress should fix, and I agreedand added FoodNet first. Project 2027 comments are due November 30. Also this week: FDA scientists modeled which Salinas Valley farms sit downstream of the cows, 58 pastures and one feeding operation connected by runoff to 277 farms; WHO’s new estimate, which I walked through Thursday, puts unsafe food at 866 million illnesses and 1.52 million deaths in 2021; and Doug Powell, the man behind barfblog, has died; I wrote about him Monday.

That’s the week — a death in an outbreak the county had already closed; a baby goat matched to 166 sick people at a farm that had the signs and the sinks; nine children sick from a beach whose creek has failed its tests since 1996; eleven students at Ohio University and no source; two new Salmonella files with no food; oysters positive a third time; and an FDA letter that said no and drew the map. Next week brings the two disclosure petitions to FDA’s docket, Virginia’s fourth round, Ohio University’s sequencing, whatever San Luis Obispo County publishes about the death, and Thanksgiving. Check back next Saturday.

About Bill Marler

William “Bill” Marler has spent more than thirty years as a food safety lawyer and advocate, work that began with the 1993 Jack in the Box E. coli outbreak and has never really stopped since. In the years that followed, he has represented victims in nearly every major foodborne illness outbreak in the United States. That case, and the movement it launched, is the subject of the book “Poisoned” and the Emmy Award–winning Netflix documentary of the same name. Bill’s work has been profiled in The New Yorker (“A Bug in the System”), the Seattle Times (“30 years after the deadly E. coli outbreak, a Seattle attorney still fights for food safety”), the Washington Post (“He helped make burgers safer. Now he’s fighting food poisoning again”), and many others. Dozens of times a year, Bill speaks to industry, regulators, and universities across the United States, Canada, Europe, Africa, China, and Australia about a simple idea: outbreaks are preventable. He has testified before Congress on the Food Safety Modernization Act and teaches food safety at institutions including the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. He writes regularly about food litigation and food safety at Marler Blog, and in 2009 he founded Food Safety News, which he continues to publish.

On November 12, FDA moved the Salmonella Javiana jalapeño outbreak, reference #1395, to the closed side of its outbreak investigations table and posted a one-page Executive Incident Summary Abstract. Food Safety News reported that the document still does not name the supplier or the grower. That is correct, and it understates the problem. In a single paragraph, FDA applied eleven redactions. Ten cite FOIA Exemption 4. One cites Exemption 5.

Disclosure first: Marler Clark represents people sickened in this outbreak and filed the first lawsuit on August 14, 2026 in federal court in Illinois. I have a stake in the names. Everyone who eats jalapeños does too.

What happened

According to the abstract, FDA’s outbreak team was notified on July 10, 2026 by the agency’s Minneapolis District of an emerging cluster of Salmonella Javiana illnesses with a signal for Chipotle Mexican Grill. Investigators traced jalapeños eaten by 38 ill people at 15 points of service. Fourteen of the 15, accounting for 37 illnesses, converged on jalapeños distributed by Coast Citrus Distributors of San Diego, supplied by a redacted firm and grown by a redacted grower at a redacted ranch in Sinaloa, Mexico.

The public dates come from FDA’s advisory. Chipotle switched jalapeño suppliers for affected stores on July 20. Coast Citrus began a limited recall on July 22. QDOBA pulled jalapeños on July 28. FDA’s first public advisory came on August 5, the same day the recall was expanded, and 26 days after the outbreak team was notified. Downstream recalls by Taylor Fresh Foods, Whole Foods Market and NatureBest followed, along with an FSIS public health alert for meat and poultry products made with the peppers.

The final count, as of October 2, was 488 people sick in 34 states, 65 hospitalized and no deaths, with illness onsets from June 16 to August 26. Minnesota had 133 cases and Colorado 132. Those two states are 54 percent of the outbreak. Georgia had 43 and Illinois 35.

What FDA found and did not find

FDA collected two retail jalapeño samples tied to QDOBA and Chipotle locations, one environmental sample and four large-volume water samples. States and Chipotle headquarters sampled produce as well. Every sample was negative for Salmonella. The advisory says FDA could not determine a route or source of contamination.

An FDA team inspected a site from September 7 to 15 and issued a Form 483 noting personnel, sanitation and cross-contamination issues. On September 24, by the abstract’s account, a firm was added to the red list of Import Alert 99-35, which lets FDA detain produce at the border without examining it because it appears to have been handled under insanitary conditions.

What is blacked out

Here is the list. The supplier, twice. The grower, twice. The ranch, twice. The place FDA inspected and wrote up. The place the water samples were drawn. The source of the peppers in the expanded recall. The firm put on the import alert. Those are the ten Exemption 4 redactions. The eleventh, under Exemption 5, covers more than a line of text immediately after the words Chipotle Mexican Grill in the first sentence.

Exemption 4 protects trade secrets and confidential commercial information. Exemption 5 protects internal agency deliberations. The question is whether the name of a farm, or the address of an inspection, is either one.

Why the redactions do not hold up

First, a farm’s name is not a recipe. Coast Citrus knows who grew the peppers. Chipotle, QDOBA and Taylor Fresh Foods know or can find out. The Mexican supplier knows. The only people who do not know are the 488 who got sick and every buyer deciding where to source jalapeños this winter.

Second, FDA drew the line in an odd place. The same paragraph names Coast Citrus, Chipotle and QDOBA. If naming a business tied to an outbreak were a confidentiality problem, those names would be gray boxes too.

Third, and this is the part I would like FDA to explain, an import alert red list is a public document. FDA publishes it so that inspectors, brokers and importers know whose product gets stopped. Here is the link to Import Alert 99-35, as republished on November 12. Scroll to Mexico. It carries exactly one entry flagged for Salmonella Javiana: Jose Francisco Esquivel Rodriguez, Benito Juarez Sn Loc Cristo Rey, Escuinapa, Mexico, listed for jalapeño peppers, with a publication date of September 22, 2026. Escuinapa is a municipality in southern Sinaloa.

I want to be careful here. FDA’s abstract does not say that this is the redacted firm, the abstract gives September 24 and the alert shows September 22, and the alert does not say whether the listing is the grower, the ranch or the supplier. But it is the only jalapeño listing on that alert flagged for this serotype, and it was posted within two days of the date FDA gives. If it is the same firm, FDA redacted as confidential a name FDA itself had already published. If it is not, FDA should say so, because then there are two Sinaloa pepper operations with a Salmonella Javiana problem and the public has been told about one.

Fourth, the Form 483. FDA tells us its investigators documented personnel, sanitation and cross-contamination problems, and will not tell us where. The advisory described the inspected site as a common Mexican distributor. The abstract redacts it. A finding of insanitary conditions with no address attached protects no one who buys peppers. The Form 483 itself, redacted or not, has not been made public. We will request it, and the inspection report behind it, under the Freedom of Information Act.

Fifth, the Exemption 5 redaction. Deliberative material is opinion and recommendation, not fact. The redacted text sits between the July 10 Chipotle signal and the start of the traceback, in a document whose purpose is to state what happened. Twenty-six days passed between that signal and the first public warning, and people kept eating the peppers through at least July 29. What happened in those 26 days is the most useful thing this abstract could have told us.

Who has a right to know

A person standing in a grocery store deciding which peppers to buy has a right to know which farm made 488 people sick. The same is true of the other importers who buy from Sinaloa, and of the purchasing managers at restaurants like the ones implicated in this outbreak. They are the people who decide, every week, whose jalapeños end up on a plate. A buying decision is only as good as the facts behind it, and FDA is holding the facts. Naming the grower, the supplier and the ranch is how a market punishes unsafe food and rewards the growers who do it right. Redacting them asks every buyer to choose blind.

What FDA should do

Three things, none of which requires new law. Repost the abstract without the Exemption 4 redactions. Post the Form 483. State plainly which firm was added to Import Alert 99-35 and what its role in the chain was.

I have a draft citizen petition, open for comment, that asks FDA to publish these closing abstracts unredacted as a matter of routine. This one is a good exhibit. FDA did real work here. It traced 37 illnesses to one supply chain, got a recall, inspected in Mexico and closed the border to a firm. Then it blacked out the parts a buyer or a consumer could use.

The outbreak is over. The grower is still in business somewhere in Sinaloa, the cause of the contamination was never found, and Sinaloa ships winter vegetables north every year.

Since late summer a draft called Project 2027 has been moving around the food world. It is a working agenda for American food: over thirty specific things that would make food safer and that can be done within a year by people who already exist. It has now gone to well over a hundred people and organizations in food safety, public health, consumer advocacy, labor, industry and nutrition. This post is an invitation to everyone who has not seen it, and a request to everyone who has.

It is about Abby and her parents:

What thirty-three years have taught me

Many of the people reading the paper are working on agendas of their own. Some of what they are working on is in my draft and some of it is not, and all of that is welcome. But thirty-three years of this work have taught me one thing about how it usually goes: each organization works its own contacts, inside its own silo, on its own piece.

The point of Project 2027 is to try another way. Whether the subject is pathogens, antibiotic resistance, the chemicals in the food supply, or the chronic disease that follows what we eat, we are asking the same agencies and the same committees for the same thing, which is a food system that does not make people sick. Our voices are stronger together than separate.

Keep your own agenda. Nobody is asked to give anything up. The ask is only that, where this paper and yours say the same thing, we say it at the same time, to the same people, with each other’s names on it. This paper has no owner, and the measure of its success is how much of it ends up in other people’s documents.

What thirty-three years have taught me most is that this is not about any of us reading this, and it is not about who gets the credit. It is about how we prevent the next Kevin Kowalcyk or the next Riley Detwiler. Kevin was two and a half when E. coli O157:H7 killed him in 2001. Riley was sixteen months old when he died in the Jack in the Box outbreak in 1993. That is what all of this is about. I feel their parents burden in a different way every day.

Why now

The case is in the government’s own numbers. Foodborne illness costs this country $74.7 billion a year by USDA’s estimate. CDC reported this spring that not one of the pathogens it tracks declined against its 2016 to 2018 baseline. In 2025 the government cut its active foodborne illness surveillance from eight pathogens to two. In 2026 the country ran the largest parasitic foodborne outbreak in its history, 18,445 confirmed Cyclospora cases, a year after that parasite was dropped from the surveillance network that measures whether anything is working. The chronic disease bill is larger still. Heart disease and stroke killed more than 850,000 Americans in 2024, more than one in four deaths, and by CDC’s accounting cost $223.2 billion a year in health care and another $191.5 billion in lost productivity. Obesity affects 40 percent of adults and 21 percent of children and costs the health care system nearly $173 billion a year. Roughly ninety cents of every health care dollar goes to people with chronic and mental health conditions.

None of what this community built over three decades is protected. A traceability rule can be frozen in a rider nobody read. A surveillance system can be cut in half in a budget line. Each of those happened while we were fighting the last one, mostly one organization at a time.

There is also a calendar. Government funding runs out on December 11, and a new Congress is seated on January 3, 2027. What we ask for in the next eight weeks, and whether we ask for it together, will decide a good deal of what is possible in the next two years.

What is in the paper

The draft has seven parts: what Congress can do, what the agencies can do with no new law, money, the states, industry, diet and ultra-processed food, and the hearings worth asking for. It runs from the traceability rule and infant formula testing to heavy metals in baby food, food chemicals, Salmonella in poultry, routine antibiotics in animals that are not sick, imported food, front-of-package labeling and school food.

Thirty-plus items is not a program anyone finishes in a year, and the paper says so. It names what comes first. Keep any rider that would stop FDA’s traceability rule out of the funding bill. Restore the foodborne illness surveillance that was cut, starting with the laboratories. Name the companies linked to outbreaks, whether or not there is a recall. And from the chronic disease side of the room, ask FDA to release its response to David Kessler’s pending citizen petition.

That last one matters to me. I have spent more than thirty years on bacteria and viruses, and the draft shows it. But diet-related disease is where most of the sickness, most of the deaths and most of the money are. The people who work on E. coli and the people who work on ultra-processed food have every reason to work together and have spent a decade not doing so. I would like this to be the document where that changes.

What I am asking you to send me

Nobody is asked to sign anything. The request at this stage is four things:

Priorities. Which items matter most to you or your organization. I would rather be told which twelve matter than be told the list is too long.

Corrections. Where I have a fact, a bill number, a date or a description of your work wrong. Readers have already corrected the draft in several places, and each correction made it better.

What is missing. The issue you are carrying that is not in it, or the bill or petition that would get an item done faster.

What should come out. One item has already been struck on comment. More should be.

Tell me, too, where your own agenda already says what this one says. Those overlaps are where the first joint letters will come from.

The dates

November 30. Comments are due, by email to bmarler@marlerclark.com.

December. What comes back goes into a shorter draft, renumbered and recirculated. It is meant to be a joint document, not a trial lawyer’s memo.

January. In the first or second week, once the new Congress is seated, I will host a working meeting in Washington for the people reading the paper, with a way to join remotely. I would rather settle the draft in a room than by email. Signatures come after that, item by item, which is more honest than unanimity and harder to dismiss.

How to get the paper

If you have not seen Project 2027 and want to, email me at bmarler@marlerclark.com and I will send it. That goes for advocates, academics, regulators past and present, people in industry, reporters, and the families who have lived through an outbreak. You do not need an organization behind you to have a comment worth making.

I have said for thirty years that I would like to be put out of business. I cannot do that alone, and neither can any one organization on the list. Read it, mark it up and send it back.