On December 22, 2024, someone told ByHeart that a baby was in the hospital with suspected botulism.

Nothing in the FDA’s records shows that ByHeart recalled anything, called California’s Infant Botulism Treatment and Prevention Program, or did anything at all except mark the complaint “lost to follow-up.”

Nearly eleven months later, on November 8, 2025, ByHeart recalled two lots. Three days after that, it recalled everything it had ever made.

I know this because the FDA has now released three inspection reports for BlendHouse Portland, the Oregon plant that filled every can and stick pack of ByHeart Whole Nutrition: April 2024, March 2025, and the amended report from the November 2025 outbreak inspection. Read them in order and you watch a complaint system fail in slow motion.

“Only Ever Received One”

When the FDA walked into Portland on November 11, 2025, on what it called a “mission critical” outbreak inspection, the plant’s Director of Quality told investigators the company had “only ever received one complaint” where a parent reported a hospitalization and suspected C. botulinum. Complaint CN-005563. (Outbreak EIR, p. 4.)

The complaint table gives the date: December 22, 2024. The parent was “lost to follow-up.” No lot number was ever obtained. That is the whole entry. (Outbreak EIR, pp. 7–8.)

Infant botulism is rare, roughly a hundred or so cases a year nationwide. Before 2025, no one had ever tied an outbreak of it to infant formula. A parent calling a formula company to say the doctors think my baby has botulism is not a colic complaint. It is a five-alarm fire.

And ByHeart’s own policy said so. Under the complaint procedure the FDA described, any health complaint involving hospitalization is a “serious” complaint, and ByHeart’s Chief Medical Officer is supposed to review every health complaint for “a potential for serious adverse health consequences.” (March 2025 EIR, p. 3.)

Three Months Later, the FDA Came Back and Never Heard About It

In March 2025, the FDA inspected the same Portland plant. The investigator reviewed ByHeart’s complaints from April 26, 2024 through March 14, 2025, a window that includes December 22, 2024.

Here is what ByHeart reported for that window: 3,247 complaints, 2,167 of them health-related. Of those 2,167, only 69 were forwarded to the Portland plant. Of those 69, ten were classified as “sensitive.” (March 2025 EIR, p. 4.)

The investigator then listed all ten, one by one. Every one was a bacterial illness. None was the December 22 botulism complaint. The word “botulism” does not appear anywhere in that 30-page report. (March 2025 EIR, pp. 4–7.)

The plant got “No Action Indicated.” (Food Safety News.)

So, one of two things happened. Either the December complaint never made it from ByHeart’s New York headquarters to the plant, or it made it and was not classified as sensitive. Either way, a hospitalized baby with suspected botulism did not make the list of complaints worth showing the FDA. Ten bacterial complaints did.

The Ten Sensitive Complaints

These are the complaints ByHeart did let the FDA see. Read them:

A daughter diagnosed with Salmonella. (24-003.)

An infant with “a salmonella infection that has entered the blood stream.” (24-011.)

A bad diaper rash and diarrhea, later diagnosed as Campylobacter. (24-035.)

An infant’s stool positive for Salmonella. (24-047.) Another. (24-059.)

An infant who “developed Salmonella poisoning” after drinking two batches. ByHeart opened two separate investigations, one per batch. (24-061 and 24-063.)

Mucous, diarrhea and blood, with cultures confirming Salmonella. (24-066.)

Two weeks of diarrhea, positive for E. coli. (24-080.)

Diarrhea, high fever, and blood and mucous in the stool, diagnosed as Salmonella. (24-0084.) (March 2025 EIR, pp. 4–6.)

That is eight Salmonella complaint files, one Campylobacter, one E. coli.

And every investigation ended the same way. “No evidence that the batch of infant formula was contaminated.” “All process controls were effective at managing any risks.” (March 2025 EIR, pp. 4–7.)

Here is the trick. ByHeart told the FDA it “did not receive more than one sensitive complaint for any batch.” (March 2025 EIR, p. 4.) Of course not. It counted batch by batch. When one sick baby drank two batches, that became two investigations of one complaint each. A system built that way will never see a pattern, because it never puts two sick babies on the same page.

Before That: Three “Serious” Complaints, All Called Allergies

Go back one more year. In April 2024, the FDA inspected Portland for the first time. Between July 31, 2023 and April 23, 2024, ByHeart reported just three “serious” health complaints. All three involved hospitalization. ByHeart called two of them milk protein allergies and one an allergy “not otherwise specified.” None of the complaints it sent the Portland plant in that period was health-related at all. (April 2024 EIR, pp. 3–4.)

Remember those dates. When CDC and FDA later looked backward, they found ByHeart botulism cases with onsets starting in December 2023, and California reported six more cases with onsets between November 2024 and June 2025. I have written about how this outbreak went on for years. Babies were getting sick during exactly the period when ByHeart’s complaint files showed nothing but allergies and, later, a botulism report closed as lost to follow-up.

What ByHeart Was Looking For

The March 2025 report also explains why ByHeart never found the organism. ByHeart’s food safety plan for Portland “did not identify any potential physical, chemical, or biological hazards” associated with the ingredients it received. (March 2025 EIR, p. 18.) The base powder, made with organic whole milk powder, was not treated as a hazard.

Its finished-product testing covered Cronobacter, Salmonella, Listeria, Staph aureus, E. coli and coliforms, Bacillus cereus, and aerobic plate count. Not C. botulinum. (March 2025 EIR, p. 19.) The outbreak report says the same thing about the two recalled lots: their release testing covered indicator organisms, Salmonella, and Cronobacter. (Outbreak EIR, p. 20.)

Even the Cronobacter protection did not work. ByHeart bought in-line equipment in 2022 “as an extra layer of protection against Cronobacter.” It never ran at its factory certification, and after troubleshooting from September 2023 to June 2025, ByHeart stopped counting it as a control. (Outbreak EIR, p. 20.)

The Constipation Complaints

Constipation is usually the first sign of infant botulism. The outbreak report lists what parents said about the two recalled lots:

A parent said ByHeart caused constipation, confirmed by a pediatrician. It went away when the baby came off ByHeart and came back when ByHeart was restarted. The FDA’s entry ends: “No root cause analysis was conducted.” (CN-007818.)

A colicky, constipated baby with a swollen belly. Lost to follow-up. (CN-007873.)

A ten-month-old constipated for four days. (CN-008241.) Another baby “getting constipated.” Three calls, lost to follow-up. (CN-008203.)

And an infant with no bowel movement for three weeks. ByHeart’s answer: it “did not receive similar complaints.” (193253.) (Outbreak EIR, pp. 4–8.)

Then the Botulism Complaints Came

After the recall, the complaints stopped being subtle. Two parents told the FDA their babies on ByHeart had infant botulism. (CN-008142, CN-008141.) A baby was hospitalized and tested for “GI bacteria including botulism” after four canisters from a recalled batch. (CN-008170.) And this, in full: “We are in the hospital with our daughter. She is being treated for botulism.” (CN-008192.) (Outbreak EIR, pp. 4–6.)

Many complaints the FDA forwarded were simply not in ByHeart’s system, or got “no response or follow up without a valid lot code.” For one family, Portland’s quality director “was not sure why” no one followed up, and ByHeart opened a deviation report to explain it. (Outbreak EIR, pp. 8–9.)

Who Was Responsible

The outbreak report names Ron Belldegrun, ByHeart’s CEO and owner, as the company’s “most responsible person.” (Outbreak EIR, pp. 10, 15.) The same executives keep appearing at close-out: the Chief Quality Officer, the head of supply chain, the VP of Quality, and the senior director of manufacturing sat in on March 2025 (March 2025 EIR, pp. 26–27), and again in January 2026, joined by the Chief Medical Officer. (Outbreak EIR, p. 27.) In March 2025 the FDA even reminded ByHeart that it was required to have a redundancy risk management plan. (March 2025 EIR, p. 27.)

What Should Have Happened

I have done this work for more than thirty years. When a parent reports a hospitalized baby with suspected botulism, a responsible formula company calls back until it reaches the family. It calls the hospital. It calls California’s Infant Botulism program, which talks to every treating doctor in the country. It pulls its retains and sends them to a lab that can find C. botulinum. And it tells the FDA, and it puts that complaint in front of the next FDA investigator who walks in the door.

ByHeart wrote “lost to follow-up.” Three months later it showed the FDA ten bacterial complaints, each closed one batch at a time. Nearly a year later, 48 babies in 17 states had been hospitalized and treated with BabyBIG.

Complaint systems exist for one reason: to hear the warning before the outbreak. ByHeart heard it. It just was not listening.

Sources

https://www.marlerblog.com/files/2026/11/1-final_applied_blendhouse_portland_or_3013670080_eir_11-11-25_-1-23-26_amendment_1_br_nj_vlo.508.pdf

https://www.marlerblog.com/files/2026/11/2-2024-04-26-Portland-EIR-2024-04-22-to-04-26-FEI-3013670080.pdf

https://www.marlerblog.com/files/2026/11/3-2026-01-23-Portland-EIR-outbreak-inspection-2025-11-11-to-2026-01-23-Amend-1-FEI-3013670080.pdf

https://www.marlerblog.com/files/2026/11/4-2025-03-27-Portland-EIR-2025-03-17-to-03-27-Amend-1-FEI-3013670080.pdf

Four of the country’s leading researchers on food and health published an editorial today in the American Journal of Public Health, “US Ultra processed Food Policy: Finding Common Ground.” The authors are James Krieger of the University of Washington and Healthy Food America, Kelly Brownell of Duke University, Ashley Gearhardt of the University of Michigan and Lindsey Smith-Taillie of the University of North Carolina. Their argument is that people who care about the American diet are losing time arguing with each other about ultra processed foods (UPFs) while the chance to do something about them is in front of us. They offer what they call “a pragmatic path forward.” I agree with them, and I want to say why.

I have spent more than 30 years on the part of the food problem that puts people in the hospital within days: E. coli, Salmonella, Listeria. Ultra processed food works on a longer clock. The policy fight, though, looks very familiar.

What does the editorial say about ultra processed foods and health?

The authors start with the size of the problem. The United States leads the world in UPF consumption, and more than half of the calories Americans eat come from these products. They describe UPFs as industrially produced foods built for profit: engineered to be hard to stop eating, to sit on a shelf for a long time and to be made from cheap ingredients.

On the science, they point to a large body of observational research tying UPF consumption to obesity, cardiovascular and metabolic disease, dementia and mental health disorders, and to randomized trials linking UPFs to higher calorie intake and weight gain. Nearly all of that research rests on the Nova classification system. Taken together, they write, the evidence meets the Bradford Hill criteria for causation, which is the standard public health uses to decide when it is time to act.

They are also candid that not everyone agrees. A minority of scientists and advocates still question the UPF concept, how it is defined, and whether it should be the target of nutrition policy. The authors list the reasons fairly: some prefer a system built on nutrients, some have financial conflicts of interest, and some raise legitimate questions about biological mechanisms. Their concern is what the disagreement is costing. It is delaying policy and putting a rare opportunity at risk.

Why is this the moment for UPF policy?

The editorial lays out how much is moving at once. States have proposed and passed bills restricting UPFs in schools, removing certain ingredients from the food supply and requiring labels. FDA is working on a federal definition of ultra processed food. The Secretary of Health and Human Services is calling for action. Bills have been introduced in Congress. The 2025 Dietary Guidelines recommend avoiding highly processed foods. The San Francisco City Attorney has sued, alleging industry deception and fraud, and the authors expect more litigation to follow. Colombia and Brazil are moving ahead with their own policies. The authors describe the support as bipartisan, which in food policy does not happen often and does not last long.

What is the food industry doing about it?

According to the authors, the industry is opposing UPF policy with tactics borrowed from tobacco, alcohol and opioids. They describe an effort to cast doubt on the UPF concept in comments to FDA and through public relations, with sympathetic academics enlisted to help. They describe an industry preference for a nutrient-based system, which a company can satisfy by reformulating a product, for example by swapping non-sugar sweeteners for added sugar, without changing what the product is. They also describe a campaign called “Americans for Ingredients Transparency,” launched to preempt state and local action. The point of that strategy, they write, is to confine policy to the federal level, where the industry has the power to shape legislation and regulation to fit its interests.

What do the authors propose?

First, that advocates stop handing the industry its best argument. Disagreements among experts are normal, the authors write, and the same kind of disagreement surfaced over trans fats and sodium. Aired the way they have been, though, these differences look bigger than they are and let the industry claim the science is too unsettled to act on. Waiting for absolute scientific consensus would set a bar that few public health measures, the regulation of nicotine products among them, could have cleared.

Second, a definition that works in a statute. Krieger and Smith-Taillie chaired a Healthy Eating Research expert panel that recommended one: a product is ultra processed if it contains a cosmetic ingredient, such as a flavor, color or emulsifier, or an industrial ingredient not used in home kitchens, such as high-fructose corn syrup. A product that meets FDA’s criteria for a “healthy” claim would be exempt unless it contains a non-sugar sweetener.

Third, answers to the standing objections, set out in a table. More research is always welcome, but the authors say the current evidence is a sound basis for policy and rigorous enough to survive judicial scrutiny, and they note that policies on trans fats, tobacco and lead went forward despite scientific uncertainty. To those who would rather regulate nutrients, they answer that the two approaches work together: 90 percent of U.S. products high in saturated fat, added sugar or sodium are UPFs, while 39 percent of UPFs are not high in any of the three, a gap a nutrient-only rule leaves open for reformulation.

Fourth, five policies drawn from the panel report: an excise tax on selected UPFs such as sweetened beverages and processed meats; limits on UPFs bought and served in publicly funded settings, including schools, childcare and government facilities; publicly funded counter marketing modeled on the tobacco Truth campaign; guidance to limit UPFs in dietary guidelines; and a front-of-package warning label identifying a product as a UPF.

Why does a food safety lawyer care?

Because I have watched this argument before, and I have seen how it ends when government acts.

After the 1993 Jack in the Box outbreak, USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service declared E. coli O157:H7 an adulterant in ground beef and began testing for it. Meat and supermarket industry groups went to federal court in Texas to stop the testing and lost. In 2002, after the ConAgra ground beef recall, I wrote an op-ed asking the beef industry to put me out of business. Over time, with a clear rule and an industry that eventually paid attention, it largely did. Hamburger E. coli cases, which once were most of what my firm did, are now close to zero. I consider that the best thing to happen in food safety in my lifetime.

Nobody had every scientific question about O157 answered in 1994. What we had was enough evidence of harm, a definition that an inspector could apply and a rule with consequences. That is what the editorial’s authors are asking for here. Open questions about mechanisms are a reason to keep doing research. They are not a reason to wait.

I also pay attention when an industry’s first move is preemption. In my experience, a company confident in its products argues the merits. A company that wants to take the decision away from states and cities is telling you something about how it expects to do on the merits.

Where I come down

The authors end by saying the tools are in hand: strong evidence of harm, a definition that can be applied and a set of evidence-based policies. I agree. I would rather argue about the details of a rule than about whether to have one. Start with the places where children eat and with an honest label on the package. Let the research on mechanisms continue. And do not let the people who sell the products write the definition of what they are selling.

The beef industry showed that a food industry can change when the rules are clear and the consequences are real. I would like to see the same thing happen here.

https://www.marlerblog.com/files/2026/11/Krieger_AJPH_2026_US-UPF-Policy_Finding-Common-Ground.pdf

Little Wicomico Oyster Company, the Virginia grower whose raw oysters CDC says made 28 people sick in 13 states, has sued the Virginia Marine Resources Commission for more than $9.1 million. According to WRIC, which reviewed the court documents, the company says the Commission and the Virginia Marine Police kept it from tending about 75 million juvenile oysters in the Little Wicomico River after the Virginia Department of Health closed the river on October 9, and that about 16 million of them died.

A disclosure first. Marler Clark represents two people sickened in this outbreak in federal lawsuits against the company: a Colorado woman in Denver and, with Regan Zambri Long, a Maryland man hospitalized with sepsis, in Richmond. I have no part in the company’s case against the Commission, and I take no position on whether Virginia owes it money. My interest is in what happens to the oysters.

The short version

  • The outbreak: 28 sick, 13 states, five hospitalized, no deaths, as of CDC’s October 30 update. The investigation is open. Illnesses began as early as May 29.
  • The river: closed to oyster and clam harvest since October 9, indefinitely since November 8. Four rounds of oysters from the company’s cages have been tested. All four found Salmonella.
  • The lawsuit: filed Sunday, November 15, in Northumberland County Circuit Court. It asks for a permanent injunction protecting 58 million living seed oysters and payment for 16 million dead ones.
  • The court order: a Lancaster County Circuit Court judge has allowed the company to pull seed oysters from the closed river, work them at its plant, and put them back.
  • The open question: what those oysters will have to show before anyone eats one raw.

What the company has filed

WRIC reports that the complaint accuses the Commission and the Marine Police of unlawfully barring maintenance since about October 12, and alleges that officers threatened to arrest owner Andrew Cockrell if he took a bag or cage of seed oysters out of the water. The company’s lawyer, Tim Anderson, wrote on X that the damages claim is one for inverse condemnation. He has estimated a possible 30 percent loss, more than 20 million oysters, and posted on Monday that “these 480,000 are already dead.”

The husbandry is real work. Juvenile oysters are pulled, tumbled, broken apart, sized, rebagged and returned. 13News Now, which covered the hearing, reports that Mr. Cockrell testified the company has about 54,000 cages plus nursery bags, roughly three years of production, and that oysters were already dying in their bags.

The dates are not consistent in the reporting. 13News Now puts the hearing and the restraining order on November 6. WRIC dates the order November 12. Mr. Anderson wrote on November 13 that the Supreme Court of Virginia had rejected the state’s emergency appeal and dissolved a stay. I have not seen the orders. The next hearing is set for December 11 at 2 p.m. in Lancaster County.

As 13News Now describes the order, the company may clean, sort, resize and rebag its seed stock and return it to the river, and Marine Police may watch on the water or at the plant. The order does not reopen the river, allow sales from it, or establish that the oysters are safe to eat.

The numbers do not reconcile yet

  • 75 million oysters less 58 million living is 17 million, not 16 million.
  • Thirty percent of 75 million is 22.5 million.
  • The only loss described as already counted is 480,000.
  • $9.1 million for 16 million oysters is about 57 cents each, described as market value, for oysters that are not market size.

The complaint may explain all of this. The news reports do not.

The rule the judge relied on turns on six months

13News Now reports that the judge pointed to the Commission’s own relay regulation, 4VAC20-310-20, which says nothing in that chapter prohibits harvesting, transporting or handling seed-stock shellfish from condemned areas. The same chapter defines seed stock as shellfish “at least six months from marketing for human consumption.”

That definition is where the public health question sits. Mr. Cockrell testified, according to 13News Now, that the 75 million range from very small seed to oysters approaching market size. WRIC, describing the order, says the seed oysters are months from market size. How many months, for how many oysters, and by whose count?

Six months is a calendar, not a test. At the hearing, the Commission’s lawyer said no studies show whether seed oysters purge Salmonella in clean water, and a health department witness said the agency has no established purging rate for Salmonella and does not regulate seed stock the way it regulates market oysters. These oysters are not going to clean water in any event. The order sends them back to the same river.

What Virginia has found in that river

CollectedWhat Virginia sampledResult
October 13400 oysters from company cages, eight meat samples, four leasesEight of eight positive for Salmonella
October 21Company cages, four leasesThree of four leases positive
November 2Company cages, eight meat samplesThree of eight positive, two leases
November 9Company cages, ten meat samples, five leasesTen of ten positive
November 16Fifth roundNo results posted; page last updated November 17

Reopening takes three consecutive clean rounds, and there has not been one. Bird feces and a human sewage marker tested negative, and the health department has not identified the source. Its outbreak page, last updated November 17, says nothing about seed oysters or the court order. I laid out the third round on Food Poison Journal and CDC’s findings here.

Questions I would want answered before December 11

  1. How many of the 75 million oysters are at least six months from market today, and who verifies it?
  2. Will oysters raised in this river be tested for Salmonella before sale, or does the six-month clock alone clear them?
  3. Will the three-clean-rounds standard that governs the river also govern this crop?
  4. WRIC reports the judge found no cross-contamination risk because the seed and market operations are in separate waterways. Is the plant where seed is tumbled the same plant that handles market oysters from the company’s other rivers, and what separates the two on shore?
  5. Where do the dead oysters and shell go?
  6. Will the health department finish a purging study before any of these oysters reach market size?

A court has agreed that these oysters need tending, and a dying crop is a real loss to a family business. I do not doubt either point. But the people in this outbreak began getting sick in May, months before the September 18 to October 8 harvest that was recalled. Who pays for the dead oysters is a question for the Commission and the court. What the living ones must show before someone eats them raw is a question for everyone else.

Yesterday I wrote about the dates in FDA’s closing reports on three Salmonella outbreaks. Today is about the black boxes.

The three Executive Incident Summary Abstracts cover investigations FDA closed on November 4: file #1402, Salmonella I 4,[5],12:i:- in romaine lettuce; file #1387, Salmonella Oranienburg; and file #1403, Salmonella Newport. Together they account for 261 illnesses and 47 hospitalizations. Coral Beach at Food Safety News has a story on each: romaine, Oranienburg and Newport.

Credit first. FDA does not have to post these abstracts at all, and a redacted report beats no report. But read them with a pencil and count.

What FDA withheld

FileSick / hosp.The foodThe firmWhere people got sick
#1402 Salmonella I 4,[5],12:i:-43 / 6Romaine, named at closureProcessor withheld under (b)(4)States withheld
#1387 SalmonellaOranienburg99 / 22Withheld under (b)(5)Packinghouse, grower and farms withheldStates withheld
#1403 SalmonellaNewport119 / 19Withheld under (b)(5)None identified. Growers’ location withheldStates withheld

By my count the romaine abstract carries 14 redaction marks, the Newport abstract 11 and the Oranienburg abstract about 40. That is roughly 65 marks across three short documents. In two of the three, the withheld item is the answer to the only question most people have, which is what the food was.

In no file does FDA say where the 261 people live.

Two exemptions, two different problems

FDA’s abstracts page says the reports are redacted to comply with disclosure laws, including the Trade Secrets Act and the Freedom of Information Act. The marks in the margins point to two FOIA exemptions, and they deserve separate treatment.

Exemption 4, marked (b)(4), covers trade secrets and confidential commercial information that a company gives the government. FDA uses it for firm names, and its long-held position is that supply chain relationships are confidential. I disagree with how far FDA takes that, but it is at least the right exemption to argue about.

Here is the argument. In the romaine file, four traceback legs converged on one supplier and processor of prepackaged, shredded romaine. FDA inspected that firm, issued a Form 483 on its sanitation preventive controls, corrective actions and verification, and concluded that the firm’s romaine was the confirmed outbreak vehicle. A customer list can be a commercial secret. The fact that a company’s lettuce made 43 people sick is not one.

FDA names firms all the time when there is a recall. It named a jalapeño importer, an egg producer and a lettuce processor this year. The difference in the romaine file is not the law. The lettuce was past its shelf life, so there was nothing left to recall, and with no recall there was no name. When the fuller summary of the 2024 romaine E. coli outbreak finally came out, the processor’s name was in it.

Exemption 5, marked (b)(5), is the bigger problem. It covers internal government memoranda that would be privileged in litigation. In practice that means the deliberative process: advice, recommendations and drafts exchanged before a decision is made. The Supreme Court said in EPA v. Mink in 1973 that purely factual material that can be separated from the deliberation is not protected. Since 2016 the statute has also required an agency to reasonably foresee harm before it withholds anything.

Now look at what is marked (b)(5) in these abstracts:

In the Newport abstract, every redaction is marked (b)(5), including the food in the document’s own title, the common ingredient among the sick, and the location of the growers.

In the Oranienburg abstract, the commodity in the title is marked (b)(5).

In the romaine abstract, the state agency that reported the cluster, the state where the subclusters were found and the party that ran the ingredient analysis are all marked (b)(5).

A vegetable is a fact. A state is a fact. Neither one is advice, and neither is a draft.

FDA knows how to print these facts. Its abstract for the jalapeño outbreak, posted last week, includes a table of cases state by state. CDC publishes a map of states for every outbreak it announces. FDA’s own investigations table names commodities as a matter of routine. Whatever harm FDA foresees from telling the public that a closed outbreak involved a particular crop, it has not said what that harm is.

No ongoing risk

FDA describes these abstracts as post-response documents. The outbreak is over and, FDA says, no longer poses an ongoing risk to the public. Take that at face value and the case for secrecy gets weaker, not stronger. If the danger has passed, naming the food cannot cause a panic and cannot interfere with an investigation that is closed.

The Oranienburg abstract also undercuts the premise. FDA traced six points of sale to one packinghouse. It inspected the farms outside the growing season, left a Form 4056 noting multiple sanitation issues, and recommended another inspection with sampling next season. Those farms will plant again. The cluster was flagged with a signal for Mexican-style restaurants in the Midwest, and those restaurants cannot ask a supplier one useful question about a commodity FDA will not name.

In the Newport file, FDA’s Division of Import Operations increased import screening for two growers. That tells us the suspect produce crosses a border. Which crop, and which country, is withheld.

What I am doing about it

First, I am asking FDA under FOIA for the Form 483 in the romaine file and the Form 4056 in the Oranienburg file. Neither has been made public in any form.

Second, the citizen petition I am drafting on outbreak disclosure will ask FDA to name the firm when it calls a product the confirmed vehicle, and to publish the facts in these abstracts without Exemption 5 marks: the food, the states and the dates.

Third, three questions for FDA, which I would be glad to print the answers to:

1. What deliberation is revealed by naming the food in files #1387 and #1403?

2. Why did the jalapeño abstract get a state-by-state table when these three did not?

3. Will FDA name the processor whose romaine it calls the confirmed vehicle in file #1402?

There are 218 people in the two files where no food was ever named. Nobody has told them publicly what made them sick. Forty-one of them were hospitalized. They are owed a noun.

I have been doing foodborne illness litigation for more than thirty years, and I have read a lot of “what not to eat” stories. Most are forgettable. The one Alice Callahan published in the New York Times this morning, “5 Foods That Food Safety Experts Avoid,” is not. It is short, it is accurate, and it explains why each food is risky rather than just telling people to be afraid of it. A tip of the pen to her.

Ms. Callahan, who covers nutrition and health for the Times and holds a Ph.D. in nutrition, asked several people who work in food safety what they personally stay away from. The five answers: raw sprouts, deli meat, packaged salads, raw shellfish and precut melon. Full disclosure: I am the one who gave her the bagged salad answer.

Why this list rings true to me

None of these foods is on the list because of a hunch. Each one is there because of how it is grown, processed or handled, and each one has an outbreak record behind it. I have spent my career in that record.

Sprouts. Seeds are germinated in warm, wet conditions that are just as good for bacteria as they are for sprouts. I first called on FDA to require a warning label on raw sprout packaging in March 2003, during a Salmonella outbreak traced to sprouts in Oregon, Washington and California. This summer brought two more sprout outbreaks, and I have drafted a citizen petition asking FDA for that same label.

Deli meat and melon. These are both Listeria stories. I represented the families of all 33 people who died in the 2011 Jensen Farms cantaloupe outbreak, and dozens of people sickened in the 2024 Boar’s Head outbreak. Listeria grows at refrigerator temperatures, which is why time in a deli case or a clamshell of cut fruit works against the consumer and not for them.

Packaged salads. I have been suing lettuce and leafy greens companies for nearly thirty years. I represented the families of the five people who died in the 2006 Dole spinach E. coli outbreak. As I told Ms. Callahan, when lettuce from many fields is cut, washed and mixed together, “If something goes wrong, it goes wrong in a big way.” I buy whole heads and wash them myself. That is not risk-free, but it is a smaller bet.

Raw shellfish. Oysters, clams and scallops filter the water they live in and concentrate whatever is in it, including norovirus and Vibrio. Cooking is the control step, and raw shellfish skip it.

The people she quoted

Ms. Callahan also chose her sources well. Barbara Kowalcyk of George Washington University is a friend and one of the most brilliant people working in food safety. Her son Kevin died in 2001 of an E. coli infection, and she has spent the years since making the system better for other families. Her point in the article is the right one: this is not about telling anyone what to eat. It is about understanding that some foods carry more risk than others, especially for young children, older adults, pregnant women and people with weakened immune systems.

The article also quotes Sandra Eskin of Stop Foodborne Illness, Ellen Shumaker of North Carolina State University and Matthew Moore of the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Readers get the science and the practical advice from people who know both.

What I would add

Consumers can lower their own risk with the choices in this article, and they should. But the burden should not sit with the person standing at the deli counter or the salad case. The companies that grow, process and sell these foods are the ones that can test, clean, keep product cold and trace it when something goes wrong. I have been asking the industry to put me out of business since 2002. The beef industry largely did. The foods on this list are where the work remains.

Read Ms. Callahan’s piece. Then take a look in your refrigerator.

On November 18, FDA added three documents to its outbreak investigation table: the Executive Incident Summary Abstracts for three Salmonella files it closed on November 4. Together the three outbreaks sickened 261 people and put 47 of them in the hospital. Coral Beach at Food Safety News has a story on each one: romaine, Oranienburg and Newport.

FDA deserves credit first. The abstracts went up two weeks after the files closed, and they carry dates the public had never seen. Those dates are the story. In all three files the government had a food in hand in August. In one, the public learned the food in November. In the other two, the public has never been told.

The short version

FileSick / hosp.When a food was identifiedWhen the public was toldInspection record
#1402 Salmonella I 4,[5],12:i:-43 / 6CDC named romaine the leading vehicle August 7November 4, at closureForm 483, September 1. Firm name redacted
#1387 SalmonellaOranienburg99 / 22Six traceback legs led to one packinghouseNever. Table reads Not IdentifiedForm 4056, August 28. Firm name redacted
#1403 SalmonellaNewport119 / 19CDC named a suspect produce item August 20Never. Table reads Not IdentifiedNo inspection. Two samples, both negative

Romaine, file #1402

The romaine abstract says CDC brought this cluster to FDA on August 4 with a possible signal for romaine already attached. State investigators had two subclusters with romaine in common. On August 7, CDC named romaine the leading vehicle of interest.

FDA posted the file to its public table five days later, on August 12, with the product listed as Not Yet Identified. It stayed that way for 84 days. I wrote on November 5 that FDA would not say when it knew the food was romaine. Now it has. It was 89 days before it told anyone.

The traceback covered twelve sick people who ate romaine at four points of sale between July 7 and July 20. All four legs converged on a single supplier and processor of prepackaged, shredded romaine. FDA and a state partner began a full-scope preventive controls inspection there on August 18. They took one environmental sample of 110 swabs, which was negative. No finished product was tested because it was past its shelf life. The inspection closed September 1 with a Form 483 citing the firm’s sanitation preventive controls, its corrective actions and its verification procedures.

FDA’s conclusion is that this firm’s romaine is the confirmed outbreak vehicle. The firm’s name is redacted. The Form 483 has not been made public.

Oranienburg, file #1387

The Oranienburg abstract says that on June 29 an FDA emergency response coordinator flagged a cluster in the Midwest with a signal for Mexican-style restaurants. The traceback covered 13 sick people and six points of sale, and every leg led to one packinghouse whose growers share fields. Twelve lots were implicated, harvested between April 28 and May 17, and lots from different harvest days were commingled in outgoing shipments.

The inspection assignment went out on August 18, fifty days after the signal and three months after the last implicated harvest. The inspection closed August 28, outside the growing season, and FDA recommended coming back next season with sampling. It left a Form 4056, the produce farm observations form, noting multiple sanitation issues. FDA says it had no indicators from which to form a hypothesis about how the contamination happened.

The commodity is redacted, even in the title of the document. FDA’s table still lists the product as Not Identified. Those shared fields will be harvested again next season.

Newport, file #1403

The Newport abstract says CDC notified FDA on August 7. There were three subclusters with one ingredient in common, and CDC named that ingredient the suspect vehicle on August 20. FDA posted the file six days later with the product listed as Not Yet Identified.

The traceback covered 15 sick people and eight points of service. It found multiple growers and suppliers and did not converge on one. FDA’s import office increased screening for two growers, which tells us at least part of the supply was imported. Two produce samples were negative. There was no inspection. The file closed with the source undetermined and no action taken. It is the largest of the three, 119 people, and the public record still does not say what they ate.

The exemption FDA used

Firm names are withheld under FOIA Exemption 4, confidential commercial information. I disagree with that reading and have said so, but it is at least the agency’s stated position.

What is new is Exemption 5. The states where these 261 people live, the state agencies that worked the cases, and the commodity in two of the files are marked (b)(5). In the Newport abstract, every redaction carries that mark. Exemption 5 protects privileged internal government communications, the back-and-forth before a decision. It does not protect facts. A state is a fact. A vegetable is a fact. CDC publishes state case maps in its outbreak notices, and FDA’s own jalapeño abstract, posted November 12, printed a state-by-state table.

A fair word for the firms

No sample in any of the three files matched an outbreak strain. Epidemiology and traceback are real evidence, and FDA and the courts rely on them every day, but a firm identified that way should be named along with the negative results and its own response. Disclosure of the whole record is fairer to a company than a blacked-out box that invites guessing.

What I am asking FDA to do

1. Put the suspect food on the table when CDC names it. For romaine that was August 7.

2. Name the firm when FDA’s own traceback converges on it and FDA calls its product the confirmed vehicle, as it did in #1402.

3. Post the Form 483 and the Form 4056. We will request both under the Freedom of Information Act.

4. Stop marking states and foods under Exemption 5.

5. Tell the public whether the follow-up inspection FDA recommended in #1387 takes place, and what it finds.

HHS and FDA leadership have promised radical transparency, and these three abstracts show how close the agency already is. The facts were collected, dated and written down. What remains is to publish them while people can still use them. That is what the citizen petitions I have drafted on outbreak disclosure ask for, and I would rather work with FDA on getting there than argue about it afterward.

Questions people ask

Which company supplied the romaine in the 2026 Salmonella I 4,[5],12:i:- outbreak? FDA has not said. Its abstract identifies a single supplier and processor of prepackaged shredded romaine and redacts the name.

What food caused the 2026 Salmonella Oranienburg and Newport outbreaks? FDA has not said. Both abstracts describe a produce item and redact it.

Is any of this food still for sale? FDA says the romaine was past its shelf life before the investigation ended. No recall was issued in any of the three outbreaks.

On November 16, 2026, Senators Patty Murray of Washington, Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire and Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin asked HHS Inspector General T. March Bell to investigate how staffing and policy changes at FDA and CDC affected the federal response to this summer’s Cyclospora outbreak. Their letter ends with thirteen questions.

The Inspector General should open that investigation. The questions are the right ones, most of them can be answered from records the agencies already hold, and nobody with authority to pull those records has yet done it. In the interest of disclosure: my firm represents people sickened in this outbreak.

Why an independent review is warranted

The outbreak that CDC and FDA tied to shredded iceberg lettuce from Taylor Farms de Mexico closed at 12,883 illnesses, 570 hospitalizations and two deaths in 21 states. CDC declared it over on September 11. FDA closed its investigation on October 2 after finding the parasite in a tank of outgoing wastewater at the processing plant and in a drainage ditch at a grower in its traceback. FDA could not say how the parasite got onto the lettuce.

It is the largest Cyclospora outbreak recorded in the United States. An event of that size calls for an after-action review by an office that can read internal email, pull inspection assignments and interview staff. No such review has been made public.

What the letter gets right

The inspection gap. The Associated Press reported that FDA inspectors reached the Taylor Farms site in Guanajuato in mid-August, about a month after the July 17 recall, and that it was the agency’s first visit there in more than seven years. The senators ask why it took a month and why the facility had gone uninspected since 2019. Both answers are sitting in FDA’s files.

The people behind the inspectors. The letter says the administration removed the support staff who arranged inspectors’ travel, scheduling and paperwork, and it cites FDA’s own data dashboard for the point that 2025 had the lowest inspection count since 2011 outside the pandemic years. In January 2025 the Government Accountability Office made three recommendations on retaining food investigators. The letter says FDA agreed with them and, as of June 2026, had not acted on key parts. An inspector general can confirm or correct each of those statements quickly.

The laboratory and the surveillance network. The letter says the CDC laboratory that responds to Cyclosporaoutbreaks went from eleven people to three last year. Separately, in July 2025 HHS cut FoodNet’s required surveillance list from eight pathogens to two, which made active Cyclospora surveillance optional. HHS has defended that change as removing duplicate work and has said tracking continued through other systems. Secretary Kennedy has called criticism of the response invalid. Those are testable claims, and testing them is what the Inspector General’s office is for.

The influence question. The letter says Taylor Farms “reportedly” met with the White House and made political contributions to change the course of the investigation. What is on the public record is narrower than that. The Wall Street Journal reported that the company called the White House to try to delay the recall. Federal Election Commission records, as ABC News reported, show a $1 million donation from Taylor Fresh Foods to MAGA Inc. in March 2025. The company told ABC that it acts on science and consumer health, “not politics.” That is a news report, a public filing and a denial. Whether any of it moved the date of a recall or an inspection is unknown. I do not assume the answer. I want someone with access to the call logs and email to find it.

Where I would widen the lens

The decline did not start in January 2025. The same AP reporting found FDA’s foreign food inspections down nearly 35 percent since 2019, that the agency was missing its congressionally mandated foreign inspection targets before the pandemic, and that former regulators say Congress never funded those targets. A credible review should cover the whole decade and both branches. That cuts in a useful direction: all three signers sit on the Appropriations Committee, and the remedy for an underfunded inspectorate is written there.

The cases with no food named. As of its September 15 update, CDC’s national case data showed 19,883 laboratory-confirmed domestic cases for the May 1 to August 31 season. The lettuce outbreak accounts for 12,883. That leaves 7,000 confirmed illnesses with no food identified. The letter does not ask about them. The Inspector General should ask what CDC and FDA did to find those sources and whether they had the staff to try.

Traceability. The letter’s seventh question notes that FDA’s Food Traceability Rule now takes effect in July 2028. Its original compliance date was January 2026. A traceback that runs through a processor to several farms in another country is the case the rule was written for. The review should say plainly what the delay cost in this investigation, and Congress should not extend the date again.

Hold hearings, and invite the public

Mr. Bell was confirmed on December 18, 2025, and leads an office of about 1,370 auditors, evaluators and investigators. A request from three senators in the minority does not obligate him to act. When FDA closed its investigation on October 2, I counted fifteen congressional letters about this outbreak with no published answer.

An inspector general’s review, if it comes, will take months and happen behind closed doors. Congress should not wait for it. The committees with jurisdiction over FDA and CDC in both chambers should hold hearings this winter, and the chairs, who hold the gavel and the subpoena, should call them. Food safety has not been a partisan subject for most of my career. The Food Safety Modernization Act passed in 2010 with votes from both parties.

The public belongs in the room. Put the people who were sick at the witness table next to the agency heads, along with state epidemiologists, growers and the company. Hold at least one field hearing in Michigan, where both of the people who died lived. Stream every session and open a record for written statements from anyone who was ill or lost income. I will testify if asked, and I will bring clients who are willing.

What we need to do in the short run: before May 1, 2027

The next Cyclospora season, as CDC defines it, opens May 1. Before then:

Inspector General Bell should open the review and publish its scope and a completion date.

FDA and CDC should answer the thirteen questions in public. None requires an investigation to answer.

HHS should put Cyclospora back on FoodNet’s required list and restaff the CDC parasitology laboratory.

FDA should restore the support staff its inspectors lost and inspect the Mexican iceberg operations that ship here before the season starts.

CDC and FDA should report what they have done to find the source of the 7,000 unexplained cases.

Taylor Farms should publish the independent third-party review that its own information page says its decisions will rest on.

What we need to do in the long run

Set and fund inspection targets for foreign food facilities comparable to the domestic ones, which is the letter’s eighth question.

Hold the traceability date at July 2028 and stop moving it.

Carry out the GAO’s recommendations so that FDA keeps the inspectors it trains.

Fund FDA, CDC and state health department surveillance at the level the job requires, year after year, so that the next response does not depend on who was laid off the year before.

Bring retail produce sampling back, as USDA’s Microbiological Data Program once did, so that contamination is found before thousands of people are sick.

I have been asking the leafy greens industry and its regulators to put me out of the lettuce business. Thirteen answered questions and a public hearing would be a start.

Last summer we had the biggest Cyclospora outbreak in U.S. history. Nobody should have been surprised.

We ignored this parasite for decades, for two reasons. Cyclospora isn’t considered endemic in the United States. And, candidly, it rarely kills anyone. If a pathogen doesn’t make headlines with deaths, it doesn’t get attention, regulation or money

Then came 2026.

The Outbreak We Chose Not to See Coming

By mid-September, CDC had recorded 19,883 laboratory-confirmed cases of cyclosporiasis nationwide. More than 12,000 of them were tied to one outbreak: shredded iceberg lettuce from central Mexico, recalled by Taylor Farms de Mexico and served at Taco Bell. Those are only the confirmed cases. Most people with diarrhea never get tested, so the real number is many times higher.

The recall was enormous, too. At least 3.1 million pounds of lettuce were recalled. The previous record for a Cyclospora recall was about 31,000 pounds of parsley in 2025.

The damage didn’t stop with the sick people, Taco Bell and Taylor Farms. It spread through the whole leafy greens and fresh produce industry. Buyers got nervous. Diners stayed away. Restaurant traffic took a hit. Growers who had nothing to do with central Mexico paid for it anyway, and they’re still paying.

The investigation itself showed how weak our tools are. FDA announced a positive lettuce sample and then took it back the next day as a false positive from a rapid screening test. In the end, FDA found Cyclospora in a wastewater tank at the processing facility and in a drainage ditch at a lettuce farm. But it couldn’t say how the lettuce became contaminated.

That’s the takeaway. The biggest outbreak of this parasite ever recorded ended with nobody able to explain how it happened.

Why This Was Predictable

We’ve seen this movie before. Raspberries from Guatemala in the 1990s. Cilantro from Puebla, Mexico, which was serious enough to earn its own FDA import alert. Salads at McDonald’s and vegetable trays in 2018. Then outbreaks almost every summer since.

The pattern doesn’t change: warm months, fresh produce eaten raw, and a parasite that comes from human feces.

And Taylor Farms has been here before. In the summer of 2013, 631 people in 25 states got Cyclospora, and FDA traced the Iowa and Nebraska cases to bagged salad mix from Taylor Farms de Mexico, served at Olive Garden and Red Lobster. The plant was the company’s facility in San Miguel de Allende, Guanajuato. It’s the same plant that was at the center of the 2026 recall. Same company, same plant, same parasite.

Here’s the part that should stop you cold. Back in 2013, FDA’s environmental assessment couldn’t get a clear read on the plant’s recycled wash water and recommended looking at whether the company should re-evaluate its washing procedures. The company shut down, then reopened after FDA found its conditions met known food safety protocols. There was no recall. Thirteen years later, FDA’s best lead was a wastewater tank at a Taylor Farms de Mexico processing facility.

It didn’t stop in 2013, either. In May 2023, Colorado health officials investigated Cyclospora illnesses among patrons of Taco del Gnar in Ridgway, with the produce supply chain running back to Taylor Farms. No recall then, either. I’ve laid out the company’s full outbreak and recall history here.

Not only a Mexican Problem – A US Problem too

It would be easy to read last summer as a Mexican problem: lettuce grown and shredded in central Mexico, and a foreign supply chain we can blame and inspect. That would be a mistake.

Remember 2020. Fresh Express bagged salads were linked to more than 700 cyclosporiasis cases across 14 states. The salads held iceberg lettuce, red cabbage and carrots, and the suspect farms were here in the US. FDA found Cyclospora in the surface water of a canal near a farm suspected of supplying the red cabbage, and it sent Fresh Express a warning letter. Sound familiar? A ditch in Mexico in 2026, a canal in the US in 2020. Same parasite, same route: human waste in water near the crop.

And this isn’t only an import problem. Researchers have found Cyclospora in samples of domestically grown romaine lettuce and cilantro. Scientists have studied the sources and prevalence of Cyclospora in growing environments in the southeastern U.S., testing irrigation water and sludge. A federal advisory committee, NACMCF, has written a full report on contamination of both domestically grown and imported produce. So “not endemic here” is a comfortable assumption, not a settled fact.

The 2018 season was the wake-up call. That year brought the first detection of Cyclospora on US-grown produce and an outbreak tied to US-grown produce. Researchers then went looking in Georgia. They tested irrigation ponds, packing house dump tanks, portable toilets on farms, and municipal sewage sludge. Cyclospora was confirmed in 9% of wastewater sludge samples, and the human fecal marker HF183 turned up in 33% of irrigation pond samples. USDA-funded scientists have also looked for the parasite in irrigation water in Arizona and Texas, worried about leaky septic systems and broken sewer pipes.

The industry already knows this. As I wrote last summer, the Center for Produce Safety has spent more than $1.6 million since 2014 showing this parasite is here in the US and can be recovered from wastewater and irrigation water. We paid to find the problem. Then we didn’t act on it.

So yes, we need to watch imports. But Cyclospora is homegrown, too, and the fixes have to apply on both sides of the border.

So, what to do before Cyclospora season 2027?

Short-Term Fixes: Deal With Human Feces

Cyclospora is a human fecal parasite. That makes the short-term fix simple to describe, even if it’s hard to do: keep human waste away from the food we eat raw.

Here’s where to start.

Sewage and sewer overflows. We have to look at what’s upstream of the fields: towns without proper sewage treatment, septic systems that fail, and sewers that overflow when it rains. If raw sewage can reach irrigation water, it can reach the lettuce.

Toilets and handwashing for workers. Every farmworker in every field needs a clean, working toilet and a place to wash their hands, close enough that they’ll actually use them. This is about decency as much as food safety.

Irrigation water. Testing water for generic E. coli, which is what the Produce Safety Rule relies on, tells you little about Cyclospora. Water that touches the edible part of the crop during Cyclospora season, in areas with a history of contamination, should be treated or not used.

Wash water. Cyclospora oocysts survive the chlorine levels used in produce wash. Water that gets recirculated can spread contamination instead of removing it. That wastewater tank finding should worry every processor out there. Use single-pass water or controls that have been proven to work.

Foreign Supplier Verification. Importers are already legally required to verify that their foreign suppliers control known hazards. For high-risk produce from high-risk regions during the season, Cyclospora needs to be named as one of those hazards, and importers should have to prove the controls are in place.

None of this applies only to imports. Domestic growers have the same need for toilets, clean water and safe wash systems.

FDA’s Plan, and Where It Falls Short

FDA closed its investigation on October 2 and released a 10-point plan to carry out before the 2027 growing season.

Here’s what FDA promises:

  • An outbreak investigation report with recommendations to prevent the next one.
  • More surveillance of the produce historically linked to Cyclospora.
  • More inspections of importers.
  • Lab capacity in Mexico, so samples can be analyzed there and results come back faster.
  • More outreach to growers, and food safety training with Mexico.
  • An updated Cyclospora Prevention, Response and Research Action Plan.

That’s not nothing. But look at what’s missing.

No root cause. FDA couldn’t gather enough evidence to determine how the lettuce was contaminated, and the plan doesn’t explain it.

No deadlines. The plan gives no deadline for any single step beyond the start of the 2027 season.

No requirements. Surveillance, outreach and training are things FDA does. None of them obligate a grower, a processor or an importer to change anything. There’s no sanitation standard, no wash water rule and no Cyclospora requirement under FSVP.

Nothing domestic. The plan looks south. The science says look here, too.

If we want a different 2027, the rules have to change. Outreach alone won’t do it.

Long-Term Fixes: Pay for the Science

The short-term fixes buy time. The long-term fix is science, and science costs money. Here’s where I’d spend it.

Better, faster testing, shared by FDA, CDC and the state labs. Last summer showed what bad testing costs: a positive result announced and retracted in a day, and no confirmed positive product sample at all. The Georgia study saw qPCR “detections” that sequencing never confirmed, meaning the tests were reacting to something else. Even the NACMCF committee flagged the limits of current PCR methods. We need one validated method that FDA, CDC and every state lab use the same way, plus large-volume water sampling that actually catches oocysts. In an outbreak, the test has to be right the first time and come back in days, not weeks.

A viability test. Right now, we can’t easily tell whether an oocyst we find is alive and infectious. Without that, we can’t validate a single control.

Kill steps that work. What actually inactivates Cyclospora on delicate greens without destroying them? We don’t know. That’s a basic gap.

How oocysts behave in the environment. We still don’t know the basics. How long does an oocyst survive in a ditch, a pond, soil or sludge? How long does it take to mature and become infectious in the heat of a growing season? How does it get from a wastewater tank or a drainage ditch onto a leaf of lettuce: through irrigation, splash, dust or equipment? And since it can’t multiply outside a human, where do the big loads come from, and when? Without those answers, every control we write is a guess.

An animal model or culture method. Cyclospora infects only humans and can’t be grown in a lab. That’s a big reason the science is stuck.

Genotyping and source tracking. FDA and CDC began building a genotype database in 2024. It needs to grow fast, with more samples from food and the environment in both the U.S. and the source countries, so investigators can match sick people to fields.

Mapping domestic risk. We need real surveillance of U.S. growing areas, so we stop assuming the problem is somewhere else.

Where to do it, and who pays. This research belongs in the growing regions themselves: Mexico’s central highlands, Guatemala, and US growing areas like the Southeast, Arizona, Texas and California. It should run through FDA’s labs and CDC, with the state labs, land-grant universities and the Center for Produce Safety, which already funds work on viability, detection and filtration.

What will it cost? Honestly, I don’t know, and neither does anyone else, because nobody has priced it. What I do know is that CDC confirmed nearly 20,000 cases last summer, more than 3 million pounds of lettuce were destroyed, and an entire industry lost the public’s trust. Compared with that, a serious, multi-year research budget is cheap. Congress and the produce industry should share the bill.

The Bottom Line

We knew Cyclospora was out there. We knew it came from human waste. We knew washing didn’t kill it and that our tests were weak. We treated it as a minor, foreign nuisance because it rarely kills people.

Tens of thousands of sick people and a damaged industry later, that bet failed. Fixing toilets, water and wash systems costs money. Research costs money. But last summer cost a lot more.

I have been doing this for nearly 40 years. I have read hundreds of answers to complaints. I have seen boilerplate. I have seen defense lawyers throw everything at the wall to see what sticks.

I have never seen anything like what Nara Organics just filed.

In two federal lawsuits brought on behalf of two babies who came down with infant botulism after drinking Nara’s powdered formula, Nara has pled 61 affirmative defenses in one case and 59 in the other. Sixty-one. And a remarkable number of them point the finger at the people who did nothing wrong: the moms and dads.

The babies

I.N. was born on March 1, 2026, in Olympia, Washington. His mother spent months researching formula before choosing Nara, because she wanted to give her son something “a little better.” He was a vigorous, healthy baby who could lift his head during tummy time.

In late May, he stopped eating. He could not lift his head. He could barely cry. On June 5 he was admitted to Mary Bridge Children’s Hospital in Tacoma, where his parents were told the toxin could weaken the muscles he breathed with and that an intensive care bed was ready if he needed it. He was on oxygen that first night. He was treated with BabyBIG flown in from California. He spent eleven days in the hospital and went home on a feeding tube. The FDA’s whole genome sequencing tied the botulism strain from his own body to a ByHeart patient, ByHeart base powder and four sealed cans of ByHeart formula, all made with milk powder from the same supplier and dryer.

The California Department of Public Health cultured the opened can of Nara formula from his family’s kitchen. It grew Clostridium botulinum type A.

W.G. is the Pennsylvania baby in the same outbreak. He was a healthy two-month-old who lost the strength to hold up his head and then the strength to feed. He went to the pediatric intensive care unit at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, a few points from the threshold for a breathing tube. His stool tested positive for botulinum toxin type A. His parents bought Nara formula at Target and through Nara’s own website.

The CDC declared the Nara outbreak over on August 27, 2026, finding that epidemiologic, traceback and laboratory data showed Nara’s formula was contaminated with C. botulinum and made infants sick. The FDA tied it to the same supply chain as the ByHeart outbreak months earlier: organic whole milk from Organic West Milk, spray dried by Dairy Farmers of America in Fallon, Nevada.

What Nara knew, and when

This is the part that makes my blood boil.

The ByHeart infant botulism outbreak broke in November 2025. By the time the CDC closed it, it counted 28 confirmed and 20 probable cases, 48 hospitalized babies across 17 states. By late January 2026, the FDA had identified whole milk powder as the suspected vehicle, and on January 28 the Associated Press named the suppliers: Organic West and DFA.

Those were Nara’s suppliers too.

By Nara’s own account, it learned from media reports in early 2026 that its milk came from the same supply chain implicated in the largest infant botulism outbreak ever recorded. It “reviewed” the situation. It relied on indicator testing for sulfite-reducing clostridia, not testing for botulism itself. And it decided its formula “could stay on the market.”

It warned no one. Not parents. Not pediatricians.

Nara had already told the world, in its January 7, 2026 launch announcement, that its screening was designed to “identify and prevent contamination from spore-forming bacteria — like those related to botulism.” It knew exactly what the risk was. It said so in a press release.

Both babies were born weeks after the AP named Nara’s suppliers. Both drank that formula from their first weeks of life.

Sixty-one defenses

Now Nara has been sued. And here is what it says.

It says the parents misused the formula. It says the parents altered or modified the formula. It says the parents used it “in contravention of warnings.” It says the parents “knowingly, voluntarily, and willfully assumed any and all risks.” In the Pennsylvania case it says, in so many words, that the parents “were negligent, careless, at fault,” and that their conduct “contribute[d] substantially” to their own baby’s injuries.

What risk did a mother assume when she mixed formula in a bottle? What warning did she ignore? There was no warning. That is the whole point. Nara knew its milk came from the botulism supply chain and chose to say nothing.

It says the parents failed to mitigate their damages. Both families rushed their sons to doctors again and again until someone figured out what was wrong.

It says the babies’ injuries may have been caused by “an allergic, idiosyncratic, or idiopathic reaction,” or by a “pre-existing condition.” The pre-existing condition was being three months old and drinking Nara formula. Infant botulism is not an allergy. It is a toxin made by bacteria in a baby’s gut after the baby swallows the spores.

It says the claims may be barred by the statute of limitations. These babies got sick this past spring.

It even says the parents cannot show they relied on anything Nara told them. Both mothers chose Nara precisely because of what Nara told them: organic, European-made, tested batch by batch, meeting “both U.S. and EU food safety standards, some of the strictest in the world.”

The spoliation defense

The one that really got me is spoliation of evidence. Nara says the families’ claims may be barred because they failed “to preserve evidence.”

Think about that in the Washington case. The Nam family handed their opened can to public health officials, and the state’s laboratory grew botulism from it. They gave three sealed cans from the same lot to the county health department, which sent them to the FDA. That family preserved everything. The evidence they preserved is the evidence that proves the case.

The Goldfins did the same thing they were asked to do: when the health department came, they handed over what they had, down to the residue in their formula dispenser. They had used up the cans bought before their son got sick because they were feeding a baby. That is what formula is for.

“Not foreseeable”

Nara also says the babies’ injuries “were not foreseeable” given “the state of scientific knowledge and state of the art.” That is breathtaking.

By the time these babies were drinking Nara formula, the FDA had written to the entire infant formula industry in 2023 naming C. botulinum as a historical hazard in powdered formula. The ByHeart outbreak had sickened dozens of babies. The FDA had traced it to whole milk powder. The AP had named Nara’s suppliers. And Nara had put botulism in its own press release.

After the outbreak, the FDA’s July 2026 letter to the industry told manufacturers that outbreak investigations “may serve as safety signals” and warned that ignoring or downplaying them can lead to illnesses that could have been avoided. Nara had that signal in January. It looked at it and kept selling.

And in Pennsylvania, Nara says its punitive damages exposure is barred because the formula was made “in accordance with the terms of the Food and Drug Administration’s approval.” The FDA does not approve infant formula. There is no approval.

Blaming everyone but itself

Then there is the crossclaim. In Pennsylvania, while denying it did anything wrong, Nara sued Organic West and DFA, alleging that their “acts, omissions and/or product(s)” were “the primary cause” of the damages.

So, Nara agrees the milk powder was the problem. It just does not want to be the one responsible for selling it to babies after it knew where the powder came from.

I understand that defense lawyers plead defenses to preserve them. I have been on the receiving end of boilerplate my whole career. But there is a difference between preserving a defense and accusing the parents of a paralyzed infant of misusing, altering and assuming the risk of baby formula. Rule 11 requires that defenses have factual support or be likely to have it after discovery. Nara will have to show us the facts behind every one of these. We will be asking. We will also be asking the Court to hold its lawyers accountable.

What this tells us

When the FDA, CDC and two state laboratories have traced your product to a botulism outbreak, and your own supplier sits at the center of an earlier outbreak you knew about, you have a choice. You can own it. Or you can file 61 defenses and blame the parents.

Nara chose the second. Juries in Tacoma and Philadelphia will get to decide what they think of that.

These families did everything right. They researched. They chose what they thought was the safest formula on the market. They fed their sons. And they watched those boys lose the strength to lift their heads.

They deserve better than to be called careless by the company that sold them the can.

On Friday I wrote that the cluster of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) infections at Ohio University had gone from four cases to eleven in two days. It has kept going. WSAZ reported on Monday afternoon, November 16, 2026, that the Athens City-County Health Department now counts 16 confirmed cases, every one of them an Ohio University student. Earlier Monday, WOWK reported 15. The news is ahead of the health department. The department’s own most recent public update, posted to its Facebook page on Friday afternoon, November 13, still says eleven.

That Friday update said the source had not been identified, that staff epidemiologists and environmental health specialists were looking at possible exposures, and that public health nurses were interviewing each student who tested positive about symptoms, onset, food and other exposures. Students who test positive get a call about precautions and about when they can go back to class or work.

What is new, according to WSAZ, is that the department believes the risk of infection is “rapidly declining” and that there is no ongoing contamination. The cause, the station says, is still under investigation.

Those two statements need to be reconciled in public. If no source has been named, on what basis is contamination ruled out as ongoing? There may be a perfectly good answer. If the illness onset dates fall in a narrow window, that is the signature of a point source, a single meal or event, and the window may have closed. If that is what the data show, the department should publish the epidemic curve and say so. On Friday the health commissioner, Carl Ortman, MD, told WOUB, “I anticipate that this is not the end of what we’re seeing.” He was right.

Where the outbreak stands

  • Sixteen confirmed cases as reported by WSAZ on November 16; 15 as reported by WOWK the same day; eleven in the joint release of November 13; four on November 11.
  • All are students on Ohio University’s Athens campus.
  • No source identified. No food, dining hall, restaurant, event, animal or water exposure has been named.
  • No serotype has been made public, and no number has been given for hospitalizations or hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS).
  • The university says it has stepped up cleaning and disinfection, and its food safety staff walked through campus culinary facilities, according to The Post.
  • Thanksgiving is November 26. Students start leaving Athens in about a week.

Who is covering it

The student reporters got there first and have stayed on it. At The Post, Kaitlin Hogg reported the first four cases and Liv Jacobs reported the jump to eleven. WOUB Public Media’s news team got the health commissioner on the record. Gabriel Scotto is covering it for the Athens Messenger, Shahid Meighan for the Columbus Dispatch, and Lydia Taylor for Spectrum News 1. On television, Donovan Varney and Keith Conner of WOWK, WSAZ’s news staff and 10TV in Columbus have carried the counts. Joseph James at Medical Dailywrote a useful piece for students heading home, and Food Safety News, which I publish, has it as well.

What reporters need to know

  • A confirmed count is a floor. It includes only students who felt sick enough to seek care, gave a stool sample and tested positive.
  • The count lags the exposure. Symptoms usually start three to four days after exposure and can take up to ten. A case confirmed today likely reflects something eaten or touched more than a week ago.
  • STEC spreads person to person. In residence halls and shared houses, secondary cases can follow a food exposure and blur the picture.
  • The HUS window is open now. CDC says HUS, the kidney complication, typically shows up about a week after symptoms begin. Students who got sick last week are in that window this week.
  • Sequencing answers two questions. Whole genome sequencing shows whether the students share one strain, and whether that strain matches illnesses elsewhere. A match outside Athens points to a commercially distributed food.
  • Campuses have been here before. In 2008, Michigan State students were part of a multi-county E. coli outbreak traced to lettuce, and more than 400 students answered a case-control survey in under a day. In 2010, a romaine outbreak reached students at Ohio State, Michigan and Daemen College.

What reporters should be asking

  1. What is the serotype, O157:H7 or a non-O157, and which Shiga toxin genes does it carry?
  2. Have isolates gone to the Ohio Department of Health laboratory for sequencing? Do the students match one another? Do they match anyone outside Athens County?
  3. What are the earliest and latest illness onset dates, and will the department release the epidemic curve?
  4. With no source identified, what is the basis for saying there is no ongoing contamination?
  5. How many students have been hospitalized? Has anyone developed HUS? Has anyone been transferred out of Athens for care?
  6. How many probable or suspect cases and pending tests are there beyond the confirmed count? Are there any cases among dining workers, staff or town residents?
  7. Do the students live on campus or off? Which residence halls and dining halls? Have meal plan card records been pulled to show who ate where and when?
  8. Is there a common restaurant, catered event, tailgate, club or Greek function, animal contact or water exposure?
  9. Are well students being asked the same questions, in a case-control study, to see what the sick ate that the well did not?
  10. Have food and environmental samples been collected? Were any food workers ill, and have they been tested?
  11. Have supplier invoices and lot codes been pulled for leafy greens, ground beef, sprouts and other raw produce? Has any state or federal agency been asked to trace product?
  12. What are the Ohio Department of Health and CDC doing? When did the first positive result reach the health department, and how long before the November 11 notice?
  13. What is the plan for Thanksgiving? Will clinicians statewide and the students’ home health departments be told what to look for?
  14. Will the department publish a final report, and will the dining facility inspection records be released under Ohio’s public records law?

If you are a student or a parent

Severe cramps and diarrhea, especially bloody diarrhea, mean a visit to a provider and a request for a stool test. If you are home for the holiday, say you were in Athens. CDC advises against antibiotics and anti-diarrheal medicines for a suspected STEC infection unless a provider directs otherwise. Urinating less, unusual tiredness and loss of color in the cheeks or lower eyelids are reasons to go to an emergency room. The health department’s number is 740-592-4431.